Long Cycles in World Politics

George Modelski

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By the same author

Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993 (*with William R. Thompson*)

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Contents

List of Tables viii

Preface ix

Introduction 1

PART I EXPLAINING LONG CYCLES
1 Concepts 7
2 Data 39
3 Literature 51
4 Narrative 64
5 Learning 99

PART II RAMIFICATIONS OF LONG CYCLES
6 Nation-states 144
7 Party Systems 161
8 Dependency 194

PART III IN CONCLUSION
9 Characteristics of World Leadership 217

Bibliography 234

Index 241

List of Tables

1.1	The modern world system	8
1.2	World population and world system type	21
2.1	Long cycles in global politics	40
2.2	World powers	42
2.3	Global wars	44
2.4	Global war battle deaths	47
2.5	World power populations	49
4.1	Internal and external phases of the long cycle	96
5.1	Global wars and long cycles	102
5.2	LIGA or AGIL?	125
5.3	Phases of the global system	131
6.1	When did the global powers become nation-states?	147
7.1	World powers and party systems	165
8.1	Global lead enterprises	202

Preface

This is the first of three related books on long cycles. As the initial volume, it sets out the framework and the general considerations involved in studying long cycles, and it does this in three ways: it summarises the evidence for believing that long cycles do in fact exist; it offers an explanation cast in the language of political and social system analysis, that proposes that long cycles are a learning process; and it traces and examines the relationships between long cycles and some other global processes.

The two other volumes strengthen the argument by adding to the evidence. *Seapower in Global Politics since 1494* (with William R. Thompson) inventories the world's major navies; but by the same token it is a measurement of fluctuations in the distribution of seapower – an essential ingredient of global politics; its major finding is a surprising regularity in the recurrence of peaks of sea power concentration. *Documenting World Leadership* (with Sylvia Modelski) (forthcoming) is a bouquet of political documents, spanning over five centuries, that show in public language, the goals, aspirations and policies of the powers that exercised leadership in the global political system. Just as seapower concentrations bunch regularly, so do declarations and innovative policies: the words of leadership match the deeds of seapower.

This quantitative and qualitative documentation is offered in such detail because the discussion of patterns in global politics is a matter of surprise to many, and must rest upon substantial backing. The start of this work may be dated to a sabbatical leave taken at Harvard University, at the Center for International Affairs, in 1973–74, during which the idea of long cycles first germinated. A second sabbatical leave from the University of Washington, in 1980–81, spent in part at the Rockefeller Foundation Center at Bellagio, and in Portugal, helped consolidate it. The books now entering publication are the products of reflection, study and research extending over more than a decade.

Acknowledgement must be made of the use in this book of material previously published as papers or articles. The substance of Chapter 9 first appeared in Japanese in the October 1984 issue of *Voice* (Tokyo). Chapter 8 is a substantially revised version of my paper in *North–South Relations* (Praeger Publishers, 1983); and

Chapter 7 is an enlargement of a paper that was written for *Transnational Parties* (University Press of America, 1983); finally, parts of Chapter 6 draw on the article in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (April 1978); others, in Chapter 3, come from my contribution to *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis* (Sage Publications, 1983). The passage, on pp. 171–2, from Henry H. Rowen's *Johan de Witt* is quoted by permission of Princeton University Press.

GEORGE MODELSKI

Introduction

Long cycles offer a new perspective on world politics. They permit the careful exploration of the ways in which world wars have recurred, and lead states such as Britain and the United States have succeeded each other in an orderly manner. They draw attention to the fact that great wars and leading powers were also linked to waves of major innovations, such as the age of discoveries or the industrial revolution, that have made the modern world what it is. They help cultivate a long-term outlook on international affairs.

Students of long cycles believe that major wars and leadership relate to each other in repeating patterns, and that these patterns, in turn, link up to major trends of global development. If they are right, then this insight will introduce order into our thinking about world affairs and by that means will also help to order them; it will help counter the widespread tendency to write off this important department of human affairs as anarchic.

Long cycles are patterns that provide a memory and an operating myth for organising knowledge about past world politics; in this way they also afford a more balanced perspective on a field widely regarded as congenitally conflict-ridden. But a perceived pattern of regularity alone is not enough to give social scientists and practitioners a firm basis for answering the important questions of international relations. To be meaningful, patterns need to be explained and placed in a broader framework.

This book is intended to help build such a framework, and to lead towards an explanation of long cycles. How might this basic task be set in motion?

The first source of support for this study is the literature of International Relations. Pre-modern works of a classic character, such as those of Thucydides and Polybius, still offer relevant discussions of war and leadership; modern literature on the balance of power and on sea power is a fundamental resource of any such undertaking. Since the end of the Second World War, International Relations Theory has emerged as a distinct subfield devoted to clarifying the conceptual, analytical and methodological problems of the discipline. Quincy Wright's *A Study of War* (1942) might conveniently serve to mark its inception. And it is within the theory of International Relations that the present work acquires its meaning.

Second, but not secondarily, this study draws strength from the tradition of the social sciences, as crystallised in particular in the mid-twentieth century writings of Talcott Parsons and, since then, revolving around the concept of 'social system'. The notion of the world as a system is at least as old as Galileo's 'Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems' (1632). More recently, this powerful tool of the natural sciences became useful to students of society, too. In political science and international politics, the notions of political system (Easton) and international system (Kaplan), and in international political economy, the concept of 'modern world system', are by now commonplace. The present work is a complementary and alternative contribution to this thinking; hence it is also located within the social sciences, in world system analysis.

Third, but not least, the most basic resource is historical experience. It is a methodological premise of this study that statements about world politics must be based not on some arbitrary and unrepresentative sample of it, such as the nineteenth century, or the world since 1945 or, worst of all, the news story of yesterday, but on the entire experience of mankind in organising its life on this earth. Much of that experience has been recorded and interpreted by historians and their work has been used freely and gratefully. Some of it, such as might for instance be summarised in statistical series on sea power, is not commonly available from historians and has to be procured independently.

Within the context just defined, the aim of the present study is twofold:

First: to consolidate the findings of observable recurrences into a coherent body of thought focused on the concept of long cycles. Long cycles offer a systematic understanding of the realities of world politics; they can be thought of as a major political process punctuated by great systemic decisions that in the past have taken the form of global wars, but whose regularity can serve as a basis for long-term systemic stability. Long cycles are, in the first place, a conservative process of repetition.

Second: to establish the fact that long cycles are more than mere repetition. Upon close analysis, they are revealed as dynamic phenomena, part and parcel of the rise of modernity. They embody evolutionary development through strategic innovations. That is why this analysis also supports the notion that long cycles are a progressive process of learning.

The book opens with a definition of the phenomenon of long

cycles. Its first chapter reviews the terms that form the core of this study. They centre on the concept of 'global political system', its origins and its components, and they include 'world leadership', 'challenger', 'innovation' and 'modern world system'. The long cycle is shown to be the mode by which the global polity functions through time.

Chapter 2 examines some systematic data bearing on the existence of long cycles, and Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature. A sustained and ordered narrative of long cycles is offered in Chapter 4; its aim is to determine whether the story of global politics does in fact support the present thesis, and to ascertain the extent to which, and the way in which, lead units can be shown to have succeeded each other in a regular fashion and in the context of global warfare.

In Chapter 5, a theoretical argument presents a Parsonian learning model of the long cycle. It supplies what is in fact the driving mechanism of the entire process: the functional requirements of the global polity, and of the global system. This demonstrates a linkage between long cycles of world leadership, the evolution of the global system, and some fundamental concepts and preoccupations of contemporary social science.

Part II of the book shows how and why long cycles are not just a phenomenon of global politics but one that is linked meaningfully, and systematically, to other major social processes and structures. In an attempt to answer the question, How do long cycles interact with other parts of the world system? Chapters 6 to 8 present findings in three fields: those of the growth of nation-states, the rise of party systems, and dependency and dependency reversal. They show that, in the modern period, the world system has been subject, in all of these dimensions, to innovation and learning, mediated in part by the long cycle. On the negative side, the same cycles have also produced, in those same fields, dangerous instabilities.

The analysis next attempts to answer a basic practical question: Who will lead in the next cycle? Chapter 9 shows that this is not an empty question and that the present framework is helpful in gaining insight into it. Briefly put, the answer is that the country (or countries) that has (have) the necessary resources to forward the process of global learning will also be the one(s) most capable of leading the global system. Most importantly it argues that global leadership is not just a matter of power but rather one of bringing the input factors necessary to the 'production' of leadership to bear upon

problems whose solution is expected by members of the global system.

In this manner the present book deals with a crucial political process that combines recurrence with growth. But the interest of the thesis reaches beyond the mechanisms of the long cycle pure and simple, to shed light on a fundamental and frequently ignored dimension of global politics – the temporal one. It asks the basic question of world politics: How does the world function politically at the global level? and replies: In an unexpectedly orderly and possibly even predictable fashion.

This book is a report on work-in-progress that has been underway for the last decade. The questions raised are broad and exciting. Few would deny that knowledge about regularities in international politics could be enormously rewarding. If global wars do indeed recur, who can fail to be concerned about the imminence of the next one? If challengers to the existing order were prominent features of past cycles, how can one not worry about the stability of the contemporary world order? If leadership has been an essential feature of modern world politics, how do we define the responsibilities and problems to be resolved by aspirants to, and occupants of, that position in the coming decades? These are some of the questions that will undoubtedly continue to occupy the attention of students of international relations in the future.

PART I
Explaining Long Cycles

1 Concepts

This chapter spells out the conceptual framework. First and foremost it presents the long cycle as a mode of operation of the global political system. Secondly, it asks the related questions: What is the global political system? What are its chief components? How did it come into existence? It is intended to make it clear that the long cycle is not some 'universal law of history' that may be invoked to explain every kind of phenomenon. Not that there is anything seriously wrong with searching for regularities in the current of human affairs. Nor is there obviously much to be critical about in checking for such uniformities through the historical record.

What does need to be guarded against is the general human propensity to see patterns, including cycles, without taking good care to verify them and in particular to specify the entities whose behaviour they are supposed to describe. The cycle of the seasons is the product of the motions of the earth around the sun. The life-cycle is the mode of operation of all living organisms. The business-cycle is the temporal dimension of an economy. No cycle exists in a haze of 'history'; every 'real' cycle must be referred to the exact system whose operation it may illuminate.

The most important implication of recognising the long cycle as the mode of operation of global politics is to see it as the normal course of structural change in global politics. The long cycle is not the product of abnormality or deviance but rather a consequence of the ordinary working of a large-scale, and a difficult-to-observe, system.

The analysis of long cycles does not purport to explain all there is to know about international affairs. But it is meant to lead to a better understanding of long-run processes of fundamental import that all too frequently tend to be ignored in favour of short-term interests and preoccupations.

WHAT IS THE GLOBAL POLITY?

The global political system (or, for short, the global polity) is a functionally specific set of relationships concerned with a defined range of problems, those attendant upon the organised pursuit of

collective action at the global level. It is a management network centred on the relationship between a lead unit and the contenders for leadership. Like all political systems it is one part politicking and one part policy. The politicking refers to the competition for positions of leadership; policy refers to the goals and methods to be pursued by leadership for collective purposes.

In contemporary conditions the central feature of global politics has been the leadership position established by the United States after the Second World War. A great number of global policies was the result of that leadership: for instance, the elaboration of the framework of international economic co-operation, by measures such as Marshall Aid after 1947, and the creation of international financial institutions. On the other hand, the competition offered by the Soviet Union was the tension underlying these developments. A design for an alternative world order, and an opposition platform, as it were, have been offered by that country for several decades. This relationship between leadership and challenge has been central to post-war international politics.

The global political system needs to be distinguished from the other functional sub-systems of the global system (see Table 1.1). The global economy (sub-system 1 in that table) is comprised of the networks of long-distance and intercontinental economic relations that include trade and multinational corporations. The pattern-maintenance structures at the global level include the media, universities, science and learning (sub-system 4); they maintain and reproduce

Table 1.1 The modern world system

	Functional sub-systems (horizontal differentiation)*			
Levels of interaction (vertical differentiation)	*Economy*	*Polity*	*Societal community*	*Pattern maintenance*
Global	1	2	3	4
Regional	5	6	7	8
National	9	10	11	12
Local	13	14	15	16

* *Source*: Parsons (1971) p. 11.

the network of information and communication on which the persistence of the global system depends. The structures of global community (sub-system 3) are the linkages of solidarity, the alliances and the party-like connections that bind international elites and others concerned with global problems into a social infrastructure of the global system. Like the global polity, the other sub-systems too significantly centre on the country exercising a leadership role.

The global political system (sub-system 2 in Table 1.1) is the topmost political structure of the world system. It is topmost because it is concerned with the longest-range problems of world organisation: the definition and clarification of global problems and of the action (or inaction) that may be appropriate in relation to them. But what it gains in elevation and perspective it loses in terms of being in touch with 'realities' at the grass roots. It needs to penetrate the layers of regional and national organisation before it reaches the true grit of the local level.

For these reasons, among others, global politics needs to be kept distinct from politics of regional (say American), national (e.g. United States) or local (state or city) systems. In the present study the term '*global* politics' is used in this strictly limited sense, and the long cycle is a process of global politics (that is, field 2 solely, in Table 1.1). The term '*world* politics' refers to the politics of the world system as a whole (in terms of Table 1.1, to the entire column, ranging from global to local, under the heading 'polity'). In as much as the long cycle also affects politics at the regional, national and local levels, as for instance in its intermeshing with the work of party-systems (see Chapter 7), its role might be studied in the broader context of world politics. Strictly speaking, though, it is first and above all a process of the *global* polity.

The Global Powers

The units whose patterns of interaction structure the global polity are the global powers. These are the suppliers of order to the global system; they are those capable of acting, and those disposed to act, there; they organise and maintain coalitions and they have a presence in all parts of the world, habitually deploying forces of global reach. Their actions and reactions define the state of politics at the global level.

In the modern world system a useful indicator of capacity for global reach, and therefore also of global power status, has been the

distribution of naval forces. (Modelski and Thompson, 1987). Naval operation on the world ocean is a phenomenon of the past half-millenium and has been engaged in by all powers competing in the global leadership stakes. Sea power has also been a stabiliser of the modern status quo. No state could overthrow the prevailing world order without first establishing a command over the oceans. To chart trends in the distribution of sea power is therefore to map the progress of competition for global status. 'Naval concentration ratios' are good operational indices of the position of global powers and an expression of their aspirations for global standing.

As it is, the global powers constitute a quite limited set of actors. If sea power is used as a yardstick for separating global powers from others (including regional powers), only nine qualify in the entire span of the past five centuries. These are England, France, Portugal and Spain (the four 'founders' of the global system), Netherlands, Russia/Soviet Union, United States, Germany and Japan. These are the powers that for significant periods after 1494 deployed more than just regional (that is, in more than one sea) forces comprising at least 10 per cent of the world's capital warships (the data are reported in the next chapter).

At any one point in time, the set of global powers may contain the following: the world power, the challenger, and a residual category of 'other' global powers.

The world power is the lead unit of the global political system. Militarily it is the one that has attained a temporary superiority in military capacity for global reach. This is military ascendancy of a monopoly character at the global level though not necessarily at any or all regional levels. The ascendancy occurs at the close of a global war and may be regarded as an indication of capacity to lead, organise and support the global system. The world power exercises a position of global leadership (sometimes also referred to as world leadership). The fact of leadership makes the system non-anarchic.

The challenger is the power contesting the issue of global leadership. That competition manifests itself most drastically in global wars, and past global wars have been contests whose organising focus has been one active and prominently 'aggressive' state. This clarity of issues is not in such good evidence in inter-global war periods of general peace; nevertheless, competitive rivalry around the issue of leadership (that is, politicking of the highest order) is inherent in global politics at all times and is partaken in by all global powers or potential global powers.

In the set of global powers, those that are neither the world power nor the clear and recognised challenger will be referred to as other global powers. They are usually those with notable but less substantial capacities for global reach and also with memories of past leadership or with past or future aspirations. For instance, in 1914 the set of global powers comprised six: the 'sitting' world power, Britain; the challenger, Germany; and the other global powers of United States, France, Russia and Japan. By the time the global conflict ran its course, in 1945, the United States had risen to world-power status (with obviously superior naval–air power), the Soviet Union had positioned itself for a challenge, and the others had lost global status, either by defeat – Germany and Japan – or gradually by curtailing their aspirations and reducing global commitments – Britain and France. New global powers could yet arise in the coming decades, for instance if the European Community created a joint military command and common strategic forces, and developed a distinct global role, or if China mounted a credible posture. But at this time of writing the number of global powers is two and is the smallest in the experience of the modern world.

Some other important states that historians and others often refer to as major states must be regarded, in the light of this analysis, as regional powers. One such great military structure was the Ottoman Empire. Situated at the heart of the Euro-Afro-Asian landmass, in a position endowed with much strategic leverage, the Empire lacked a modern understanding of sea power, and in any event failed to keep up with the times by timely innovation. Even at the height of its power in the sixteenth century its range of operations was basically Mediterranean in scope and it never challenged Portugal on the ocean. Despite some helpful later alliances with ascending world powers it gradually withered on the vine. Its great continental opponent, the Hapsburgs' Austrian Monarchy, another prominent regional power, shared a similar fate. Among today's regional powers most observers would probably include, for example, in Latin America: Brazil; and in Asia: India and China.

The concept of global power, and of world power that is derived from it, is used in this study in preference to the conventional one of Great Power. This last is a well-known term of diplomatic usage dating back to early-nineteenth-century practice, and it is intimately linked to the working of the regional European system: the Concert of Europe, the Balance of Power, etc. International historians draw up lists of Great Powers of that period but employ no operational

definition of that term. Political scientists identify Great Powers on the basis of general military capacity, and not just capacity for global reach. In a study that draws a close distinction between global and regional politics, it is important to rely on terms that can become components of clear theoretical propositions and that are also susceptible to operationalisation for the entire period.

COMPONENTS OF THE GLOBAL POLITY

In the spirit of systems analysis, and following the distinctions drawn by Ervin Laszlo (1972, p. 98 ff) for all systems, and for social systems in particular, the global political system is seen to be made up of the following components:

(1) the relationship between the world power and its challenger;
(2) the relationship that sub-system 2 (in terms of Table 1.1) maintains with the (superordinate) global system (1–4), and world system (1–16), and with the (co-ordinate) sub-systems (1, 3, 4) of global economy, community and culture-maintenance;
(3) the regulatory mechanism that governs it; and
(4) the developmental mechanism that accounts for its evolution.

These are the components of the global polity. The first defines the system's identity and qualities, and the important role of leadership. The second accounts for the system's origins, establishes its boundaries and defines the patterns of interactions with other co-ordinate and with superordinate systems. Mechanisms in (3) and (4) are feedback processes wherein the output of one sequence of events creates the conditions for the next. Each will now be discussed in succession.

LEADERSHIP IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Leadership is a role that needs to be filled in the global political system. Global politics generates a demand for leadership, a vacancy, as it were, to be occupied by qualified applicants because the global system needs leadership. A vacancy, in turn, generates competition, and challenge.

Why does the global system need leadership? (i) Because all political systems have it; (ii) because leadership performs a set of

basic functions at the global level; (iii) because the role has been successfully practised in the modern world for the past five centuries.

The Need for Leadership

It may be taken as axiomatic that all social systems have *inter alia* a political sub-system, and that the central role in that political arena is that of leadership (Mitchell, expounding Parsons). In other words, every political system needs leadership, and there is no particular reason to believe that the global polity constitutes an exception to this generalisation.

The global political system is a social system that, given the necessary conditions, allows for the specialisation of functions, including that of leadership. The necessary conditions include those of scale and intensity of interactions. Once a certain threshold is passed, specialisation, and therefore leadership, become inevitable.

The special feature of global politics is the unit that may be called upon to exercise leadership. In ordinary parlance the term 'leadership' refers mostly to functions filled by individuals – men or women elected or appointed or self-selected to roles or offices in political and other systems. The functions of leadership are best illustrated by those attributable to an individual office such as that of the Presidency of the United States. But it is not uncommon also to assign leadership to an organisation, for instance to Congress or to the Supreme Court, on issues in which it has special competence. It is in this latter sense that the onus of leadership may also be placed on nation-states – and in respect of global politics, leadership is primarily exercised by these complex organisations that are the nation-states (and by individuals acting on their behalf). They are the units that provide leadership in global politics.

A contrary view – that is, a view denying the existence of leadership – would hold that world politics is an arena that does not allow for such functional differentiation because the prevailing practice of self-reliance renders every state unwilling to become dependent on the services of others. But even if such were a strong sentiment in many quarters, especially among the larger and more powerful states, the great disparity in the distribution of capacity in the world at large makes it most unlikely that the strong tendency toward specialisation could be negated for long in any social system where the intensity of interaction rises beyond a minimum level.

The practice of naming entire epochs after the leading powers that

distinguished themselves in them confirms the existence of leadership. The nineteenth century is widely known as the age of *Pax Britannica* (an idea too often overshadowed by the imperial Roman connotations of that term). The twentieth has been referred to as the American century, and as it draws to a close the correctness of that appellation becomes increasingly harder to contest. The seventeenth century was the Golden Age of the Dutch, and so forth.

Functions

Leadership cannot be viewed solely or primarily as a display of power or a manifestation of superiority; it must be seen more essentially as the accomplishment of essential services that give impetus and example to the global polity and, eventually, to the entire world system. What are these services? They are, in respect of global politics: (i) agenda formation, (ii) mobilisation, (iii) decision-making, (iv) administration, and (v) innovation.

The first four of these functions are essentially political services, those pertaining to making the global system work. Agenda formation concerns the clarification and definition of global problems and the assignment of priorities. For instance, in order to deny rival powers control over the 'narrow seas', Britain determined, for centuries, that the security of the Low Countries was a high-priority security interest for which it was prepared to go to war, and other states were ready to join her in that evaluation. Similarly, at one point, Britain adopted free trade as the preferred regime of the international economic order, and by example and exhortation succeeded in bringing into it large portions of the global economy. Agenda formation is a function of knowledge and values, and is the product of debates.

Mobilisation refers to the need to create a coalition large enough to serve as the basic infrastructure of world order. This coalitioning capacity is an essential ingredient of leadership. The opportunity for this activity is particularly good prior to, and during, major decisions, but it carries over into post-decision periods. Essential conditions of mobilisation have been a sensitivity to global problems and openness to debate and to the demands of coalition partners.

Decision-making concerns the tests of strength that all political systems undergo periodically and from which new leadership normally emerges. In world politics these systemic decisions have taken the form of global wars: winning such a war and leading a

successful coalition has been, in effect, making a basic decision about the political direction of the global system for a significant period ahead. In the past, the essential conditions of this decision have been military capacity for global war, and in particular sea power (without which no global war could be won, and thanks to which the mobilisation of coalitions could be much more effective).

Administration, finally, refers to implementing a world order once it is established or confirmed by a systemic decision. Much of it concerns the administration of the international economic order, i.e. arrangements for a reliable financial system, stable exchange rates, predictable commercial policies, etc. An active economy is a basic precondition for such administration.

A function of an altogether different dimension is that of leading in global innovation. By definition, one can hardly establish what the nature of this function should be because innovation must remain unpredictable. But experience of modern politics includes cases of leading nation-states undertaking great projects of fundamental innovation, such as Portugal pioneering oceanic navigation, and Britain launching the Industrial Revolution, that moved and reorganised the world and achieved more than a strictly political transformation. Without this kind of basic innovation, linked to leadership, and amounting in essence to the exercise of a teaching role, the world would have been short of evolutionary potential.

Past Experience

As the examples of Portugal and England (and others to be cited later) demonstrate, leadership has been the experience of the modern world system, and that experience can be said to have been, on balance, positive. If there was need for it in the past half-millenium, then that need is also likely to continue into the next century.

It follows from these propositions that the global system needs leadership and experiences a demand for it. But to argue that leadership is wanted is not to say how much of it is demanded at any one point in time. In fact, the demand is likely to be variable. A close look at the functions filled by leadership in the global system suggests that the demand tends to peak around periods of global wars. These are the occasions where the need for global leadership is at its most obvious and the exercise of it most 'natural'. Great systemic decisions stimulate the spectacular achievements that afford the right opportunity for the display of leadership: world-wide military operations,

coalition arrangements defining issues of common interest, great peace settlements that shape the international system for decades to come. At times other than those surrounding global wars, the demand for world leadership becomes less pronounced and the need for it less obvious. International politics is then less sharply focused: the wars are smaller, even though there are more of them; the coalitions are narrower, and more self-interested; no great schemes of reconstruction are afoot. As the urgent problems of the past appear to be resolved, the world settles into a condition that is no more than a welter of clashing rivalries.

Is international competition purely a play of power politics, a brute competition of raw strength? A structural analysis of leadership suggests that strength is indeed an important factor, and that is hardly surprising. But it also shows that brute force alone is not a sure guide to success.

As a general rule, those likely to be successful in the race for world leadership are those who are best suited or best qualified to acquit themselves of its responsibilities. The qualifications for world leadership depend on the functions to be performed. Given that the functions of leadership may be restated as (i) debating, (ii) coalitioning, (iii) effecting decisions, (iv) administering, and (v) innovating, the states that excel in these fields will be likely to be in greatest demand as leaders.

In practical terms (spelled out again in greater detail in Chapter 9) this means that successful candidates will need the following: (i) a secure platform from which to observe and debate the state of the world system and its problems – an insular position has traditionally proved the most advantageous; (ii) a society capable of coalitioning, that is coherent and stable, hence worthy of aligning with, but one that is also open to the world and pluralistic in its internal arrangements, i.e. accustomed to the politics of coalition – an open-democratic predisposition has proved helpful in the past; (iii) a political system with effective forces for global reach (particularly at sea and in the air) at its disposal – traditional sea-powers have been strikingly successful here; (iv) an economy that is of world significance in its lead industries and foreign trade; and (v) capacity to innovate and respond to emerging world problems – a secret ingredient whose precise make-up is hard to know in advance. As this list makes abundantly clear, leadership in this context does not bestow upon its holders the licence to govern other national states or to intervene in their domestic or local politics.

In as much as the ordering of global problems and the performance of global functions respond to world needs and expressed demand, they interest all those who partake of the global interactions. The activities involved in carrying out these functions have the potential for nurturing the common interest, though quite obviously they can also generate conflict. World leadership therefore, in part, consists in exploiting the possibilities for common interest and minimising the areas of conflict. To the extent that it succeeds, such leadership operates in the areas of community formation and is, in the first place, a form of co-operative or innovatively co-operative activity.

If leadership in the world system is the solution to global problems of common interest, then it is a form of specialisation, one form that the division of labour assumes at large. While one nation-state, the world power, thus initially specialises in the production of the bulk of the order created, other units, nation-states, parties, interest groups and associations, households and individuals, become the consumers of this order. The producers and the consumers of global order are the essential components of the structure of world politics and the relations between them are the substance of that process.

Hegemony?

In recent work in international political economy the concept of 'hegemony', as applied for instance to the role of Britain or the United States, is understood principally as one of 'preponderant resources'. For Immanuel Wallerstein, hegemony means 'productive superiority' (1980, p. 38) viewed chiefly in economic terms of agro-industrial, commercial and financial power; military resources seem also to be involved (Holland is regarded by Wallerstein as the 'least plausibly' hegemonic power because it was 'least of all the military giant of its era'), but they seem to play a less central role in the definition. In terms of the present analysis, that particular concept of hegemony must be regarded as excessively reliant upon some aspects of 'supply-side' leadership: those bearing on the resources needed to lead, with special emphasis on politico-economic issues; it ignores the factors of demand and the problems that leadership must cope with; it is therefore conceptually incomplete.

But the term 'hegemony' also has a broader reference. In fact, in its original classical Greek meaning it connoted (personal) leadership, and in the fourth century BC it came to stand for 'leadership under a monarch as a Hegemon' (Ehrenberg, 1964, p. 120), specifically the Macedonian domination of Greece. This association

between hegemony and domination has continued to this day. Its emotional overtones, rather than a literal reading of definitions, therefore suggest a deviant and not a 'normal' form of leadership (in Aristotelian terms, a form of tyranny: that is, a rule to the ruler's advantage but not in the general interest). In so far as the present analysis assumes it to be a normal and necessary function of politics, 'leadership' will be used in preference to 'hegemony'. Such a 'legitimate' concept of leadership in any event does not include the practice of acting in an overbearing fashion or of acquiring domains in an imperial manner. Where such cases occurred, as instanced by large-scale British annexations in India in the nineteenth century, they may be regarded as deviations from the concept of global leadership and as signs of deterioration and decay and not as the essential and constitutive elements of modern world politics.

In the last few pages, much has been said about leadership and not nearly enough about the challengers. This unequal treatment is not to imply that the world-power's role is the only important, or the most important, one in the modern world system. If mankind were divided between those who go roaming on the seas and those who stay at home, there is no general rule that says that those venturing out are more important than those remaining to tend the native hearths. It is in this sense that the contribution of the great land powers who were the principal challengers becomes equal in importance to that of the world powers. The concept of leadership needs to be balanced by serious attention to the role of challenger, because the global political system includes within it as constitutive element the recurrent dualism between lead powers and those who set out to challenge them and to compete with them.

EMERGENCE OF THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

The problem of emergence (and existence) is one aspect of the relationship of the global polity to the systems superordinate to it. The global political system came into existence because the premodern world system became a modern world system and that, in turn, evolved both the global and the national systems of organisation. Long cycles as modes of operation of the global polity therefore are coextensive with the evolution of the global system itself,

yet also closely related to the concurrent evolution of the nation-state.

The origin, and the existence, of the global political system may be accounted for as the result of the conjunction (and disjunction) of the following three processes:

(1) the birth of the modern world system (a world system process);
(2) the vertical differentiation of the two-tier pre-modern world system into a four-layer modern world system (a modern world system process); and
(3) the functional differentiation of the global layer of the modern world system into political and non-political sub-systems (a global system process).

All these surfaced at about 1500. Their joint action produced the global political system. That is why the qualifier 'modern' is redundant and may be omitted; there was no global political system before the onset of the modern world system. Because it all happened around 1500, that point in time is of especial significance for this analysis.

The Modern World System

World politics does not exist in a vacuum, social or otherwise, and must always be seen in a broader context. The study of International Relations is part and parcel of contemporary social science and it cannot be conducted as though the world of states, or the international system, existed in some splendid isolation from the world economy, from world culture, or from the physical environment. The contemporary boom in International Political Economy has been a corrective to this tendency but the full remedy must be even more broadly based, going beyond the relationships between politics and economics. For it is clearly impracticable to discuss, for example, questions of global leadership, without examining the ways in which it might be related not only to world trade regimes but also to other matters that are, in the first place, unpolitical, such as questions of education and knowledge, or those of values and community, that nevertheless need to be systematically related to the study of world politics. In particular, the *functions* of world politics cannot be meaningfully discussed without a clarification of the wider framework they might be serving.

For purposes of this analysis modern world politics will be under-

stood to be one functional sub-system of the modern world system. The modern world system, in turn, is one among the class of social systems known as world systems, namely, null, pre-modern, modern, and post-modern systems.

The World System

World system is an analytical concept in the Parsonian tradition of social system analysis (Parsons 1951, 1966, 1971) and has already been employed in Table 1.1. Even though Talcott Parsons himself did not use that term, world system is a handy analytical tool in that it clarifies and throws into sharp relief certain aspects of social processes and social structures while ignoring others and much else besides. It may be distinguished from such 'concrete' terms as 'the world', the earth, or 'the world's peoples'.

For Parsons, 'social systems are those constituted by states and processes of social interaction among acting units' (1971, p. 7). World systems are social systems constituted by states and processes of social interaction of the human species. The concept of 'world system' is an answer to the questions: How much, and what kind of, social interaction and institutionalisation is there when the world is looked upon as a whole? and, in particular, What is the quality and quantity of interaction at the global level, interaction that is world-spanning and world-significant? The world system is a device for viewing the world's social arrangements as a totality, and for investigating the relationship between world-wide interactions and social arrangements at the regional, national and local levels.

If world system is an answer to the question, How much and what kind of social interaction does the earth space contain? then implied in that question is the possibility that the volume, or intensity, of these interactions is a variable one. In practice, world-significant interactions concern such matters as the diffusion of cultural patterns, long-distance trade, intercontinental migrations, world-wide political arangements and global military operations. These are the substance of world processes and the social institutions that organise them are the grids that hold the whole together. Hence world systems might be classified according to the intensity of world-wide interactions they entertain and according to the strength of the grid that sustains these interactions.

But world systems cannot just be classified in the abstract. Never in the history of mankind has more than one world system been, or

could have been, in existence. A useful classification will therefore be one that reflects the evolutionary propensities of the known world system. On such a basis the following types of world system may be distinguished: null world systems, of no significant world-wide interactions; and pre-modern, modern and post-modern, and in turn these labels might be associated with the scope and intensity of world-wide interactions – low, medium, and high interaction.

This is, of course, a rather general typology. To give it better definition, world systems might be compared and contrasted with ranges of world population size. For, generally speaking, world systems of larger population might be expected to be associated with higher rates of interaction. The world's inhabitants being distributed reasonably evenly over the earth surface, and the surface itself being a constant one, a significant increase in the world's population will in all probability be associated with greater intensity of interactions and higher institutionalisation. Decisive jumps in world population may be measured in orders of magnitude.

Given these distinctions, the evolution of the world's population appears to fall into certain well-marked stages, as shown in Table 1.2. According to McEvedy and Jones (1978, pp. 342, 344), only some five thousand years ago, at around 3000 BC, the inhabitants of the globe may have numbered no more than fourteen million. Only two millenia later, by the year 1000 BC, the progress of the agrarian revolution raised that number to about 50 million. It took two more millenia for that figure to exceed 300 million after 1000. World

Table 1.2 World population and world system type

Date	*World population* (million)*	*World system type*	*World interactions type: (complexity)*
−3000	14	Null	none
−1000	50	Pre-modern	low
+1000	265	Modern	medium
+2000	5000+	Post-modern	high

* *Source*: McEvedy and Jones (1978).

population is expected to pass the 5 billion mark in the 1990s at the latest.

Beyond showing that the world population has grown by three orders of magnitude in the past seven thousand years, Table 1.2 also suggests that distinct world system types might be associated with each of these orders.

It is fairly certain that no regular interactions that could be described as world-wide in significance existed prior to 1000 BC. Such early intercontinental movements as the migrations from Asia into the Americas do not seem to have left behind any lasting connections or records.

The critical turning-point seems to come after that date and leads to what William McNeill has called the 'closure of the Eurasian ecumene' at about 500 BC to 200 AD (1963, p. 322). This was the work of the agrarian empires that had come into existence in China, India, the Near East and the Mediterranean, and to which the world's major religions owe their origin and take-off. These empires initiated a measure of inter-regional contacts: the extension of Chinese control into Central Asia at about 100 BC led to the establishment of a caravan route between China and Central Asia, the famous Silk Road that was gradually extended to the Mediterranean. The extension of Roman control to Egypt consolidated the sea routes between the Middle East, India and China. Yet neither of these two routes remained in full vigour in subsequent centuries, because they were liable to experience political disruption and constituted, in essence, a linear network system resembling a relay race in which the flow of traffic would pass through several intermediaries and contiguous jurisdictions before it reached its final destination. Thus most of the time neither the Silk Road nor its southern variant was a direct traffic route between Eurasia's two major zones of activity, Europe and China, nor did they, of course, incorporate the Americas.

The opening of a direct sea route between Europe, India and China, as well as the discovery of America, both *circa* 1500, transformed this system and drastically raised the intensity of interactions within it (and therefore also its complexity). What was previously a linear system now became a circular network where each node could be reached from many another point. Navigators sailed around the globe, and Europe and China were linked not only by the Indian ocean route but soon also by traffic across the Pacific, via the Manila galleon for Acapulco.

With the development in the twentieth century of radio, aircraft, and orbiting satellites, global networks of interaction are becoming non-planar. The likelihood is of significant structural impact of these developments sometime in the none-too-distant future.

The purpose of this argument has been to suggest the pervasiveness of structural change in the story of the world system. Stages in the growth of the world's population appear to be closely linked with such change but the direction and nature of causal relationships is a more complex matter. The fact of structural change is, however, beyond doubt, and establishes in general terms the modern world system as a type of world system that is distinguished from its predecessor by higher rates of world interactions and higher degrees of complexity. The process of transition from null to pre-modern to modern world system, then, is one of structural change. What is the nature of that change?

This change may best be characterised as successive stages of an evolutionary process. The process is one in which increasingly larger populations have come to occupy the earth space in conditions that, on balance, and over the long haul, have shown increased self-awareness and elaboration of human culture. This is not the place for an extended explanation of that complex phenomenon; suffice it to say that by 1500 the modern world system reached the stage of birth.

Vertical Differentiation

Differentiation is 'one of the main processes of structural change' that constitute 'progressive' evolution to 'higher system levels'. Differentiation is the division of a unit or structure in a social system into two or more units or structures that differ in their characteristics and functional significance for the system. An example is the emergence of government as a specialised organ that is differentiated from the societal community and is at the core of the polity (Parsons, 1971, pp. 26, 16).

In relation to large-scale systemic change, two types of differentiation may be distinguished: vertical and horizontal. The process whereby a global system (a global layer of interactions) and a number of nation-states (systems of interactions at the national level) have emerged has been one of vertical differentiation. The evolution of functional sub-systems of the global system, such as the polity or the international monetary regime, has been a process of horizontal (or

functional) differentiation. The reader may wish to refer back to Table 1.1 in which the global system is composed of functional subsystems 1–4; and the national level of interaction of functional subsystems 9–12.

The characteristic organisational feature of the pre-modern world system was the empire. Classical instances of that type included Rome (with a continuity of some two millenia), the empires of the Middle East including the Assyrian, the Persian, and the Alexandrian, those of India, and Chinese imperial structures of several dynasties including those of the Han and the Tang.

As noticed in particular by anthropologists (e.g. Robert Redfield), the distinguishing feature of these pre-modern ('traditional') societies was a two-tier organisation in which a 'great tradition' of the court, the town and the nobility coexisted side by side with the 'little traditions' of village peasantry (Modelski, 1961).

The most notable feature of modern world organisation is the evolution of this rather simple high–low differentiation into a more complex arrangement. The two-layer pattern has subdivided into a four-layer structure. The high-culture tier of the great tradition has split into two: the regional systems that in significant ways continue the frameworks, with strong cultural overtones, of the earlier imperial systems, such as the Chinese, or the Indian, or the Middle Eastern, or European; and the global system that is the creation of the past few centuries. The low-culture tier may be said to have partitioned too: into the local systems of large number and great variety, and the newer national systems. The result is a world system that with increasing clarity may be seen as being composed of four distinct though obviously interacting layers: local, national, regional, and global.

Again, it is beyond the scope of this analysis to advance a full explanation. It may be said, though, that this process, too, is broadly evolutionary because it is a process of the modern world system creative of new types of community; it, too, became notable after 1500 and has been closely linked to the long cycle, possibly having run its main course in the twentieth century.

National Systems

One side of the coin of vertical differentiation is therefore the emergence of the national systems of interaction (this theme will be taken up again in Chapter 6). In Europe, the first nation-states emerged

on the fringes of the Holy Roman Empire. In China, India and the Near East they arose, too, out of pre-modern imperial structures, and also out of modern colonial systems.

Nation-states are the political organisations of the second level of interaction, intermediate between the local and the regional levels. They are founded upon a societal community, that is not unlike that of a classic city-state of antiquity, such as Athens, but are usually larger, more populous and more inclusive than most city-states used to be. Functioning federal states such as the United States or Australia are nation-states where the differentiation between national and local levels of interaction have been most clearly defined; they are therefore more experienced in systematically differentiating levels of world system interactions.

The Global System

The principal characteristic of the pre-modern world system was its lack of a global system of interactions, and consequent want, and need, of institutionalisation in that respect. The principal political structure was the imperial system engaging in, at most, inter-regional relations (for instance, in the classical period, trade between China and India). Such long-distance and inter-continental interactions as there were occurred sporadically and between abutting regions of the world, for instance *circa* 1000 AD in the Mediterranean, between the Moslem and the Christian worlds as mediated by the Byzantine and the Ommayad Empires; but they were not a regular or constitutive feature of the world system.

The oceanic voyages at about 1500 created that global layer of interdependence that should be called the global system (Modelski, 1972, ch. 3). It is a system of diverse interactions that attends to vital problems of international security and economic relations; it also lends itself to control that can be differentiated from territorial rule in various primary areas. This last is a crucial point, for it makes possible non-imperial systems for global governance, and renders imperial-type arrangements redundant. The first time this basic insight occurred was at the very beginning of the modern period, in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas that created a new global political regime for the oceanic system without touching upon, or interfering with, national territorial arrangements.

The global layer of interaction and its chief institutional forms are still basically oceanic, though now also substantially air- and space-

oriented. As already noted, the core of that layer is the role of world leadership, and the occupant of that role, the world power. The functions of leadership cluster here, together with the attention to global problems, the focus of global debate, and the heart of world solidarity. So do the lead economy, world trade and finance, and the global deterrent forces. But the global system does, of course, extend much beyond the lead unit and includes, in particular, the past world powers, the winning coalition of the last global test of strength, and the emerging principal challenger.

In this light, the evolution of the global system, including the institutions for its regulation centred on the world power, constitute a case of partial differentiation of global functions in the world system. It is a case of differentiation because the global system is clearly distinct from systems at the national level of interaction. Specifically, the problems of operating the global deterrent or of stabilising the international debt system are vastly different, for most countries, from the problem of safeguarding national frontiers or that of balancing the national budget or managing a national corporation. But it is also a case of only partial differentiation because a world power is at the same time also a nation-state, and global functions are not fully distinguished from national ones. The division of functions becomes particularly problematic for such office-holders as the President of the United States, or such bodies as the British Parliament in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, over the entire course of the global system it was certain nation-states that were the units performing the most vital global functions.

Functional Sub-Systems

Given the creation of the global system, the emergence of a global political system as a distinct sub-system must be accounted for as a process of functional differentiation. The case most crucial to this analysis has been that of the global polity as a specialised sub-system of the global system built around the world power. In the global perspective this is a case of a nation-state specialising in global political and other functions. As noted, this represents the successful evolution of a global governmental-type function that is distinct from the diffuse imperial role, and in which the possibility exists of greater separability between global and national functions.

Over time, and within the global system, certain clusters of functions also differentiate into special international regimes. Thus the

governance of the oceans – early on, the exclusive prerogative of the world power (as in the case of Portugal, in an arrangement with Spain) – has gradually evolved a more complex regime wherein many nations participate and exercise control over such aspects of it as fishing, deep-sea mining, or pollution. Three hundred years ago the international financial system was the concern of little more than a handful of Amsterdam bankers; more recently it is the focus of a complex network run by two major international institutions based on one in Washington, one in Switzerland, regular meetings of the world's finance ministers, the international banking community, and various other participants. The rise of certain specialised international regimes amounts to a differentiation of functions earlier monopolised by the world power alone; but it is too early yet to dismiss the role of the world power in international regimes for that role remains a most significant one.

Equally significant are the non-political areas of functional differentiation at the global level. The rise of a global economy centres first on the lead economy and its lead industries, and on the metropolitan cities that from Venice to New York were the active zones of the international economy. Parsonian 'pattern-maintenance' and the infrastructure of knowledge are under the care of the world's media and academies. The global community has become the province of gradually expanding international elite networks, in the custody of more than just international lawyers. In each case a certain degree of autonomy runs parallel with functional differentiation.

The trend of the past five hundred years has been a notable growth in the distinctiveness of the functional sub-systems at the global level. In the case of Portugal *circa* 1510, such differentiation could hardly be noticed at all. The King of Portugal was not only pre-eminent in the politico-strategic matters, directing the movement of fleets, the establishment of bases, and the administration of the entire structure, but he also was the monopoly trader of the main commodity (spices) and also controlled the movement of people and the organisation of religion. His hold over the circulation of information about the discoveries was exceedingly strong and effective.

As time passed, and the world powers came and went, knowledge diffused, and functional specialisation rose too. The first major instance of it might have been the creation of the Dutch East India Company as an organisation distinct from the political system and pursuing its own economic goals at the global level. Its links to the Dutch political establishment were in fact quite close, but its

formation, followed by that of the West India Company, in the context of vigorous other economic activity, marked a turning-point toward increased functional autonomy in the future. The differentiation of navies from other forces, and most recently of strategic, including nuclear, forces from others in the defence structures of the major powers, are among other developments leading in that direction. Overall, however, functional differentiation is as yet incomplete, as is the vertical differentiation between national- and global-level functions.

In sum, therefore, the global political system is a fairly though by no means fully differentiated sub-system of the global system that is in turn a partially differentiated sub-system of the modern world system. It is the global political system that generates a demand for global leadership. The degree of differentiation is, as noted, partial but is sufficient to permit the exercise of leadership.

Given these developments it would not be surprising for a modern world system with a demand for leadership at the global level and a supply of nation-states suitable as candidates for the position, to develop rivalries and conflicts around it (the motivation for entering into competition for global leadership is hardly a mystery), together with regular though widely spaced opportunities for deciding the question. Given such evolutionary trends it would not be surprising for the modern system to have a capacity for long cycles (which the pre-modern system did not have). Arnold Toynbee (1954, p. 260 ff) argued the existence of war–peace cycles in the post-Alexandrine and in the Sinic worlds but these could hardly be described as global cycles. Nor would it be surprising for such an evolutionary system to have potential for learning – that is, capacity for systemic, hence predictable, change.

Overall, then, the emergence of the global political system may be explained as the product of evolutionary trends actuating systems superordinate to it. These trends, too, account for the appearance of long cycles.

REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT

So much for identity, and boundaries. They name, and frame, the global polity. But what makes it move?

According to Laszlo, all social systems move by the action of two

sets of mechanism: that of regulation, and that of development. The first is a control process and explains stability; the second is a growth process and explains change. Both embody feedback, in that some of the effects (or output) of the process, constituting information, return to the earlier stage (or input) of the process so as to modify or reinforce it. The information reports discrepancies between the actual and the intended or purported operation and leads to self-correcting action that can be utilised in improving the functioning of the social system. The regulatory or control process constitutes negative feedback: the returning output serves to decrease the amplitude of oscillations of a system and keeps such oscillations within limits. The thermostat of a heating system is the model of negative feedback. The developmental or growth process is positive feedback: the returning output is such that is serves to increase the amplitude of the process. Population or economic growth are types of positive-feedback process.

A view of the social system, and therefore also of the global political system, as propelled by feedback mechanisms, has two implications for this analysis:

(1) all systems cycle (because they all embody feedback); and
(2) the cycle of the global polity comprises both negative and positive feedback.

Systems Cycle

If all systems feed back, then they all must cycle. To analyse feedback is to look into essential processes of self-regulation. To look into self-regulation is to look at the operation of social systems over time. The task of the analyst is not to 'prove' that they cycle but rather to develop a persuasive account of how they cycle.

If cycling is the mode of operation of social systems over time then it would be unreasonable to expect such systems to function over time in some uniform or homogeneous fashion. More reasonable would be the expectation that complexes of specialised sub-systems will, as ongoing processes, also specialise over time, that different sequences of the system's operation would have different and in some way definable properties. In other words, the time dimension of the systems must be just as differentiated as its vertical or horizontal structure.

Take, for instance, the Presidential cycle of American politics. It

has a very clear structure in which each of the four years constitutes a distinctive phase. The election year is the high point of the entire process: it is the year of the decisive trial of strength, albeit conducted through the ballot box, yet by means of vigorous, well-financed and prolonged campaigns. This intense phase of political combat is followed by a honeymoon period that presents the optimum conditions for the implementation of new programmes. The off-year election year serves as a means for mid-course corrections and of testing the waters for new issues and ideas. The fourth year of the cycle sees the rise of competitors and of new coalitions and raises the spectre of a lame-duck presidency that can only be resolved by a new election campaign.

Such divisions in the time structure of the operation of a system may be described as *phases*. Complex systems move through time in variegated form. Phase-movement, the process whereby a system moves through a sequence of phases, is a form of system differentiation through time. The long cycle, as the process by which the global political system moves through time, thus becomes the basic temporal unit of that system, and in turn passes through a distinct and regular succession of events. The dictionary definition of a cycle is that of an 'interval of time during which one sequence of a regularly scheduled succession of events is completed'. Such a sequence cannot be random but is an ordered one and its ordering is an aspect of the structure of the entire system. The principal events of the long cycle are its phases. Earlier on it has been argued that the functional subdivisions of the social system are four; it may now be conjectured that the essential temporal structure of the long cycle is similarly fourfold.

If a sequence of events is a regular one then its internal structure is also likely to be regular, driven by simple but basic forces. Consider the long cycle as a political process that is driven by a pair of basic variables; then it is not difficult to see it as passing through four regular phases. If the relevant variables are 'preference for order' (or demand for leadership) and 'availability of order' (or supply of leadership), then any given political system is unlikely at any one time to achieve a precise match between them but more likely to fluctuate or oscillate and in the process pass through the following four (systemic) phases.

Phase (1) may be seen as one of intense political conflict such as a *global war* in which the preference for order reaches exceptional heights but is hard to meet given the conditions of general disorder.

Cycle phase	Preference for order	Availability of order
(1)	high	low
(2)	high	high
(3)	low	high
(4)	low	low

A resolution of the question at issue through a systemic decision and a major trial of strength (which is global war) initiates phase (2) where order is achieved (that is, the volume of it enjoyed by its consumers is high) at a time when the preferences for it are still high. Because the bulk of this order is the product of world leadership, this phase may be called that of *world power*. However, the experience of a plenitude of security erodes the high priority given to it and this decline may be described as the stage of *delegitimation* (3). That, in turn, inevitably produces a situation where low preference for order (and rising preference for alternative social goods, such as wealth or knowledge) also induces a decline in the supply of order, and the system reaches a position of *deconcentration* (4) where both the availability of order and the demand for it are at an all-time low; the high levels of concentration marking the world-power phase have given way to lower degrees of power concentration. Conditions are in place for the cycle to start all over again, for this is precisely the situation in which another systemic decision is called for, at (1) (global war).

Bearing in mind that the relevant preferences for 'order' (i.e. the services of leadership) are those of the acting units of the global system (the consumers, and in particular the elites and the publics of the world power, the challengers, and their respective allies), and assuming that the supply of order is some function of the potential of the producers (again the world power and its allies, and the principal challengers, that is the global powers in particular), then the abstract model just described appears entirely plausible and easily fits into a four-phase scenario.

More concretely still, it is possible to think of the demand for order as being the function of generational change, as declining with the changing experience of the age cohorts; and to see the supply of order as the function of the resources available to the world power, in particular the resources of global reach derived from sea power and seen as a share of the world total.

Double Feedback

The idea that international relations may be regarded as a cybernetic – that is, self-steering – system, is not new. The post-1945 surge in systemic analysis produced a number of such interpretations. Two notable early attempts that might be singled out are Morton Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics* (1957) and Richard Rosecrance's *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (1963). Both took off from Ross Ashby's ideas of regulation and proceeded to interpret classical doctrines of the balance of power as negative-feedback processes. In his discussion of models of government, Karl Deutsch (1963, ch. 11) included both negative and positive (amplifying) feedback, and pointed out that 'in its application to politics the feedback concept permits a more sophisticated approach' including a wider range of analysis and measurement 'than does the traditional mechanistic concept of equilibrium'.

It is suggested here that the analysis of the global political system in relation to long cycles might usefully include the mechanisms both of negative and of positive feedback. The negative-feedback system is indeed the classical process of power-balancing. But that process must be combined in a necessary relationship with positive feedbacks of development – both narrowly political development and more broadly understood global development. This means that world-wide political tendencies cannot be understood other than as part of wider processes responding to global problems. This linkage not only makes sense because that is how the world surely works, but also because, theoretically speaking, the political system must be seen as linked to its superordinate systems in a clear fashion. No longer can international politics seem to be suspended in a vacuum; it is part and parcel of the workings of the entire world system.

The Balancing of Power

Generations of students have viewed the balancing of power as the very essence of world politics. Indeed this can be described as a regulatory process because it is in fact a negative-feedback mechanism. For global politics, information about a rise in tension created by change and friction leads to a sustained attention to problems of order and stability and, in the end, to a cutback on activities that have aroused fears of systemic danger.

This may loosely be described as the balancing mechanism of the

long cycle. It works roughly as follows. A challenger to the status quo creates a systemic perception of threats (that constitute negative problems for the system). On past experience these threats have been closely bound up with the stability of a critical region of the world system (Italy, then the Low Countries, finally Western Europe as a whole, and at present possibly Western Europe together with Japan). They have also concerned the accomplishment of major systemic tasks such as conserving the fruits of the discoveries, resolving religious wars, or leading the industrial revolution. Challengers have usually been seen as threatening because of being centrally situated and continental, capable of exerting pressure in several directions, and needing to be contained by a far-flung coalition.

This information input (or threat perception) has operated as the cement that binds a variety of states in forms such as core alliances (between the old and the emerging world power), or the general coalitions, in particular those that fought in the bouts of major warfare. It has been the experience of the past five centuries of global warfare that the continental challengers (Spain, France, Germany) invariably succumbed to a general coalition co-ordinated by the world power and basically oceanic in orientation. The challenger was usually isolated internationally and claimed being encircled and surrounded.

The oceanic coalition has been notable for the reliability of its victory, and also for the fact of its eventual breakup or fracture. One of the key members of that coalition ultimately leaves the winning side and assumes the role of challenger in the next major round of the long cycle, ending up in the role of opponent in the coming global war. Brandenburg-Prussia, for instance, fought in the Dutch-led coalition against Spain, and in the next two global wars played a critical role in the alliances against France. But in the nineteenth century it became the core of the new German state and as such fought The First and Second World Wars on the other side of the great oceanic–continental divide. Russia belonged to the oceanic coalition through three global wars but may now have become a prime challenger to the United States, if only because the number of global powers in this cycle has been reduced to two.

Systemic Development

The long cycle of global politics is the major rhythm of the modern world; its mechanism is the regulatory process or negative feedback. Other systems and sub-systems might have their own distinct regularities and repetitions but the long cycle's is assuredly most visible, with its product, the succession of world powers, a glittering, if perhaps vainglorious, pageant.

As a rhythm the long cycle is not a merely mechanical process of regulation and control. It is in fact more akin to a heartbeat, suggestive of the pulsations of a living, growing system, one capable of renewal, even self-correction, one that goes beyond the dimension of biological time into that of social time, the spacing of the social processes by the rites of passage of the world system. The major event clusters of the cycle, the global war campaigns and the celebrated settlements, the ceremonial observances of the great nations, and the passing into obscurity of others, these make up the rituals of world politics. They are the key markers of world time. For a world power, the performance of the expected function of leadership may be in itself the accomplishment of a ritual act, beginning with the birth of a nation, through its maturing in adversity (internal and external), the consummation of alliances and assumption of leadership, and the commemoration of its achievements, each age accompanied by appropriate observances.

If the rhythm of the long cycle gives it form, what might the substance be? Several elements in the discussion so far suggest that it might be more than a mere replacement of one power by another, important though that process might be for the powers in question. There is a strong suggestion that the ubiquitous companion of the long cycle is political and social development.

Consider the modern world system as a generator of such change. We have already observed how the processes of vertical and functional differentiation brought in their train profound social transformations, including the emergence of nation-states, the creation of global networks, and the rise of powerful economies. This systemic evolution was more than mere increase in size; it also involved rising complexity due to improved organisation.

Consider also the role of global leadership. It is more than just caretaking or management. Substantial elements of it are creative: through a response to new problems and the handling of innovations it resembles in part a teaching role, the role of enhancing capacity

for dealing with new situations, and cumulating that capacity for the future.

This makes it possible to view the long cycle as a process of cumulative change in which each generation contributes its share to a common enterprise and in which cross-generational learning (one generation learning from the experience and the mistakes and difficulties of its predecessors) builds up skills and resources and, in turn, the motivation for increasingly complex political projects, not only for the world powers but for the system as a whole.

If these considerations have any merit they point to the likelihood that the long cycle (because it is a positive feedback process) is also a mechanism of political and social development, effecting political change and global innovation. As such, it, in its turn, requires regulation. All development is an exponential process that cannot continue unchecked for ever, and that from time to time needs either dampening or rechanelling in order that it might not 'run away'. Because the process feeds upon itself, each completed cycle creates the conditions for yet higher performance in the next, in a potentially explosive chain reaction. It cannot go on without end and calls for regulation by means of negative feedback.

In the developmental process the first stage is that of new information, a clarification of the situation and a resetting of the agenda with active participation of the media. As the problem is laid out and defined, learning occurs and innovations are proposed. A stage of coalitioning follows in which the innovators develop a constituency and enter into political and social alignments with old and new social interests. What is then needed is a systemic decision process that ratifies and approves, and then diffuses as legitimate for the entire system the products of that innovation. In the past five cycles this systemic decision has taken the form of global war that selected and confirmed world leadership and by implication the innovations that leadership was identified with (e.g. the Netherlands, against Philip II who tried to put the clock back on religious reform, or Louis XIV who tried to remake England into his own absolutist image).

Global War as Systemic Decision

The long cycle, then, consists of two major processes, each of which passes through distinct phases. The balancing process opens with

systemic threats, passes through coalition-building and global war and ultimately generates a new challenger. The developmental process opens with the perception of new global problems, and moves on to innovations and a systemic decision by means of a global war to select world leadership to deal with these problems.

The long cycle is therefore not one simple process, but a summation of two feedback processes. Each of the four phases discussed earlier in this section is also the sum of the phases of these two processes. How might these be synchronised and co-ordinated?

The short answer is that the most direct coupling between the regulatory and the developmental process has been the global war. This spectacular event is well suited to the task of punctuating social processes. Its functional significance is that of a systemic (or macro-) decision.

A global war is a decision to fill (and unfill) the position of leadership in the global political system. It is a 'decision' in the Lasswell–Kaplan (1950, p. 74) meaning of that critical term – as an 'effective determination' of a 'policy involving severe sanctions (deprivations)'. This is quintessential politics, the central process of the global political system. It marks the advent to leadership of a successful world power, and the exit of a retiring one, and it is a process that involves sanctions and deprivations in the sense of creating not only winners but also losers.

On five previous occasions in the modern era this mechanism has assumed the form of global war. But if the object of the procedure is to decide upon the question of leadership for the global polity, then the massive violence required by a global war is just one way in which that object may be attained. Tests of strength as means of decision-making can range all the way from global war threatening the survival of mankind to political coup, civil war, election, one-on-one combat, and various sorts of symbolic and simulated contest. The concept of long cycle is compatible with types of macro-decision other than global war.

Viewed as a sequence of events, the long cycle is an interval of time comprising a global war (a systemic decision) followed by a longer period of general peace. The global-war phase is basic to thinking about long cycles; it is the trial-by-fire that decides the issue of leadership during, and around, which the demand for leadership is at its highest and the function of leadership most sharply defined and clearly understood. Global war is a system process that is persistent, pervasive and participated in by all the global powers; it

is constitutive of new political arrangements and basic innovations and firm in its primacy over all other concurrent events and processes. It is the noise-maker and the fire-cracker of the world system.

The global war contrasts sharply with the substantial period of general peace that follows it. General peace at the global level is entirely compatible with wars at regional, national and local levels, in a variety of areas and at diverse times. The Korean (1950–53) and Vietnam (1965–75) wars, for instance, or more recently the Iraq–Iran war, were localised affairs that did not disturb the general peace of the world. General peace is the period during which social priorities (other than political) can be and are maximised, at least at the global level (in which world trade, for example, flourishes). This period could be expected to be longer than that of flobal war, and is one of gradual though slow evolution.

Viewed from the vantage point of a 'sitting' world power, the general-peace period is one of eroding leadership. The passage of time brings decreasing influence and weakening capacity. From the viewpoint of its competitors, however, and especially as it appears to the ascending world power, this is a period of rising confidence, avowal of strength, boisterous nationalism, and generally one of preparation for greatness. Either way, the interval is not short but measured in decades.

Are global wars macro-decisions in the sense that they are decisions of the global political system? Or is this uncalled-for reification?

Consider a national election. It is a process by which millions of individual voters choose a new government. Individually, these decisions are of small significance. Jointly, they add up to a national decision – for instance, for or against a candidate – that is binding on the system, and a decision that can be discussed apart from the individual decisions composing it. Global war needs to be regarded in a similar light. It is made up of a large number of organisational and individual decisions as to which side to join, and its results remain binding on the global system for much longer than a national election. It becomes a property of the global system and assumes a status that is independent of the individual decisions that brought it about. It is in that sense that it must be understood as central to global politics, just as critical elections (and other systemic decisions, such as coups) are central to other types of political system, and market processes are central to economics.

This chapter has proposed a 'systemic' model for the study of long cycles. Repetitive and noisy, but also innovative, long cycles are precisely how a large, living, though not fully formed, political system may be expected to behave. The model uses vertical (functional or Parsonian) and horizontal (layered) differentiation to explain the origin of a system of global politics. It employs temporal differentiation of the process into phases to account for the structuring of global politics over time. Chapter 2 confronts the model with some systematic data.

2 Data

In the terms just described the long cycle defines the time dimension of the global political system; more specifically, it shows the sequence and character of the phases to be expected in that process.

Does experience bear out these expectations? Does the world system exhibit long-range cyclical behaviour that includes a succession of world powers, and regular global wars that can be understood as systemic decisions? Does it, moreover, show developmental tendencies such that the cycles become more distinct and the system more clearly differentiated? Absence of these would falsify the theory; their presence would tend to reinforce it. What is the evidence?

EVIDENCE FOR REGULARITY

A principal exhibit is Table 2.1 in which global politics of the past half-millenium is succinctly summarised in a few lines of data. This is a basic representation of the long cycle as viewed from the perspective of the global system. Each row of that table describes one long cycle, with emphasis on the roles of challenger and world power. Each column points to structural similarities between the several cycles. The world-power entry of one cycle and the challenger of the preceding cycle (e.g. United States, and Germany) show the principal contestants of the global war of that cycle. The world-power and the challenger columns of each cycle (e.g. Britain II, and Germany) viewed jointly suggest the principal political relationships of the phases of delegitimation and deconcentration.

This 'periodic' table is a basic tool for the study of long cycles. Not only is it an economical summary of a vast array of information; it draws attention to the identities of the principal players and the character of phases of the process. By extension it also invites predictive uses.

The full story of the rise to leadership of certain nation-states is recounted at some length in Chapter 4: it details how in the past 500 years Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain (over a long period in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) and the United States, did in fact succeed one another in the exercise of global leadership and

Table 2.1 Long cycles in global politics (systemic mode)

Global war	*Phases* *World power*	*Delegitimation*	*Deconcentration*
Major warfare	*Nation-state*		*Challenger*
	Portuguese cycle		
1494–1516	1516–1539	1540–1560	1560–1580
Italian and Indian	Portugal		
Ocean wars			Spain
	Dutch cycle		
1580–1609	1609–1639	1640–1660	1660–1688
Spanish–Dutch war	Netherlands		France
	First British cycle		
1688–1713	1714–1739	1740–1763	1764–1792
Wars of Louis XIV	Britain I		France
	Second British cycle		
1792–1815	1815–1849	1850–73	1874–1914
Wars of French	Britain II		
Revolution and			
Napoleon			Germany
	American cycle		
1914–1945	1945–1973	1973–2000	2000–2030
World Wars I & II	United States		Soviet Union

did, by and large, perform the functions that could be expected of them: agenda formation, coalitioning, decision-making, administration, and innovation. Their main opponents, Spain, France and Germany, did not play such a role and did not fulfil these functions. The next few tables supply additional systematic data both about the world powers and about the systemic decision by which they reached their position.

EVIDENCE FOR LEADERSHIP

Grounds for asserting that global leadership was in fact exercised may be reviewed under several headings.

(1) *World powers.* There is a good scholarly consensus on this list of lead states. Contemporary students of international political economy are virtually unanimous in agreeing that the United States and nineteenth-century Britain meet the criteria of leadership status.

Some would also accord such 'hegemonic' rank to the Netherlands. There is disagreement about Portugal being placed on the list and about Britain's role in the eighteenth century. Gilpin (1981, p. 145) questions the leadership of the Netherlands and Portugal. Bousquet (1980), Chase-Dunn (1981) and Wallerstein (1980) would include the Netherlands but not Portugal, and they conceptualise Britain's early position in a way that suggests one sustained hegemonic period rather than two cycles. A full discussion of Portugal's claim to world-power status may be found in Modelski and Thompson (1987, ch. 7).

(2) *Data on sea-power distributions*. From 1500 onward, ocean-power (and more recently a combination of sea- and air-power) has been a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of leadership; it has been a requisite of global status because it is the means by which global reach can be exercised: without it global wars could not be won and would likely be lost. Table 2.2, 'World Powers', lists the states so named in Table 2.1 above, and the years in which they may be documented as having held a monopoly of sea-power usable for global operations.

The data attesting to 'oceanic supremacy' is based on an extensive year-by-year survey of the naval inventories of all the world countries having a capacity for oceanic action, for the entire period since 1494 (Modelski and Thompson, 1987). A naval concentration ratio of 0.5 or over is deemed to confer a virtual monopoly of ocean-power because it means that its holder controls one-half or more of the world's assets in capital ships. This means that it could take on all the world's navies combined and still expect to win where it counts, in decisive confrontation. In practice, that ratio could be even more favourable because some of the other navies would probably be allied. Capital ships (that is, as applicable, great ships, galleons, ships of the line, battleships, aircraft carriers, missile submarines) alone are counted because they have been the true measure of sea-power in the past half-millenium, no matter how dangerous other forms of sea-power (such as privateering or anti-ship submarines) may at times have appeared.

Table 2.2 shows that, as predicted by theory and confirmed by narrative and other general evidence, the world powers are those powers that have held (each in its turn) oceanic supremacy for substantial periods. Portugal, which many disregard as a significant power, shows notable oceanic potential nevertheless; this resided mainly in the command of much of the Atlantic and of the Indian

Table 2.2 World powers

World power	*Oceanic supremacy**	*Occasion for global leadership****
Portugal	1502–1544	1449 Treaty of Tordesillas 1499 Manuel uses title of 'Lord of Conquest, Navigation and Commerce'
Netherlands	1608–1642**	1601 VOC (East Indies Co.) established 1608 Mare liberum
Britain I	1719–1723	1689 Anglo-Dutch alliance 1701 William III to Parliament: 'hold the balance of Europe'
Britain II	1809–1890**	1793 Pitt leads coalition against France
United States	1944–	(1918) Wilson's 14 Points 1941 Atlantic Charter 1947 Truman Doctrine

* *Source*: Modelski and Thompson (ch. 5); gives years in which the world power's naval concentration ratio equalled or exceeded 0.5 (that is, it had one-half or more of the world's oceanic warships in that year).
** intermittent, for better than one-half to two-thirds of that period.
*** cf. Modelski and Modelski (forthcoming).

Ocean; it was manifested in the regular route to India (Lisbon–Goa) and in Portugal's capacity to defend and sustain the exclusivity of that route against all interlopers. The 'Britain I' period of naval monopoly appears short but is in fact complemented by at least twenty more years in which the ratio hovered just below 0.5 (a mean of 0.47). In four of the cases, the average interval of time between the attainment of naval preponderance by one power and by its successor is 120 years. This is one preliminary measurement of the period of the long cycle.

(3) *Evidence for intentions*. Overall, the critical index of naval concentration demonstrates 'objectively' and beyond the shadow of a doubt that five 'world powers' did, one at a time and for a considerable period, command forces of global reach that were beyond the challenge of any other acting unit of that system. Table 2.2 also lists the occasions that may be viewed as declarations of intent or major acts of assumption of leadership at the global level, beginning with

Manuel's confident first use of the grandiloquent but not at all inaccurate title of 'Lord of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and India'. Portuguese kings never assumed the title of king or emperor over these eastern areas; they merely asserted control over their oceanic linkages.

These assertions of a role invariably preceded by a few years only the establishment of a monopoly of oceanic power. If naval superiority is an objective measure of world power, and overt actions and declarations of intent the expression of a subjective meaning, then those two aspects of reality match exceedingly well in the experience of the world powers.

EVIDENCE FOR GLOBAL WARS

The theory of long cycles posits that the succession to leadership is directly related to sustained and general (that is, systemic) bouts of warfare. In the modern experience these took the form of global wars that can be viewed as violent and ever-more-lethal forms of decision-making. The theory also asserts that these events recur in every fourth phase of the cycle.

The evidence from the record of the modern age is quite striking. Recent studies of war concur in characterising at least The First and Second World Wars, the Napoleonic wars and the wars of Louis XIV as special 'hegemonic wars' (see, for instance, Gilpin, 1981, p. 200). Quincy Wright's classic *A Study of War* called them (as well as several others) 'general wars', that is, wars in which all the great powers participated.

What is a global war? A global war is the most acutely political phase of the long cycle, a test of strength that effects a systemic decision; furthermore, as a phase of the long cycle it has to last close to one generation; and, being a global systemic process, it must have the participation of most if not all the global powers. The (structural) causes of a global war pertain to a systemic breakdown; its consequences must be epochal and include a decision for new leadership. The modern world's record of politics and wars shows evidence of a regular incidence of wars of precisely this character.

Spread at regular intervals since 1494, five wars or clusters of wars meet the characteristics just described. Table 2.3 'Global Wars' lists these wars, together with the participants, and compares this selection with Arnold Toynbee's choice of 'general wars' (featured in his

Table 2.3 Global wars

Global war and duration	*Participation**	*Toynbee's** *'the general war'*
Italian and Indian Ocean wars 1494–1516	*Portugal* + Spain + England† vs France	1449–1525
Spanish wars 1580–1609	*Netherlands* + England + France vs Spain	1568–1609
French wars (1) 1688–1713	*England* + Netherlands vs France + Spain†	1672–1713
French wars (2) 1792–1815	*Britain* + Russia vs France	1792–1815
German wars 1914–1945	*United States* + Britain + Russia + France vs Germany + Japan†	1914–1918

* Global powers only: world power in *italics*.
** *Source*: 1954, p. 255.
† Not for the entire duration.

'War–Peace Cycles in Modern and Post-Modern Western History'). All of Toynbee's wars are also global wars as defined in the present analysis, but the datings deviate from 9 to 27 years in four out of the five cases.

The largest single difference is due to Toynbee's decision, in his main analytical table, to classify the Second World War as a 'supplementary war'. This should more correctly be viewed as a continuation of the First World War that did not come to a proper conclusion until the mid-1920s and was in effect resumed with the Manchurian incident of 1931. The contest was identical, the principal challenger being Germany throughout, and the main issue, global leadership, remaining unresolved until 1945; thus there is every reason to regard these two wars as constituting one 'global war' phase of the long cycle.

The precise arguments for regarding these five (and no other) wars of the modern period as global wars are as follows.

(1) Each bout of major warfare lasted about the lifetime of a generation, that is between 25 and 30 years (cf. Table 5.1). Thus it was long enough to constitute one separate phase of the cycle and a distinct generational experience. Each was in fact a sequence of interrelated wars, composed of at least two major conflicts with

generally identical contestants, principal challengers, and main issue; and each set off a further series of minor conflicts. Among wars other than those in Table 5.1 and on the criterion of duration alone, only the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), and the combined War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48), and Seven Years' War (1756–63), could qualify as global wars.

The Thirty Years' War was, of course, a very big war whose ravages impressed themselves powerfully upon the consciousness of Europe, and of Central Europe in particular. But it was not a global war and may best be classified as a great regional war. Its theme – if there was one – was the future of Germany, an issue of European rather than global consequence. Its principal combatants, other than the princes of Germany and, after 1635, France, were the Austrian Hapsburgs, and Sweden, two regional powers lacking global capacity or even aspirations. There was, running parallel with the German war, the last stage of the Dutch–Spanish war (1621–48); while this had important naval and overseas elements, well brought out in Jonathan Israel's recent study (1982), it was no more than the tail-end of the earlier global war and settled nothing that had not already been *de facto* achieved in 1609. True, it did finally break the power of Spain in Europe, but at the global level that issue had already been decided in 1588.

(2) Each war also had global scope and participation. Prior to 1494, there could be no global wars and no long cycles because the modern system had not yet been created. After 1494 the wars involved all of the global powers of the time (i.e. all the members of the global system, with significant forces of global reach at their disposal, as defined above). These wars were fought on all continents, involved oceanic warfare and major naval battles. By the criterion of participation alone, the Dutch war of 1672–8 and the War of the Austrian Succession would also qualify, although neither was a major oceanic conflict.

(3) The five global wars can be explained as the results of structural crises in the world political system. They were the products of systemic deterioration under the conditions of great power rivalry and of a shortage of legitimate leadership. Thus they may all be viewed as having been prompted by the quest for leadership for the system. By this criterion, not even the Seven Years' War can be considered to have mounted a serious challenge to the status quo. The Dutch War of 1672 may have heralded an approaching structural crisis, but in 1672 the crisis had not yet arrived.

(4) Each global war was a systemic decision that produced a new leadership structure for the global system. If Table 2.3 is considered jointly with Table 2.2, the emergence of global leadership is seen to be directly related to global wars. In the modern record, no other war or series of wars had the same result. The military campaigns of Louis XIV after 1665 raised France's status in Europe to new heights, but did not carry it through to the global level, if only because of lack of sustained backing for the navy and overseas projects (both attributable to the King's personal disinterest and the higher priorities accorded to continental problems). Maybe the Seven Years' War could have had that effect but it did not; it merely reaffirmed the position Britain had attained in 1713. The wars of Bismarck, between 1863 and 1871, altered the situation in Europe and gave Germany a new place in it, but again they did not change the distribution of functions at the global level.

To sum up, each of the five wars shown in Table 2.3 satisfies all the basic criteria of a global war. No other inter-state conflict in the same time-frame (or at any other time for that matter) meets all four conditions. The only near exception is possibly the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War viewed as one and extending from 1739 to 1763. But even here the criterion of epochal impact is not really present; this interval of sustained hostilities should be viewed as a case of prolonged mid-cycle warfare that does not achieve full global status. In any event, do we have the right to expect that reality should conform to a theoretical model perfectly, 100 per cent? In the social sciences, such fit is basically unattainable.

Lethality

A striking characteristic of global wars is their lethality, that is, the loss of life they entail (Table 2.4). Data on inter-state wars with great power participation recently assembled by Jack Levy (1983, pp. 88–92), for the entire period, make it possible to document the relative weight of global wars in the population of inter-state wars. Levy lists 114 such conflicts between 1495 and 1945. To that listing, three other wars need to be added: Charles VIII's Italian campaign of 1494–5, Portugal's naval campaigns in the Indian Ocean (1501–15), and the Spanish–Dutch war of independence (1579–1609).

This adds up to 117 inter-state wars and great power wars all told, during 1494–1945. For that particular population of wars, total battle deaths may be estimated at just over 32 million. Of that figure, the

Table 2.4 Global war battle deaths

Global war	*Battle deaths* (1 000 000)*	*As percentage of battle deaths in*
1. Italian and Indian Ocean wars	0.1	
2. Dutch–Spanish wars	0.2	1517–1609: 20
3. Wars of Louis XIV	2.0	1610–1713: 37
4. French Revolution and Napoleonic wars	2.5	1714–1815: 40
5. World Wars I and II	20.7	1815–1945: 95
Five global wars	25.5	1494–1945: 79
Inter-state wars 1494–1945	32.2	

* Based on Levy (1983) pp. 88–92.

five global wars accounted for close to four-fifths of all battle fatalities. Roughly speaking, fewer than one-fifth of all the wars caused the bulk of battle-related losses of life. In the 130 years prior to 1945, the two world wars absorbed 95 per cent of the fatalities of all inter-state wars.

The evidence on lethality reinforces the argument about the distinctiveness of global wars. If these are in fact the special phenomena postulated by the theory, then they can be treated as markers of world system time, and the intervals between their onsets (or their terminations) as measures of the long cycle. In turn, the uniqueness of global wars and their regular occurrence is undeniable proof in favour of viewing long cycles as a repetitive process.

EVIDENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT

Possibly more surprising than the recurrence thesis is the suggestion that the long cycle might involve a developmental movement: that international politics might be a process creating complexity, a motor of modernity. Development opens up a new range of possibilities in an altogether different dimension from recurrence.

This being a central theme of the analysis, it will be encountered again on other occasions. At this point no more than a few prelimi-

nary considerations will be offered in its support. These considerations have a bearing on (i) innovation, (ii) the evolution of the world powers, (iii) the evolution of global wars.

(1) Innovation is to society what mutation is to biology. Innovation shapes social processes and structures by injecting variety that has the potential, given a niche or demand, for changing social systems and their capacity for development. The innovations story is the story of the cutting-edge of an evolving society, and the incidence of innovation is evidence of capacity to learn.

The long cycle is the process by which a distinct cluster of innovations is introduced into the world system and domesticated in it, and its story is one of continuous innovation at the global level. The narrative in Chapter 4 is studded with instances of basic political and social change. At this point suffice it to say that 'the world power is the carrier of change' and the trial-of-strength is the test by which it validates and disseminates it. Portugal, as mentioned, was the pioneer of discoveries, those great initial innovations of the modern age. Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution whose impact is still reverberating around the globe. But in the long cycle these great waves of general innovations also went hand in hand with characteristic changes in political and military arrangements: Portugal's development of naval gunnery, Britain's elaboration of free-trade doctrines and policies, are two instances. These are no more than representative samples taken from the fuller survey given in the fourth chapter.

(2) The world leadership role is the main carrier – that is, the vector – of the long cycle. Were the long cycle no more than a repetitive process, the states filling that role might be expected to remain basically similar (if not identical) implementors of the same general movement. In fact they are not. Over time, the succession of modern states occupying the leadership role shows a clear progression from the rather simple though finely goal-directed Portuguese polity to the obviously large and much more complex society of the United States.

An index of this progression is population. The importance of population lies in the ready availability of statistical information in a continuous series for all the relevant cases. As already argued, population size is a rough-and-ready indicator of the complexity of a society and may also be seen as one of the basic indices of capacity for global functions. Table 2.5 shows the population estimates for all the world powers at about the start of 'their' global war. For

Table 2.5 World power populations

*Date**	*World power*	*Population*** (1 000 000s)*	*As percentage of world population*
(1346)	(Venice)	(0.16)	(0.16)****
1500	Portugal	1.25	0.30
1600	Netherlands	1.50	0.30
1700	Britain I	9.25	1.50
1800	Britain II	16.00	1.80
1914	United States	100.00	5.40

Source: McEvedy and Jones (1978).
* Date close to the start of global war.
** Metropolitan populations only.
*** As percentage of the population of the European–Mediterranean region, estimated at 100 million.

purposes of comparison, Venice (a modern prototype) is also included, and its population is compared with the estimated total for the European–Mediterranean region on the eve of the Black Death (1347).

Over the entire modern period the population figures show a steady rise for the world powers, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the world population at the time. It is notable, however, that the size of the population does not advance in a smooth fashion but seems to take two-step jumps, with two long cycles making up one jump that reflects the new size, and inferentially the higher complexity, of the base society. Portugal and the Netherlands being essentially of equal size were also (nevertheless) ten times as large as Venice, the Italian city-state closest in experience to the modern world powers. Britain in the following two cycles represents the next level of magnitude, and in the twentieth century the United States brings the base resources of the world power to a new order of magnitude. The progression is consistent with the thesis that as global tasks have increased, more effective resources have become available for mobilisation to respond to them.

Despite continuous absolute and relative population increases throughout the period, the world powers have represented only a fairly limited minority of the world total. The United States' 5 per cent share obviously carries greater weight than Portugal's less than 1 per cent, or even Britain's less than 2 per cent. But the American

figure is still only a small fraction, one-twentieth, of the population of the globe. The work of global leadership is that of the cutting-edge and of the innovative minority. This is probably the only way in which evolutionary change can be effected on a global scale.

(3) If successive world powers manifest an evolutionary trend, getting bigger and more complex, so do the global wars; witness the progression in the lethality of wars in Table 2.4. This latter evolution, too, is stepwise, with three jumps in the orders of magnitude of battlefield fatalities, going from less than 200,000 in the first two cases, to some two million in the next two wars, on to 20 million in the last. It is interesting to note that each of these figures corresponds to about 20 per cent of the population of the world power of the time. Thus for the wars of Louis XIV, approximately two million fatalities is the equivalent of 20 per cent of Britain's population of nearly ten million *circa* 1700. This seems to confirm the feeling that global wars and world powers are linked in more ways than one.

Another notable aspect is the degree to which these wars absorb the violent propensities of the system. Table 2.5 has shown that over the five long cycles of the past the proportion of fatalities attributable to global wars has steadily risen from less than one quarter in the period ending in 1609 to 95 per cent in that concluded in 1945. Such evidence is not inconsistent with the idea that the global system was gradually learning to displace the incidents of major conflict to one phase of the long cycle, the phase best suited for handling it. It is as though the system was evolving on its way through the long cycle, one of whose features is precisely such a displacement. More-recent long cycles are clearer, or more-perfect, examples of this process because they may be the result of a move up the 'learning curve'.

So much for the preliminary, general, and statistical data supporting the notion of a long cycle. These considerations are at variance with much of the conventional wisdom about the anarchy and randomness of international politics; to that extent, they are unexpected and provocative. They are also falsifiable, for if they were untrue no recurrence of either leadership or global war, or development, could be demonstrated in world politics. What support do these arguments find in the literature?

3 Literature

A 'long cycle' approach is supported, and indeed has respectable antecedents, in both the evolution of thought about International Relations and the general literature of the social sciences. Two specific branches of classic writing will be mentioned in the first place: Balance of Power, and Sea Power. These two bodies of thought come to grips not with timeless and abstract questions related to the 'behaviour of states' in a 'states-system', but rather with the clearly defined time-and-space-bounded problems of modern world politics.

THE BALANCE OF POWER

The *locus classicus* of scholarly reflection on international relations has for a long time been the doctrine of the balance of power. It has two variants: the original doctrine that evolved from the practice of statecraft to become a principle of the European political system; and the twentieth century's neo-classical glossaries and elaborations that attempt to fashion it into a universal law of international politics.

The classical doctrine is quite plain. Its sources lie in the politics of the Renaissance Italy of the fifteenth century, and in particular in the relations between Venice, Milan and Florence. The balance of power was first identified as such by the Venetian humanist Francesco Barbaro in 1439. The initiator of the policy was Cosimo de' Medici who, in the 'diplomatic revolution' of 1451, withdrew his support of Venice and aligned Florence on the side of Milan (Mattingly, 1955, p. 73).

The concept thus entered the literature. But, in the practice of modern states, it only surfaced again in any significant way during the wars of Louis XIV, in William III's last address (1701) to Parliament urging it 'to see England hold the balance of Europe'. The Balance of Europe was incorporated into the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and commented upon by such writers as Bolingbroke (who helped negotiate the treaty); thus it became part of the public law of Europe. The standard texts on it may be found *inter alia* in Forsyth *et al.* (1970) who must be considered the principal authorities on the subject. Writers such as Emmerich de Vattel, who expounded the new *Law of Nations* (1758), discussed it with fine discernment among

the just causes of war; marking the start of a venerable tradition that may be seen to endure even in such late works as Quincy Wright's *A Study of War* (1942). The doctrine never went out of fashion among historians. Ludwig Dehio's (1962) account of the modern states system is one of the best short renditions of the classical system of the balance of power. Herbert Butterfield (1966) placed it in the context of diplomatic theory.

In the classic eighteenth-century mode, Europe was seen as a (regional) political system bound by common interests but subject to grave conflicts between two sets of powers, France against the Austrian Hapsburgs, the latter then being the relatively weaker side, fearing the more active and challenging might of the other. Alerted by French designs, especially in respect of the Low Countries, and anxious to impede the growth of a quasi-imperial system that might pose a threat to her own independence, Britain, not having any continental or territorial ambitions, assumed the role of balancer: by intervening on the side of the weak she could help keep the strong in check. Contemporary English commentators such as Charles Davenant explained this by precedents created by Elizabeth I, who 'by holding thus the ballance . . . made England safe and happy during her time' (1701, p. 9). The interventions were thus justified by the principles of the balance of power, and were in fact so justified also after France became the weaker party and needed bolstering up against Germany. That is how Winston Churchill, among others, wrote about the world wars of the twentieth century. That is how even the United States' involvement in these wars could be accounted for; and so could her active part in post-1945 European economic and political recovery programmes, since they came to the aid of a weaker party against a threat looming from the East.

The classical balance of power was designed to link the stability of a critical region to the interests of world organisation as represented by Britain. It can therefore be seen as a statement of a central problem pertaining to the conditions of leadership in the modern world. Greater difficulty, however, attends neo-classical attempts to restate it in the form of universal propositions: they are ambiguous and tend toward over-generalisation in search of some 'general equilibrium' in the style of neo-classical economics.

These contemporary versions of classic doctrines, even the successful ones, such as that of Chatterjee (1975), who is much aware of the need to bear in mind the historical context, suffer from the failure to distinguish between global (in particular, naval) and

regional (especially land) forces. They do not distinguish between global and regional systems. Nor do they take into account that all modern world politics has combined long periods of predominance (that is lack of balance) at the global level with an absence of superiority in several regional systems.

Sea Power

The balance of power primarily answered questions about the workings of the European political system; it referred to the world structure only implicitly, without enlarging a great deal about how and why Britain was in a position to act as balancer and in so doing was free to arrange the global system to suit her own designs. Since until recently in the modern world the ocean was the only effective and cost-efficient method of long-range interactions, it became obvious that reflections about the role of sea power must be among the basic resources of the study of long cycles (for a full discussion of the evolution of the concept of sea power see Modelski and Thompson, 1987, ch. 1).

The first modern author to expound this set of problems comprehensively was Alfred Mahan. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783*, his first major work (1890), needs to be remembered less for its analysis of sea battles and tactical prescriptions than for its grasp of the world scene and analysis of British sea power, beginning at the moment when Britain was ready to take over from the Dutch, up to (in his later work) the time she was about to be superseded by the United States.

But, of course, the concept of sea power neither began nor ended with Mahan. Writers in Greek antiquity, including Herodotus and even Polybius, used it more than two millenia before him. Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* is not only an excellent analysis of the role of sea power, but also an illuminating analysis of how Athens' leadership in the Greek system deteriorated into empire. Modern treatments of sea power include Francis Bacon (1625) and John Colomb (1867).

Contemporary theories on the use and control of strategic nuclear forces (nuclear deterrence) may be perceived as the most recent incarnations of the classical doctrines of sea power and the balance of power. The continuities in the evolution of strategic doctrine are particularly clear in the work of Bernard Brodie, who started out as a student of naval strategy, then proceeded to coin the term 'deter-

rence' (probably derived from Mahan), and went on to write the still classic formulation of the military consequences of atomic weapons in *The Absolute Weapon* (1946).

PIONEERS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

If the basic question is, How is the world organised at the global level? or, How might it be made to cope with conditions of varying complexity? the problem is clearly not one (strictly or technically speaking) of International Relations in the narrow conception of that term, but rather one that merges at several points with the major strands of modern social thought. It helps to know where the boundaries of that initial question lie and where the other social sciences take over. The present analysis is in fact conducted at the boundary of this and other fields.

Is It Historicism?

Are those who, with a hope of better understanding the present and the future, ask broad questions about global politics and long cycles, in danger of falling into the trap of 'historicism'? Are those who assert the need to specify carefully the time and space referrents (the historical and geographical contexts) of their analyses committed to the view that historical and geographical conditions alone determine the events occurring at a specified age and place?

Following Karl Popper's usage, historicism may be defined as the tendency to pronounce 'laws of history' and to derive from them predictions that cannot be solidly sustained by the procedures of the social sciences. Popper (in Gardiner, 1959, p. 278) calls this the 'historicist doctrine of the social sciences'. Quite obviously, students of long cycles have no desire to indulge in false prophesy or to engage in predictions that are outside the procedures of the social sciences. On the other hand, there can be little harm, and much social merit, in preparing members of society for a better understanding of the conditions that might befall them in the future. As Popper himself points out, prediction is possible in the case of recurrent or repetitive systems; and such systems exist both in the inanimate physical world and (in particular, in biology) in the life-cycle of breathing organisms.

Although in Popper's view 'the most striking aspects of historical development are non-repetitive', he does allow that in so far as

human society is 'repetitive' we may perhaps make 'certain prophesies'. The problem then reduces itself to determine what aspects of the operation of social systems are repetitive. The answer, at the minimum, is of course the long cycle of the global polity. The global polity and, more broadly, the modern world system constitute the strictly defined time-and-space-bounded systems (though not 'history in general') within which it is possible to identify patterns of repetition. But if recurrence is indeed a feature of long cycles, so is innovation, which accounts for some of the more interesting characteristics of modern world politics and is also a central feature of long cycles.

Scholars intent on analysing carefully defined time-and-space-bounded world systems need not subscribe to the notion that these are in any way uniquely determined: that they must be understood in terms of their unique 'meaning'. These systems should rather be looked upon as intersections of social behaviour in a particular context, and be explicable in terms of general social science.

Toynbee's *Study of History*

The study of long cycles does not try to compete with philosophies of history of which Arnold Toynbee's major work *A Study of History* may be taken as an exemplar. For Toynbee, the point of departure was the insight that the smallest intelligible field of study of historical societies is that of whole societies he called civilisations. Never really focusing in upon the world as a whole, his problem was that while a number of distinct civilisations may be clearly identified in earlier history, by the time the year 1500 is passed their separate identities tend to blur. As for western civilisation, it is Toynbee's considered opinion, based on his study of earlier civilisations, that it is 'already far advanced in our time of troubles' that seems to have begun around 1500; and that it has, to date, produced two major breakdowns and a second relapse.

In point of fact, as already noted, Toynbee (1954, pp. 230–328) saw this 'time of troubles' as passing through a series of war-and-peace cycles whose time matches quite well the concept of long cycles. There are three principal differences between Toynbee's approach and the present one. First, his is basically a theory of war cycles; 'long cycles', by contrast, are intended to throw light on global leadership, a subject absent from *A Study of History*. Second, he views the war–peace cycle as a symptom of a decaying civilisation

and looks forward to its suppression or dissolution in a future 'universal state'. The long-cycle approach sees past global wars as one form that tests-of-strength can assume in a large social system, not as a sign of irreversible decay; but it does not exclude the possibility that this violent form of decision-making might in future be replaced by a less lethal one even while the cycle continues on its course.

Third, Toynbee's 'time of troubles' is part of the thesis that 'civilisations' exhibit uniform patterns of behaviour and that the modern war–peace cycles of 'Western' civilisation have had their counterparts in similar cycles of the 'Hellenistic' and 'Sinic' civilisations, the implication being that Western civilisation is heading in the same direction. For Toynbee, a universal state is looming ahead if some other form of world order is not established; for that reason the modern era is, for him, no more than a time of troubles, the tail-end of a waning civilisation, a postscript to the story of a greater age. The long-cycle approach does not carry the same implication. It chooses to view the modern world system as a new formation, more complex than anything that preceded it, and long cycles as modes of its functioning that are unique to the era (even if some prototypic elements might be found in earlier times, in Athens or in Venice in particular). Rather than a time of troubles, the era of the long cycles is the most promising and exciting period in the world's entire history, when the global social system may for the first time have discovered its potential for creative self-organisation.

The Nature of Modern Society

A major strand of social, rather than historical, thought has vigorously tried to clarify the novel features of society that have been evolving in recent centuries. Adam Smith, Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, have each seized upon clusters of such features and have minted exceedingly useful concepts: handles for opening to public understanding the nature of the advancing and the advanced societies of the modern world.

Smith, Comte and Spencer clarified the notion of the industrial society as contrasted with the agrarian; Marx gave substance to the concept of capitalist society as emerging out of feudalism; Weber delineated modern society and set it against traditional structures; and Durkheim introduced the idea of the mechanistic society to contrast with the organic. In each case, tools were devised for gaining

greater insight into some aspects of the advanced national societies the authors knew and had studied well; more often than not, this meant the lead polity and economy of their time or its challenger. What can hardly be gainsaid is that as they wrote (and this applies even to this day) the conditions they labelled 'industrial', 'capitalist', 'modern' and 'mechanistic' were hardly representative of even a small number of the world's national societies, and the world system as a whole could not be regarded as homogeneously composed of such units. Rather, only a lead unit of its time would prominently have such characteristics and engage in diffusing them in the world, while the rest were engaged in 'modernisation'.

The analysis of long cycles, on the other hand, focuses attention primarily on the structure of the world system as a whole, and secondarily on certain advanced societies and the process by which modernisation occurs at the global level. It cannot, and does not, presume social homogeneity, but rather needs to contend with problems created by innovation and growth in some parts of the system, and the lack of the same elsewhere. Modernisation is seen here as a problem rather than a solution. It is considered to be, in the first place, a product of the world system. In that sense, the 'greats' of the 'long nineteenth century' may supply indispensable background reference without yielding direct guidance on questions of world organisation.

The above considerations also apply to Talcott Parsons, the resourceful interpreter of these writers in the twentieth century. But Parsons's works (1950, 1966, 1971) also provide the most carefully elaborated framework of social system theory available at the present time; they have supplied some of the basic premises of the present analysis.

International Political Economy

A separate note is required to address the contributions of a newly rediscovered field, international political economy, which brings together a variety of social scientists working on broad questions of the interrelationship between economics and politics.

Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1980) deliberately focuses on the structural problems of the 'modern world-system'. He uses the concepts of class and core–periphery (that are also the major themes of dependence theory) to address the differential distribution of activity and innovation in a 'world-economy', thus also raising sign-

ificant problems bearing on world organisation. But he sees the world-economy as single-handedly determining the operation of the modern world-system (making that system 'capitalist'), and in so far as political science is concerned he is less sensitive to political structures and political innovations, such as parties, and tends not to bring out the distinctive role of political processes such as global wars (which he regards as epiphenomenal) at the world level. Thompson's volume (1983) carries full comparisons of the world-economy and the long-cycle approach.

Responding to political problems more directly is Robert Gilpin, who writes of the interrelationship between economics and politics as a more evenly balanced process and brings rational-choice theory to bear upon questions of world politics. Gilpin's analysis centres upon hegemonic war. This is the driving force for international change which he sees as a disturbance of a condition of homeostatic equilibrium by the differential growth in the power of states. His analysis in fact implies a process of cyclical change (1981, p. 12, fig. 1). But his theory of international change is formulated as a series of universal propositions, and avoids specifying its context – that is, the 'initial conditions'. All the while, Gilpin acknowledges that 'the study of change cannot be divorced from specific historical contexts' (p. 49). This the present analysis attempts to do quite explicitly *inter alia* by the extended use of the concept of modern world system.

CYCLES

Cycles are a narrower concept than that of recurrence. Cycles are regular recurrences: fixed sequences of several phases that invariably return to their point of departure. All cycles are strong recurrences, but human affairs also know of other types of historical recurrence, such as alternations (in which one set of conditions is succeeded by another and then returns), reciprocal processes, re-enactments and restorations (Trompf, 1979, p. 223).

Anacyclosis

Cyclic analysis was a prominent feature of the political thought of antiquity. 'Human things are a circle' was a commonplace among the Greeks (Trompf, p. 83) that was inscribed for the Athenian public on the walls of the Erechtheum, a temple to Athena built

between 421 and 401 BC, years during which great disasters befell their city.

Classical experience between 500 and 100 BC afforded several examples of the transitory nature of even the most powerful of empires, including those of the Persians and the Macedonians. To explain this phenomenon, political thinkers devised two types of model: a biological model of growth and decay, and a model of regime cycles.

Thucydides (Bk. II:64) quotes Pericles as saying that even Athens, 'a power greater than any hitherto known' might be subject to 'a general law of decay'. Plato raises the issue of political decay *inter alia* in Book IX of the *Republic*. Polybius too, the great historian of Rome's rise to 'rule over the whole of the inhabited world' (Bk. I:1), regards it as a matter that 'scarcely requires proof' that 'all existing things are subject to decay' (Bk. VI:57).

The internal sources of the decay of states achieving supremacy, according to Polybius, are attributable to *anacyclosis*, the process whereby constitutions move in recurrent cycles, from kingship to aristocracy to democracy and back to kingship. The Romans succeeded in suppressing this cycle, claims Polybius, by devising a mixed constitution of evenly balanced elements. But for Polybius, writing *circa* 150 BC, the future was clear and the cycle of constitutions was still at work:

> When a state . . . achieves supremacy . . . life will become more luxurious. Among the citizens themselves rivalry for office . . . will become fiercer than it should . . . The craving for office, . . . ostentation and extravagance, will usher in a period of general deterioration. The principal authors of this change will be the masses . . . They will have been roused to fury . . . but will demand everything . . . for themselves. When this happens, the constitution will change its *name* to the one which sounds the most imposing of all, that of freedom and democracy, but its *nature* to that which is the worst of all, that is the rule of the mob. (Bk. VI:57)

In the modern age, the Polybian anacyclosis was taken up by Machiavelli in his *Discorsi* (Bk I:2). For him, too, this was 'the cycle through which all commonwealths pass', and he was also quick to add that 'but rarely do they return to the same form of government . . . What usually happens is that, while in a state of commotion . . . the state becomes subject to a neighbouring and better organised

state. Were it not so, a commonwealth might go on for ever passing through these governmental transitions'.

Is the classical analysis relevant to modern long cycles? Athens in its golden century (5th BC) might be regarded as a source of fruitful analogies. But not Rome, whose career spanned two millenia and whose empire is in fact an inappropriate source of models, however imperial the aspirations of some modern states. In fact, as Polybius knew, the *anacyclosis* was not really a particularly well-fitting model for Rome in the third and second centuries BC (Walbank, in preface to Polybius, 1979, p. 32). In Athens' century, on the other hand, the progression from kingship to aristocracy (after 509), to democracy (after 460), to decay (*circa* 404 BC) is fairly clear. Maybe the subject of regime change calls for renewed attention. Could it be related to the alternation of phases of liberalism and conservatism (punctuated by critical elections) in modern lead states with political party regimes?

More generally it has been argued that cyclical thinking is a characteristic feature of the traditions of antiquity, while the Judeo-Christian tradition is linear in character, one that takes a straight-line view of history that runs from the Creation and God's first covenants with man to the future eschatological fulfilment of his promises. Trompf's analysis seeks to 'undermine' this 'well-known yet superannuated linear-cyclical dichotomy' by showing that paradigms of historical recurrence, including those of cycle and alternation, were not foreign to Hebrew and early Christian interpretations of temporal change (1979, pp. 119, 113). It shows the actual argument and analysis to have been complex and partaking of both types of approach. The integration of the two approaches is the inspiration behind the present analysis.

Balance of Power

In modern thought, cyclic analysis of international politics has taken the form of balance-of-power approaches, previously referred to, in respect of which recurrence was implied rather than deliberately worked out. Dehio's (1962) study was a schema of alternation: hegemony and equilibrium. Toynbee's description (already alluded to) of a 'war-and-peace' cycle in volume IX of *A Study of History* (1954, p. 234ff) as a 'law of nature in the histories of civilizations' is the fullest such statement on record of the 'modern Western political Balance of Power'. His cycle is no mere recurrence, but a four or

five phase process that is part of a secular movement 'working steadily toward an eventual overturn of the unstable equilibrium between a plurality of parochial states and towards the replacement of this by an at least temporarily stable oecumenical regime in which political power would be a monopoly administered from a single centre'; that is, in fact, a movement toward a universal state. For Toynbee, the important indicator of this movement was the number of great powers extant in the system, which by the mid twentieth century had declined to two.

Kondratieff Waves

Toynbee took it for granted that the war-and-peace cycle was linked to the long-range fluctuations in economic activity characteristic of the industrial system since the eighteenth century. Even though aware that 'the more cautious economic investigators had returned verdicts of "non proven" on these longer cycles' claim to be economic realities', for him the 'alternating phases of war and peace were the political counterparts of alternating phases of economic prosperity and depression' (pp. 234–5).

The first to point out the possibility of long-term price fluctuations in the capitalist world economy was J. van Gelderen, writing shortly before the First World War. But the most widely known attempt was by Nikolai Kondratieff whose 'Long Waves of Economic Activity' (1928) was taken up by Joseph Schumpeter in his *Business Cycles* (1938). The latter's suggestion that the fifty-plus year movements be remembered as Kondratieff waves has found wide acceptance. W. W. Rostow's *The World Economy* (1978) and J. J. van Duijn's *The Long Wave in Economic Life* (1983) have been the most significant recent additions to the literature.

The more important facts about the Kondratieffs are probably not the long swings between prosperity and depression but the bursts of economic innovation and the rise of new industries they are associated with. The Kondratieffs appear to synchronise long-term movements in the global economy with the operation of long cycles. Indeed, there is good reason to expect such co-ordination; as shown in the next chapter, the world powers are the lead economies of their time and their economic activities, especially innovations in crucial segments, have impact on the entire global system, in a manner that is systematically related to their political role.

These long-term developmental trends, focused on the lead

economy, are closely linked to Kondratieff waves (Modelski, 1981, 1982). Moreover, periods of rapid economic growth and of industrial growth may be observed to alternate with those of slower growth and emphasis on basic industries such as raw materials and food; just as in the global polity, times of 'order surplus' may be seen to alternate with periods of 'order deficit'.

Long-term price trends in the advanced industrial countries show a rising tendency at times of political upheaval such as global wars (which are times of order deficit), while tending to fall in periods of declining tension that also happen to coincide with eras of notable economic advance. If the global-war phase can be recognised as distinctly political in character the phase that follows it is clearly dominated by economics. The global-war phase that 'selects' a world power and ushers in a new world order is a period of political innovation; the phase succeeding it is predominantly one of rapid growth based on economic innovation. This amounts to synchronisation of political and economic processes at the global level.

The evidence so far is incomplete though. For the era prior to the mid eighteenth century, global economic processes are less well documented and understood. While authorities such as Braudel (1984) are willing to employ the notion of Kondratieffs in large-scale historical analyses, much conceptual clarification and data analysis will be needed before these matters are fully sorted out. The need is great to distinguish clearly between global trends for instance in world trade and investment, and the sequencing of basic innovations between industries and between locations, and follow-up developments at regional and national levels by modernisation and industrialisation.

Generational Change

Arnold Toynbee's use of a 'Physical Generation' cycle as a regulator of social change was an important part of his explanation of war–peace cycles, and will be taken up again in Chapter 5. Classical writers, too, conceived of generational turnover as being among the motors of the cycles of regime change. It seemed to them as though the second generation could never do as well as the founding fathers, never learning from their experience; preoccupied with private interests, they habitually deteriorated into licence and disorder.

Among modern writers, the connection between generations and political change was clearly asserted but poorly documented by

Giuseppe Ferrari in *Teoria dei Periodi Politici* (1874). The link is strongly suggestive but difficult to demonstrate in practice. D. C. Watt's *Succeeding John Bull* (1984, pp. 13–20 – 'The concept of historical generations') uses the same hypothesis to explain the several phases in the process by which the United States took up Britain's position in world affairs. But Watt is careful to confine his explanation of generational change to the elite level, much influenced by transnational linkages between political, academic and research establishments. His generational cycles, though, are only one-half the length of Toynbee's and run to about fifteen years.

Probably the most significant facts about generational processes are their links, or absence thereof, with structures of 'social reproduction' such as education and the ways in which generational experiences are transmitted and utilised.

SUMMING UP

This review of the literature, together with the earlier introduction to concepts and evidence, suggests that the long-cycle approach is central to understanding world politics and also has wide ramifications in the social sciences. For it assumes that political processes cannot be understood outside the historical context of the modern world system, and it suggests several new directions along which enquiries into the working of that system might be pursued.

Besides the review of the literature, two other tasks have been accomplished so far: (i) an introduction to the global political system, the long cycle being a mode of behaviour of that system; and (ii) a preliminary review of the evidence bearing on long cycles. The next chapter continues this testing by means of an extended but structured narrative of long cycles.

4 Narrative

Long cycles of global politics may be studied at the systemic or the nation-state level. The first point of view summarises the state of world politics, and was emphasised in Chapters 1 and 2. The second directs attention more particularly to the rise and decline of world powers and is utilised in the present chapter so as to depict as accurately as possible the process whereby, in the modern age, the world powers have succeeded each other in a fairly regular manner; in the next chapter, it helps us to understand the learning process.

In the pages that follow, the story of modern world politics is told and observed with the help of a concept of chain process. The main questions are: Is this a useful way of telling a complex story of international affairs? And does it in fact fit the facts? The purpose is to deploy a systematic view of the long cycle while presenting an informative narrative of five hundred years of global politicking and policy.

CHAIN PROCESSES

Long cycles clearly are sequences of events. The series Portugal, Netherlands, Britain I and II, United States, prima facie constitutes just such a sequence. But can long cycles also be shown as an interconnected series, such as a chain, or maybe even as a cumulative process, a chain reaction?

To establish such interconnectedness let us posit that the state of the global system and of its sub-systems at time 1 determines the state of the system at time 2. As already noted, the global system in its functioning (and in its sub-systems such as the global polity) encounters problems that over time become increasingly onerous. These problems need to be attended to and ultimately resolved. In other words, the system develops a demand, a market or a niche for a set of solutions. Problems may therefore be seen as a set of opportunities, or as a number of roles to be filled. World leadership itself is one such opportunity to be exploited or role to be filled.

To meet these problems and to respond to the opportunities for leadership, people organise and create or make use of existing organ-

isations. Some of these will display a proclivity for coalitioning, that is the ability to develop alliances and to lead and manage coalitions: in a more general sense, the ability to mobilise in response to global problems. In a competitive mode, those best fitted on those criteria are likely to be selected for leadership in the global system.

'Eligible' lead powers solve the problems and transform the system through the devices of global decision and innovation. Global war is the specifically political decision by trial-of-strength that in past experience has brought about a systemic purge, streamlining, reorganisation and recharting of the development process; this systemic decision has been the mechanism of recurrence in world politics. Innovation of diverse kinds, on the other hand, has been the mechanism of evolutionary growth, accounting for learning and complexity. Acting through macro-decisions and through innovation the world power responds to world problems and reorients the global system, lifting it to a new level of performance. But in the fullness of time, and in response to problems solved in the preceding cycle, a new set of problems arises and new qualifications and abilities are required to meet them. The cycle keeps moving in a feedback process.

At time 1, the beginning of the world-power (learning) cycle, the global system generates a set of problems at a rising rate. Responding to these problems are nation-states, and the one that proves to be most fitted, i.e. with the best available combination of resources (or factor inputs) for meeting these problems, is the emerging world power. 'Global war' (as macro-decision) and 'Innovation' are two mechanisms by which global problems are resolved; the rate at which they are put to work is a measure of the response of the system to its problems; the response needs to be matched against both the problems and the means that can be summoned to solve them. The interaction of problems, factors, and mechanisms of change, brings about, at the completion of one cycle, Global System at time 2. The system has arrived at a new state, and the interval between 1 and 2 is one long cycle.

The process just described has elements that are both cyclical (or repetitive) and evolutionary (and therefore cumulative); in other words it has the essentials of both regulation and development, of both negative and positive feedback. It is repetitive (as the life-cycle is basically repetitive) because its form ensures a steady replay of certain basic features; indeed, the by-now-familiar parade of challengers and the recurrence of global wars in the role of selection

mechanisms are the principal elements of this cyclic process. But the process is also evolutionary because the system at time 1 is not exactly replicated in time 2 but rather moves toward a new level of complexity. The primary elements of the evolutionary side of this process are leadership and innovation, and that makes it possible to regard it as developmental. The main constituents of that process are the global problems that define a niche within which evolutionary change may be accommodated, and innovation as the mechanism for filling such a niche.

Viewed in this way the long cycle may be seen as a social process that is composed of the basic ingredients of all social processes. It represents a fundamental interaction of ends and means at the global level: the ends are the resolution of the problems motivating the process and the solutions (or end states) themselves that are reached at the completion of each stage of the cycle; the means are the factor inputs (or resources, principally supplied by the lead unit) and the mechanisms of macro-decision and innovation that activate the long cycle. Such a model reflects, too, the interplay of the internal and the external aspects of the global polity: its state, and its cyclical and evolutionary mechanisms are essential internal aspects of its functioning; its orientation to the environment via recognition of problems, and its need to extract resources from that environment, are evidence of strong external involvement.

A chain model is compatible too, with a depiction of the long cycle as a four-phase process. In the 'systemic' cycle the four-phase sequence is: Global War, World Power, Delegitimation, Deconcentration. These are descriptive labels that stand for successive clusters of events at the global level of politics. When the focus shifts to the world power learning cycle the four-phase sequence becomes: Clarification, Coalitioning, Macrodecision, Implementation. Here the emphasis is not on the state of the global system but on the sequence of events that culminates in the emergence of a world power, and that is why World Power is the end-phase of that process; the first two phases, Clarification, and Coalitioning, describe the path by which the aspiring world power prepares for its role. Clarification means the definition of the new global situation and assessment of the priorities to be accorded to global problems; Coalitioning refers to the mobilisation of resources, and innovative investments that are needed to resolve those problems, be it economically (in lead industries) or politically (in new instruments for global reach and organisation) or socially (as in new alignments and coalitions).

The test of Macrodecision is the mechanism that crystallises these developments, that ushers the system into its new state, most clearly visible in the final, Implementation phase of that process. The world – power cycle anticipates the systemic cycle by two phases (or two generations).

The intermeshing of these two ways of looking at the long cycle may be represented as follows:

LONG CYCLES

	Systemic mode	*Learning mode* (world power as agent)
Phase	.....	Clarification
Phase	.....	Coalitioning
Phase	Global War	Macrodecision
Phase	World Power	Implementation
Phase	Delegitimation	-
Phase	Deconcentration	

In other words, world powers do not assume their new status fully formed. They are fashioned, moulded and prepared during a span that extends over at least two phases of the long cycle. What at the systemic level appears as decay, may be seen at the national level as a process of growth, learning and exuberant emergence. What seems to be the collapse of beliefs and allegiances in the stage of delegitimation, is also a time of clarification and of the elaboration of new concepts. What is the loss of power (deconcentration) by the well-established forces, may in fact be counterbalanced by the jelling of a new winning coalition.

The process as described here is in the first place political because the basic (cyclical) beat is the rise of new leadership and the recurrence of global war. But in the second place the process also is inextricably intertwined with other social functions, both because of the nature of the problems generated and because of the variety of resources needed and mechanisms employed, all of which have, besides political, also economic, social and cultural ramifications. This makes it possible to see it as a learning process, a point that will be developed fully in the next chapter.

CREATING THE MODERN WORLD: 1494 AND ALL THAT

For a student of long cycles the story of the modern world begins in 1494. The choice is not intended to be controversial but it is made with some deliberation and it is intended to be precise.

For historians it has been a point of general agreement for much more than a century to view the years at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries as a major turning point in human affairs. In what he sub-titles 'A History of the Human Community' William McNeill (1963, p. 619) takes it for granted that the year 1500 AD 'aptly symbolizes the advent of the modern era, in world as well as in European history'. In his analysis of the creation of the 'European world-economy' Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, p. 68) regards as the 'meaningful time unit' the years 1450–1640, the 'long' sixteenth century where modern capitalism was born.

Historians concerned more precisely with the emergence of European diplomacy and the history of wars (such as A. H. L. Heeren, writing in 1800) also converge around the year 1500 as the starting point of the 'states-system'. For Ludwig Dehio (1962, p. 23) that 'structure came into existence at a quite definite moment: the beginning of the struggle among the great powers over Italy in 1494'.

Why was this year in particular such an important moment? As Dehio makes clear, the classical reason has to do with Italy. In the half-millenium prior to that date Italy was the critical area, the active zone of the Western system. Following a series of trials-of-strength with the German Emperors, also later involving the Kings of France, it became a politically vigorous system of autonomous states, based on the principal cities of the most populous, and the most urbanised, part of Europe and the Mediterranean. It is within that system too that such elementary features of modern international relations as residential diplomacy and the balance of power first evolved. The series of wars that began in 1494 and pitted France against Spain, put an end to the relative autonomy of the Italian system and gradually subjected most of its members to the dominance of these outside powers, Venice alone retaining a precarious independence until late into the eighteenth century. These 'Italian' wars, of which there were at least four in the next generation, opened with a spectacular campaign by Charles VIII, a youthful King of France. At the head of the army that would soon take him to Naples the King marched out of Lyons on 27 July 1494.

Only a few weeks earlier, on 7 June, another important event took

place that for students of global politics represents an even more important beginning. At Tordesillas, a small town in northwestern Spain near Medina del Campo, negotiators representing the Kings of Portugal and Spain signed the treaty that put an end to months of wrangling about how to reconcile Spain's newly acquired claims in the West Indies with Portugal's old-established rights in the Atlantic (Diffie and Winius, 1977, pp. 172–4). The initial solution advanced by Pope Alexander VI at the instigation of the Spanish Ambassador having proved unacceptable to Portugal, the matter became the subject of negotiations between the two capitals most concerned. While John II of Portugal was mobilising his fleet, Ferdinand of Spain began to receive reports of French intentions to march on Italy, where Ferdinand's family had long-standing interests, especially in Naples and Sicily. Preferring a secure rear in a situation of imminent war against France, Ferdinand made significant concessions to Portugal (ceding claims to what has since become Portuguese-speaking Brazil) and came to a far-reaching settlement whereby lands newly discovered by Columbus in the Americas (west of approximately 48 degrees longitude) would be Spanish but the route to India would remain under sole Portuguese control. In as much as both Columbus and the Portuguese were searching for India, the treaty, in the immediate and the intermediate terms, gave the advantage to Portugal. In a broader sense its significance lies in having created a regime for the governance of global-level interactions, the world's first global political regime.

The year 1494 thus marks the creation of the modern world system for two reasons. First, it opens the Italian wars that soon also spread to the Indian Ocean, hence the first global war of the modern era. In turn, this global war may be counted as the first phase of the first systemic long cycle. Second, the year also marks the formal inauguration of the first differentiated regime for oceanic management, one that was to be reaffirmed by the outcome of the global war and that came to govern oceanic communications until 1609, having come under serious challenge only in the last quarter of the sixteenth century.

PORTUGAL

But this is moving ahead of the story. The creation of a global regime coincidentally with the start of a global war marks the start of the

systemic long cycle and heralds the arrival of new forms of world politics. Yet such momentous changes must spring from pre-existing foundations and are anticipated by a period of building and designing. There have to be active agents to lay down and to shape these foundations, and there must also be a system that is receptive to such new ventures.

At the western end of the linear system of the old world (comprising China, India, the Near East, and Europe) Venice had long held a position of leadership. By about 1400 she had consolidated a crucial role of intermediary in trans-regional interactions. She had come out victorious in major naval wars against Genoa and her navy had no equal in the Mediterranean. She controlled the major gateways of East–West trade and held a virtual monopoly over the lucrative spice trade from Egypt. Venice herself was the principal 'world market' of her time and her galley fleets sailing from the Black Sea all the way to Flanders were the principal linkages of the European system. Her republican political system was unmatched anywhere in its stability but she also controlled a network of ports and bases that included Constantinople, once a great imperial capital, now her virtual dependency. In her golden *Quattrocento* Venice was at the peak of her power and her splendour; in 1494 the French ambassador, Philippe de Commynes, described her as 'the most triumphal city that I have ever seen'.

The system worked, and Venice made the most of it, but conditions were also ripening for a change. True, the world system had remained in a state of weak interaction for two or three millenia, but some of its foundations had begun to weaken. Knowledge of the world's structure had recently spread: for instance, Marco Polo travelled from Venice as far as China and committed his experiences to paper during an interval of enforced leisure (in Genoese captivity); his *Travels* became an instant success. Moreover, the technology of sea transportation had recently improved as a 'nautical revolution' took effect in the Mediterranean; the preconditions of oceanic navigation were beginning to be established. The structure of the system was changing as, after a resurgence of the Middle East between 600 and 1000, first China and then Europe took off both economically and politically. While the significance of the Middle East was declining, that of the two outer regions was rising and the importance of interchanges between them was increasing too. The incentives for finding new routes and building new circular structures were growing. At the same time, Venice's wealth and power was widely envied and

many understood that this was based on its superlative maritime–commercial organisation that monopolised East–West interactions.

Who was there to contest this monopoly? Who could remake the structure of the world system? Not Venice again, because of her vested interests in the existing system, her limited natural resources and lack of access to the oceans. Not the Dukes of Burgundy (who also ruled the Netherlands) whose plan it was to erect a strong territorial state at the heart of Western Europe; that design collapsed on the death of Charles the Bold in 1477. Not England or France, both engaged in a 100-years war (until 1453), with England remaining in the turmoil of the War of the Roses for three more decades. Not Spain, whose highest national priority remained, until 1492, the completion of the Reconquest. And not Morocco, whose orientation was basically continental and trans-Saharian rather than oceanic and whose Merinid dynasty collapsed in 1415 on the occasion of Portugal's conquest of Ceuta.

Of the appropriately sized and equipped states only one was able and ready to devote the time, the manpower and the resources sufficient for assuming a global role, and that was Portugal. In the first place, Portugal was favoured with a prime location: a peninsular position with major oceanic harbours, in particular Lisbon, athwart Europe's then premier maritime route between the Mediterranean and Flanders (Bruges and Antwerp), yet also superbly placed for exploring the Atlantic and coasts of Africa. Second, Portuguese national cohesion was already of a superior order: attained early through the consolidation of a national territory (1249) (unchanged to this day, probably the world's oldest such territory, the basis of what may rightly be regarded as the world's first nation-state); and consolidated early through the acquisition of a national identity by political separation from Castile (*circa* 1100) under an independent (Burgundian) dynasty; and confirmed in real independence through wars with Castile, culminating in the decisive victory at Aljubarrota (1385). Third, Portugal was an economy that was part of the Venice–North Sea network, participating in long-distance trade, capable of developing the Atlantic Islands, such as the Azores or Madeira, as well as rich in shipbuilding and related industries. Finally, this was a coherent state based on an alliance between the monarchy and the urban classes (coming out of the revolution of 1383), well connected to Burgundy and England, learning from

Venice and Genoa, and both capable and willing to deploy policies and programmes of global reach.

Portugal's resources and capacities for global reach did not suddenly materialise in 1494, ready to be dispatched on the world's longest and most arduous maritime expeditions to date. They were designed and developed over a period of several decades prior to that moment. The consolidation of the national territory and identity, and victory in the long war with Spain, freed national resources for new enterprises of substantial scope. The trial run – and Portugal's first transmaritime venture – was the conquest of Ceuta in 1415, an impressive amphibious landing backed by a large fleet. But Ceuta lies on the Mediterranean, east of Tangier, and its capture was not really a first move in an oceanic policy. The long-term benefits of the operation proved elusive as Morocco re-routed trade through other cities. That is why the next two Portuguese projects appear more significant as the true start of oceanic expansion: the discovery, settlement and development of the Azores (midway in the Atlantic) and of Madeira, off the coast of Morocco, in the 1420s. The 'conquest' of Cape Bojador (that is, the rounding of a cape that mariners traditionally regarded as the 'end of the world') signified in 1434 the opening of serious exploration around the coast of Africa and of trade posts along that coast. After an interlude that saw a new burst of adventures in Morocco, John II resumed exploration that culminated in the construction of the fort of El Mina on the Gold Coast; Christopher Columbus was a member of that expedition, and that in turn led to the capture of the gold trade of Guinea (1482). Five years later, Bartolomeu Dias sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and John II knew then that the new route to India was his. His advisors had rejected Columbus' 1484 proposal for sailing west as 'nonsense' (Diffie and Winius, 1977, p. 169).

The policy of exploration, development and inter-continental trade was unprecedented in scope and daring and in itself constituted the major innovation of this cycle. It included the occupation of a number of islands in the Atlantic and later in the Indian Ocean, the researching of problems of sailing on the oceans including navigation and mapping, and the development of new types of ships and naval armament appropriate to these tasks. The caravel emerged in the 1430s coincidentally with the opening of exploration of the African coast. The 'Great Ship' (*nau*) was developed specifically for the voyage to India and to withstand the onerous sailing conditions beyond the Cape of Good Hope as reported by Dias. Naval gunnery,

and in particular the practice of building gun ports into the walls of ships, may have been first fully implemented by the Portuguese; they probably fought the first true naval artillery battles. Portugal's too was the first real oceanic navy, annually sending substantial fleets to India, while keeping everyone else out. These innovations responded to the demands of the age and gave substance to the age of discoveries.

Exploration and hardware and software development prepared the ground for a major breakthrough in global organisation. But this breakthrough also required a major test of strength. First, Venice had to be kept in its place for, as a King of France explained, Venice would like 'kingship and dominion over the whole world' (Zorzi, 1983, p. 1). From 1494 to 1516 Italy became the battleground of Europe and Venice took a lead in putting together a counter-coalition. This, and the coalitions that followed, became the seedbed of modern international politics. In the League of Cambrai (1508) the target was Venice herself, and the proud city came close to losing its independence; its previous (regional) lead role was at an end. Second, Portugal established herself in the Indian Ocean by major combat against the Mamluks of Egypt, who were supported indirectly by Venice (battle of Diu 1509).

This first instance of global-scale warfare had far-reaching consequences: it ended Italy's role as the centre of the European regional system and at the same time terminated Venice's part in organising that system; furthermore, by engaging Europe's major states in a regional conflict in Italy it freed Portugal for oceanic action to establish a global system sanctioned by the Treaty of Tordesillas and superseding the Venetian one. After 1500 Portugal sent annual fleets to the East (159 ships were dispatched from Lisbon between 1500 and 1509) and by 1515 a world-wide network was in place that stretched from the cod fisheries off Newfoundland, and Brazil, to East Africa, the Persian Gulf, the Malabar coast, Malacca and the Spice Islands. Soon China and Japan would join a world system that had a circular network structure: each region (or node) now being accessible from every other region via the oceans.

The two or three decades following 1515 marked the heyday of Portugal's global system, the 'world power' phase of the Portuguese cycle. While Spain's interests were still, in the main, Caribbean and her attention diverted by internal problems and by Charles V's commitments as German emperor and defender of the established faith, Portugal had a good run at the global level. Its 'Burgundian

connection' that had functioned well throughout most of the fifteenth century (until the death of Charles the Bold) was also useful in the sixteenth: at the commercial level, with excellent links at Antwerp (that became the northern distribution point of the Portuguese global system); and at the political level, with comfortable access to the Hapsburgs, who after 1482 ruled not only in Burgundy but increasingly in Spain as well after 1500.

Portugal's global system was not unchallenged. French interlopers and English freebooters challenged it in the North and South Atlantic and occasionally even in the East; Magellan (a Portuguese in the service of Spain) had to be careful and was lucky not to be intercepted by Portuguese patrols when he achieved his circumnavigation of the globe, and the prime results of his voyage, Spanish claims in the Philippines and the Spice Islands, became the subject of years of heated debates and major treaties. Spanish activities in the Americas put increasingly powerful pressures upon the Portuguese system, especially after the conquests of Mexico and Peru. But Portugal and Spain also had important interests in maintaining a common front in defence of the Tordesillas regime and, overall, the Portuguese system held well in place until after 1600.

Many people think it unwarranted to see Portugal in a role of global leadership; instinctively, they compare Portugal with the USA today, and obviously find it wanting. But one must remember that the modern world system in its infancy was in a rudimentary stage capable of being controlled at the global level by a relatively small state with the right qualifications. Other 'Great Powers' may have proved more alluring subjects of attention by historians, but one must give small Portugal its due for having started the whole experiment rolling.

NETHERLANDS

Portugal was not up to operating the global system for very long. The monopoly of trade with India was hard to justify on a permanent basis because, as critics pointed out, Portugal did not discover India; even the Romans had carried on a flourishing trade with the subcontinent; she pioneered one new route to that area. Maritime innovation, arrested in the form of the Great Ship that was perfected *circa* 1530, ceased. After 1550 a series of sea disasters began to plague Portugal's proud ships and this gave rise to an entire literary genre known as

'storia tragico-maritima': 'tales of catastrophe at sea'. As Spain grew rich on American silver, Portugal dropped its connection with Antwerp and came to depend on Seville as its source of that essential metal needed for the Eastern trade.

Portugal, moreover, loosened the ties that earlier bound it, in an effective core alliance, to Burgundy, the political entity then controlling the Netherlands. As just noted, the Antwerp 'factory' was closed down in 1549. The Hapsburgs who had earlier represented the Burgundian connection assumed, after the accession of Philip II, an increasingly Spanish coloration. As long as Charles V ruled, his policies had a basically Burgundian orientation, but in 1555 he divided his possessions between his two sons and assigned the Netherlands to Philip. Philip soon left the Netherlands for Spain and never returned. Not long after, Spanish policy took a decidedly nationalist ('Castilian') turn.

The occasion for the disaster that precipitated the final crisis of the Portuguese system was Morocco. A young and foolish king without an heir launched upon an ill-considered expedition that cost him his life and wiped out his army. The ransom needed to liberate the survivors drained the national economy and the succession crisis gave Philip the chance to stake out a claim to the crown (his mother was Portuguese). He backed up his claim with an efficiently executed military and naval campaign and ascended the Portuguese throne with the support of the urban classes.

In 1580 Philip thus united in his person the impressive holdings of the Spanish Crown – that besides Castile, Aragon, and Navarre, and the new American kingdoms, also included control over Italy and the Netherlands (by then in revolt) – with the global network of the Portuguese Crown, including its still significant navy. This was the empire upon which the sun would never set. For a time in 1580–82 Philip moved his government to Lisbon. 'Looking out over the ocean, this was an ideal place from which to rule the world' observes Fernand Braudel (1984, p. 32). But this oceanic interlude did not last. While Portugal retained its administrative autonomy Philip settled for 'continental' seclusion at the Escorial. According to Braudel, it was 'a fateful mistake'.

For by joining with Portugal, Spain was in effect making a bid for oceanic leadership and such leadership could not be secured by continental policies. Spain's ambition had two special characteristics: first, it had imperial overtones in as much as it seemed to be aimed at the control of the only two other important portions of Western

Europe not yet under the Hapsburg grip – France and England; and, second, her aspiration was justified and came to be wholly identified with the defence of the 'old religion'. Spain's response to the revolt of the Netherlands as well as to the situation in England and the (Huguenots') civil wars in France, was greatly conditioned by this religious issue, an issue that raised fundamental questions about the character of international solidarity.

With the passing of the Portuguese era, the global system thus faced two problems: who should legitimately take the lead position, and what should be the character of solidarity at the global level – i.e. what should be the role, respectively, of the 'old' and the 'new reformed' religion.

The Spanish bid for global leadership was strong; indeed for a time in the 1570s and 1580s it looked overpowering: an impression that lingers in English historical memory to this day. Spain was, of course, a global power of solid standing, but did she attain the position of a world power? Not on this analysis. Her failure to secure this status was less a matter of power and resources, which in her case were considerable: rather, it was a matter of wrongly conceived, imperial-type strategies of 'universal monarchy' – in essence a lack of vision and inability to resolve the global issues of the age. Spain's polity was non-competitive, and grew increasingly intolerant. Her economy was distorted by the flow of free silver from the Americas, expended upon fruitless campaigns all over Europe. Soon lack of strategic vision translated into diminished power, and the real answers to the problems of the age would be given by the United Provinces of the Netherlands. That is why the latter, also now a vital centre of the 'new reformed creed', can arguably, via the Burgundian connection, be regarded as the 'legitimate' successor to Portugal.

At the dawn of the modern world system the Low Countries were, next to Italy, Europe's and probably also the world's most notable concentration of urban, economic, and social activity. Geography placed them at the crossroads of Western Europe, where the Maas and the Rhine meet the North Sea and where the Mediterranean and the Atlantic routes met the Baltic trade. The oceanic discoveries improved their position *vis-à-vis* Italy, and the Reformation itself may be seen as an assertion of the primacy of the North over the 'decaying' South of Europe – the idea that the centre of the Christian world should move where economic and political power was also migrating: to the North.

The Netherlands had, in fact, the necessary qualifications for lead

status: a basic insularity, hence security; social cohesion assured actively (especially at the elite and popular levels in the cities) by the Dutch Reformed Church; economic vigour and a high degree of specialisation, hence capacity for raising large resources for public purposes; and finally a fine navy that shortly grew out of the Sea Beggars into the world's most powerful naval force.

The Netherlanders could also claim the benefit of centuries of close contacts with Portugal, both at the elite and the commercial levels, especially in the fifteenth century. Isabel, daughter of John I of Portugal, married Philip the Good of Burgundy in 1430, and presided at the ducal court and organised its pomp and etiquette until 1471. Thus it was at her intercession that a group of Flemings were settled in the Azores. Her granddaughter Mary's marriage to Maximilian, the Hapsburg who himself was the son of another Portuguese princess, was the event that brought the Hapsburgs to Burgundy and gave them a central role in European politics. On a less exalted plane, trade had been active with Portugal since the Reconquest; for instance, salt from Setubal was essential in the important Dutch herring industry. Next to the Portuguese, the Dutch probably knew most about the structure of the global network that the Portuguese were trying to keep entirely secret. It was a Dutchman, Jan H. van Linschoten, who in 1594 published the account of the Portuguese rule in Asia on the basis of which the Dutch and English voyages would soon be launched.

The mechanism that brought these opportunities to bear upon the global problems discussed earlier was the war of Dutch Independence that was soon internationalised into the War of the Armada and, in effect, into a global war. The Dutch revolt first broke out in 1565–6 and registered its first success in 1572 when the Sea Beggars seized Brill, whereupon much of Holland and Zealand rose up against the Duke of Alba, culminating in what was in effect the proclamation of independence of the United Provinces in 1581. Led by William of Orange, the revolt was right from the start closely co-ordinated with the activities of the Huguenots in France; the Dutch successes of 1572 were counterbalanced by the Huguenots' setbacks in the St Bartholomew's Day massacre. But the powerful Spanish army, led by the Duke of Alba, in Flanders since 1568, was also alarming Protestant England, while English privateers were beginning to prey upon Spanish possessions in the Americas. Spain's seizure of Portugal put into question the legitimacy of the Iberian world system, sanctioned as it was by what came to be known as the 'Borgian

grant'. Spain took the side of the Catholic Party in France. By 1585, when England signed a treaty of alliance with the Dutch, the internationalisation of the Dutch revolt was complete. The Spanish plan for making a landing in England with the army of Flanders (the battle of the Armada) was defeated by the joint action of the English and Dutch navies (1588). In the 1590s the Dutch sailed to the East, openly challenged the Portuguese monopoly of trade and proclaimed the doctrine of freedom of the seas. It was not until 1609 that a Twelve Years' Truce was finally signed between Spain and the United Provinces of the Netherlands. This was only a truce in the great war of Dutch independence, but it was the end of a global-war phase in which all the global powers aligned themselves in a world-wide trial-of-strength.

The primary political innovation of the Dutch cycle was the replacement of the Iberian system and the defeat of the Spanish option by a more workable and a more legitimate global system. A fundamental issue had been the flexibility and the openness of the new arrangements. The Portuguese' and the Spaniards' stern monopoly on all access to the non-European world had become so obviously productive of strife and controversy that it had to be replaced once the knowledge of the operation became more widespread. The Dutch, through their own explorations, together with the English, and not least by their globe- and map-making and their publishing, disseminated the knowledge about the new system. By developing a large navy and a great shipping industry they created another set of circumstances that altered the conditions of control. The Dutch system combined broad general access to the world system with a variety of monopolies in special areas and sectors; The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), for example, had the monopoly of trade with the Indies as well as privileged access to Japan, but it did not claim control over all Asian commerce. Nor was there much change in respect of territorial control, as for instance in the Americas, or in Africa, where either Spanish or Portuguese rule had taken root and remains a significant memory to this day. Attempts to conquer Brazil, for instance, ended in failure. It was only the global level of interactions that became subject to Dutch leadership; Amsterdam became the world market, and a world metropolis, but it did not rule the world.

The principal Dutch innovation may well have been the effective solution devised in response to the need for integration, a problem the wars of religion had pushed to the top of the global agenda; such

a solution had become absolutely essential if the system was to continue operating at all effectively. It comprised two parts: (i) laying the ground for a coherent and persistent elite network that would organise the global system; (ii) structuring the system so that this broadly leading element would not be incompatible with a large degree of flexibility capable of accommodating a variety of other elements.

The strongest link in that great chain was the Anglo-Dutch alliance. After they had renounced their allegiance to Philip II, the Dutch asked Elizabeth to be their 'protector' and sovereign; she refused, but pledged to aid them against Spain, and did so until her death. The alliance was founded on a common interest in containing Spanish power so arrogantly deployed in the heart of Western Europe in the form of the Army of Flanders (Parker, 1976). It was supported by commercial contacts of long standing and high intensity, and most recently by religious connections based on what would later come to be known as the 'Protestant interest' – shared by the Dutch Calvinists and the English Puritans (to be). But the net had an even wider spread. The French Huguenots belonged to it, and Henry IV, a former Huguenot, was part of this winning coalition. Scotland (Calvinist since 1562) was included, as were some Swiss cantons and various German princes and principalities (including Brandenburg, soon to become Prussia) and even the new settler colonies in America (New Amsterdam 1621, Plymouth Rock 1623). The clearest early expression of that network may have been the Synod of Dort (1618) that brought together representatives of the reformed churches from most of these areas. This might be called the basic structure of solidarity that has 'glued together' global affairs for the past four cycles; it is within that structure that the world powers (the Netherlands, Britain twice, the United States) took up their responsibilities.

It is important to stress that this was not a design for world dominion. Global elite linkages were quite compatible with the international political structure of the nation-state system. If Portugal built the first nation-state, the Dutch might be credited with inventing the nation-state system. Their long fight for national independence was their formative political experience. Grotius, their most famous jurist, created the Law of Nations. The Peace of Westphalia (1648), confirming the independence of the Dutch Republic, enshrined the principle of sovereignty in international law and is widely regarded as having laid the legal foundations of the nation-state system, a

concept that performs reasonably well the feat of reconciling leadership with national independence.

This last achievement came close to squaring the circle. But in fact it may have been no more than a transposition of Dutch domestic experience to the international domain. At home in the United Provinces the overarching elite network was Calvinist. Within that network divergent trends developed, even a form of two-party system. Church members, on the other hand, never constituted a clear majority of the population and, in the initial stages of the Republic, perhaps only a small minority. Yet there was also no attempt to enforce religious uniformity or to impose the religion of the governing classes as happened elsewhere in Europe at that time. Thus within a firm framework of cohesive rule a plurality of beliefs and practices prevailed that proved compatible with political and social efficacy. But as time went on this system proved less flexible and in the nineteenth century it was broadened in line with democratic developments.

BRITAIN I

The Dutch system was a notable blend of early nationalism, flourishing capitalism, and a well-honed navy. Its productive achievements, be it in shipbuilding or in land drainage and agriculture, were the envy of all. When Peter the Great of Russia went on a tour of Europe to learn about modernity he chose Amsterdam and its shipyards as his principal classroom. The Dutch trade network was worldwide, and its financial institutions, such as the Bank of Amsterdam or the Stock Exchange, models of organisation.

Built upon a narrow base of small territory and limited population, the United Provinces also were a triumph of social engineering over institutions that contemporary observers described as archaic or even non-existent. True, the political system was strong in that it was capable of calling forth remarkable efforts at times of crisis and of maintaining levels of taxation that were probably the highest among nations of that era. The state certainly was not 'strong' in the sense of being oppressive toward its citizens. But because its institutions harboured an inbuilt and unresolved conflict between the republican States-General (the parliamentary body representing the seven provinces) and the Stadholder (the commander in chief of the army and navy, aspiring to monarchical status and authority) it was liable to

break down into 'disunited provinces' at crucial moments. Its foreign policies lacked vision and the diplomatic service was inadequate for its global role. The predominance of Holland – and, within Holland, of Amsterdam – lent some stability and inertia to the whole but it also aggravated internal tensions.

The Dutch system worked as long as the United Provinces remained the focus of the common effort against Spanish pretensions. But it came under strain soon after Iberian might began to falter, a highly visible signal of that process being the regaining of independence by Portugal in 1640. The collapse of Spanish power removed the *raison d'être* of that effort and opened the field to international competition. The Thirty Years' War removed Germany from contention, but once France began to consolidate under the capable rule of Louis XIV and England emerged from the travail of the civil war greatly strengthened under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell, the pressures of these two powerful and modern states on the Netherlands became quite palpable.

Commercial competition created the occasion for the 'trade wars' between England and the Netherlands between 1652 and 1674. The Navigation Act, 'the notorious ordinance to the disadvantage of trade', as Johan de Witt called it, was in fact deliberately designed to defeat the economic ascendancy of the Dutch (Rowen, 1978, p. 65). The Royal Navy made most profitable use of its superior geographic advantage in the English Channel and the North Sea and of the generally larger and more powerful ships of the line (the Dutch ships being smaller because of the shallower draft called for by the character of their waterways). The wars turned out to be a draw, but Dutch leaders had learned a lesson: for them a war with England meant 'risking disaster, while victory could not bring positive gains but only avert losses' (Rowen, p. 257). In 1653, as part of the peace talks in the first war, Cromwell indeed proposed to unite the English and the Dutch republics 'in such manner as they may become one people and one Common wealth' (ibid., p. 201), but now the Dutch would not have it.

The most serious threat to the survival of the Dutch Republic came in 1672 when Louis XIV launched a powerful land attack that brought him before the gates of Amsterdam. The situation was saved by William III who ordered the dykes opened, flooding much valuable land. England initially joined in that attack but soon withdrew from the war, and after some heavy fighting the Netherlands

retained their independence and integrity, but the stability of the Dutch system was severely shaken.

It seemed as though England was better qualified to replace the Dutch than France. Both countries now commanded resources and capabilities that were at least one order of magnitude superior to those of the Dutch. But, unlike her competitor across the Channel, Britain (a union with Scotland was finalised in 1707) was an island and had discovered what Dehio has called 'the gift of the gods called insularity' (1962, p. 29). Her last continental European positions had been abandoned more than a century earlier and this made it possible to focus national energies squarely on a set of goals relating to global issues and most importantly on sea power. France, on the other hand, always pondered the balance between the competing attractions of an eastern continental policy versus western maritime expansion and usually came out in favour of the former. While France was more populous, England's was a more cohesive society. When France expelled the Huguenots, who were responsible for much of her trade and industry, England welcomed many of them, to the benefit of her national wealth and economy, as did Prussia. France built the most powerful standing army in Europe while Britain's navy became its largest enterprise and soon was the world's dominant maritime force.

The principal selection mechanism between Britain and France was the global war of 1688–1713. The war began with a daring invasion of England by William of Orange as the Protestant claimant to the throne. His smooth accession placed England at the head of the coalition aiming to put limits on the pretensions of the Sun King. The coalition succeeded in maintaining the balance of power in Europe and in preventing the union between France and Spain. By the battle of La Hogue (1692) the British Navy was firmly ensconced in that 'command of the sea' position that, except for a short lapse, was to endure until 1945.

William's 'descent on England' (Carswell, 1969), a seemingly exceptional incident in British history, may in the broader context of long cycles be regarded as the first smoothly working instance of the co-optative process and of the consensual transfer of world power. Within the framework of the Anglo-Dutch core alliance that had been in effect at least since 1585 (and for which the trade wars were no more than temporary rude noises) a process had matured that constituted a major innovation in world politics.

The other major burst of innovations of the first British system

may also be described as political because it centred on the creation of a modern state as the focus of the world system: an institutional complex functionally differentiated from other societal sub-systems. England's political development found solutions to most of the political problems of the Dutch. The Puritan Revolution, Cromwell's dictatorship and the Stuart Restoration together prepared the ground for a political system of moderation. The antagonism between King and Parliament was decisively resolved in favour of Parliament by the Act of Settlement. This in turn cleared the way for an institutionalised party system (see Chapter 7) that would give substance to the rule of Parliament. Furthermore, an independent and basically representative parliament at the centre of the political system distanced itself from religion. While Dissenters and Catholics continued to be excluded from office for the next century they were in fact tolerated. The state was Anglican rather than Calvinist but the Whigs whose Ascendancy dominated this period were probably closer to the Dissenters than to the Anglicans.

Finally, the English system regularised on an unprecedented scale the relations between the state and the economy through such basic institutional forms as the National Debt, the Bank of England and the pound sterling. Through the funding of the public debt that was secure in its principal and regularly serviced by interest payments, the problem of extracting resources for governmental purposes, and especially for financing wars, was put on a sound internal basis. The Bank of England helped to operate the system and looked after the stability of the pound sterling. The stability of the currency in turn underwrote the expansion of trade. Much of this amounted to learning from the experience of the Dutch, and from their problems. But the system that emerged was unique in its comprehensiveness and its elaboration. The political theory that elucidated and justified these developments in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Lord Bolingbroke, David Hume and Edmund Burke remains to this day the conceptual foundation of modern political science. The British political system thus became a lesson to the world. In doing away with absolute monarchy in this relatively painless manner, it accomplished what it took the French one great revolution and several smaller ones to achieve a century or more later. It served as a steady beacon for world leadership and established the preconditions of modern economic development.

BRITAIN II

The principal operating characteristics of the first British system were command of the sea, maintenance of the Balance of Power in Europe, and a mercantilist trade and colonial policy. The War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48) and in particular the Seven Years' War (1756–63) seemed to strengthen Britain immensely, by demonstrating once again her naval mastery, her capacity to manage complex alliances in Europe, and by adding greatly to her commercial and colonial assets especially in North America and India (at French and Spanish expense). The Treaty of Paris (1763) appeared to vindicate in an even more decisive manner the verdict of the wars against Louis XIV.

As a matter of fact the verdict was not all that conclusive because the very decisiveness of the results of the wars produced problems. Whig Ascendancy had about exhausted itself and British politics (including the party system) was in disarray. In North America the disappearance of the French danger dissolved the cohesion that bound the American colonists to London. In India the defeat of the French transformed the East India Company from a trading organisation into a territorial ruler and placed a severe strain on its profitability. This in turn produced a demand for sources of revenue (*inter alia* from tea) that placed new burdens on the American colonies.

The mounting troubles of the first British system came to light most dramatically during the War of American Independence. Starting as a local uprising this war soon transformed into an international conflict of major proportions through the intervention of France (war declared 1778), Spain (1779) and the Netherlands (1780). All of a sudden, the basic conditions of Britain's global system seemed to crumble: the command of the sea was lost (leading to the capitulation of Cornwallis at Yorktown and directly to the peace granting independence to the Americans); even more significantly perhaps, Britain found herself without a single ally, in complete international isolation, and threatened by invasion as well. Far from managing a balance of power and a delicate system of alliances to suit her own (as well as the general) interest, it was she, uniquely in the experience of the modern age, whom most of the other global powers lined up against. Finally, the grievances of the colonists as well as the problems of the East India Company pointed to the need for a fundamental reassessment of the mercantilist colonial system.

Historians have come to see this as the crisis of the first, and the founding of the second, British empire (Harlow, 1952, 1964). It might more broadly be interpreted as a decay phase (deconcentration) of Britain I and the formative stages of the Britain II global system (clarification and coalitioning). Britain's qualifications for world leadership were if anything stronger than they had been one hundred years earlier. France remained the only viable competitor but she had not succeeded in truly improving her position *vis-à-vis* Britain, either in the wars or in other undertakings. In the age of enlightenment her political system had remained absolutist, surely a prescription for unsettlement. Despite rising wealth (her GNP seems to have risen in the eighteenth century at a higher rate than Britain's – see Braudel, 1984, p. 382) her contribution to industrial growth or to the international economic system seemed disproportionately small as compared with her potential.

Britain's institutional strength allowed her to overcome the crises of naval weakness and international isolation. The Rockingham reforms restored confidence in Parliament and government. The wars of the French Revolution and of Napoleon that occupied the next generation saw the Royal Navy rise to the height of its power and Britain once again at the head of powerful coalitions. One after the other, the coalitions would succumb to Napoleon's brilliant generalship and to the vigour of the French armies, but Britain would not give up and in the end her grand alliance prevailed. Napoleon ended his days as Britain's prisoner on St Helena.

That much for the cyclical aspect of the story. Britain built on strength and moved steadily onward. What is of central interest, however, is her response to the crisis of her commercial system as represented by North America and India. As is now apparent, from a long-cycle perspective, she met that crisis by a series of spectacular innovations in industry, trade and economic policy that one century later came to be referred to as the Industrial Revolution. This changed the face not just of Britain and parts of Europe and North America in the nineteenth century but of the entire world in the twentieth, with its effects still far from exhausted to-day.

The Industrial Revolution first took root in the generation prior to the Napoleonic wars. In the early stages of the modern world system, a sophisticated application of wind-power had supplied the energy for oceanic navigation, for key engineering projects such as land drainage and water management, and for industrial purposes such as milling. Both the Portuguese and the Dutch excelled in the

use of wind-power. In the first two waves of the Industrial Revolution it was the utilisation of a new and unprecedentedly more powerful source of energy, the steam engine, that revolutionised key sectors of economic activity. The invention and development of the steam engine, while starting early in the century, was a protracted process that took off in 1759 in the patent awarded to James Watt for a condenser and continued through a number of his other innovations for the next two decades. In 1770, James Hargreaves received a patent for the spinning-jenny, the invention that mechanised cotton spinning. The combination of these two developments from about 1780 onward revolutionised the textile industry and made it the lead sector of the new industrial age. In the second wave of the Industrial Revolution the steam engine was applied to purposes of transportation. In 1825, George Stephenson, the inventor of the locomotive, opened the Stockton– Darlington line and, soon after, one between Manchester and Liverpool, and thus inaugurated the railway age. Soon the steam engine received wide application in ship propulsion.

Britain's Industrial Revolution was a response to the changing conditions in the global system, but she too changed in the process. Her policy shifted away from colonial monopolies and protected markets to a self-confident assertion of free trade; her assurance was derived from the great productivity of her new factories. It was a dramatic turn-away from trade empires in the Portuguese–Spanish mode, towards an 'empire of free trade' (in Gallagher and Robinson's (1953) sense of an 'informal empire'), still dependent on an overarching political framework but qualitatively different in allowing for more choice and flexibility. The outlines of such a policy were beginning to come together in the 1780s, having received powerful intellectual stimulus from Adam Smith's great *Wealth of Nations* (1776) and substantial political impetus from Lord Shelburne, the father of the peace settlement with the American colonies. 'We prefer trade to dominion' he argued in defending against vehement criticism the treaties that 'from end to end' were inspired by 'the great principle of free trade' (Harlow, 1952, vol. 1, pp. 436, 448). It was obvious to him that a new world full of potential friends and customers was much to be preferred to a narrow and costly-to-administer enclave rife with hostilities. But this view was yet to be widely shared. Even though the peace treaties were implemented, Shelburne fell from power and Britain moved toward complete free trade slowly, completing the process only as late as 1846.

All this was happening while Britain herself was undergoing drastic

change. From a largely agricultural society with important commercial interests in wool, sugar and in the Eastern trade centred largely on the South and the West, benefiting London, the port towns and the landed interest, she moved in the space of a few decades to become a predominantly industrial society, exporting industrial products and materials world-wide with the world's largest shipping fleet, a society of the urban and industrial classes now based on the North of England and Scotland.

While some analysts have trouble recognising the British role in the first cycle, few would deny that the nineteenth century was in fact the age of Britain. But for students of long cycles the really interesting question is, How did Britain manage the transition from one successful cycle to the next – how, in fact, had Britain 'managed' two cycles where its immediate predecessors, Portugal and the Netherlands, only lasted one cycle each? For such 'repeat performance' cannot be taken for granted and must be regarded as an innovation.

Britain had, on this evidence, two distinct cycles. In the first, the essential changes were political, and concerned parliamentary rule and the procedural basis of democracy on the one hand, and the stabilisation and delimitation of the political system on the other. In the second, the essential tasks were economic and industrial, also with world-wide effect. Undergirding both cycles were the command of the seas and a successful balance-of-power policy in Europe together with regional-level control in other parts of the world.

Why and how, then, did Britain succeed in putting her stamp on two cycles? She did it by repeating some successful policies (command of the sea, balance of power) but innovating fundamental others (from trade empire to industrial growth). Most important of all is the insight that Britain's golden age in the nineteenth century was readied and prepared for – and had to be readied and prepared for some two generations earlier in the series of basic innovations that surfaced and spread so vigorously in the second half of the eighteenth. The crumbling of the first British system, in the wake of a bungled colonial war, was the shock that stimulated new ideas and set under way the processes that would soon constitute the foundations of even more astounding gains in the second. This managing of a repeat cycle was in and of itself another major political innovation.

UNITED STATES

The London Great Exhibition of 1851 marked the zenith of the second British cycle; it was a sumptuous celebration of technical and industrial prowess. But within a decade or two of that event the system began to show signs of stress, brought about to a significant degree by Britain's earlier achievements. For the Industrial Revolution transformed not only her own economy and society but also that of other and potentially rival states; in short it engineered a large-scale diffusion of power. Industrialisation and the spread of railroads in particular created the preconditions for the emergence of markets of continental dimensions; it undercut the influence of sea power and favoured continental states. Whereas the first and second waves of industrial growth started and gained momentum in Britain first of all, the third wave of development (in steel, chemistry and electricity, beginning in the 1870s and 1880s) occurred simultaneously in Britain and in several other (larger) countries: in Germany, in the United States, in France, and soon also it began to be experienced in Russia and in Japan.

In the (delegitimation) phase of the long cycle that followed 1848, several critical areas underwent profound political and then economic changes reflecting these conditions. By 1865 the United States had reaffirmed the possibility of national unity, and within another generation that unity was implemented on a continental scale, demonstrating at the same time great resources in the deployment of industrial and naval projects on a global scale. By 1870 Germany had achieved unity in a great Empire, creating at the centre of Europe an unprecedented concentration of industrial and military might. A naval dimension would be added to it after 1899. By 1867 Japan had taken the decision to modernise and to create a powerful nation-state on the British–German model.

In the ensuing international competition and scramble for power that soon assumed the form of economic imperialism, Britain's capacity to order the global system declined and she resorted essentially to a defensive stance. She turned away from Europe where the rise of Germany was upsetting traditional balance-of-power calculations; conceding regional primacy to the latter, she concentrated her attention on protecting her seemingly vast imperial possessions and erecting barriers behind which the status quo could still be enjoyed in India, Africa and even the Middle East. Nor did either her educational or technological attainments reach the level called

for by these dramatic changes – the most devastating critique of the lack of cultural creativity coming from such internal critics as Matthew Arnold (*Culture and Anarchy*, 1869).

The creation of large nation-states and powerful economies on several continents transformed the scale and the operational conditions of world affairs. It 'continentalised' the scales of politics and economics and raised the stakes required for active player status. In the same way that the discoveries of the Renaissance shifted the optimum scale of operations from Italian city-states to the nation-states of Europe, so now the Industrial Revolution created the possibility of large states in several parts of the world and with full global capability.

What were the candidates for world leadership in this new, higher-stakes game of world politics? Russia, who in the period following 1815 had been Britain's principal counterweight in Europe and the Near East, was checked in the Crimean War of the 1850s and then sank into a morass of internal problems from which she had great difficulty extricating herself. Germany, on the other hand, was building up some strong qualifications. German linkages with Britain were approaching the strength of a core alliance, and they were particularly evident at the elite level where the ruling dynasty in England had been Hanoverian since George I and had retained close connections with Germany, especially under Queen Victoria. Certain industrialists (such as the Chamberlains) favoured a German alignment. Just as significantly, Prussia (earlier called Brandenburg) had been Britain's important ally through two global wars and even longer via the 'Protestant interest' and via the Dutch connection. (For instance, in 1688, during the critical months of William III's landing in England, Brandenburg provided the troops that shielded the Dutch Republic from possible French attack; in 1815 the timely arrival of the Prussian corps decided the issue at Waterloo.)

In her own right, too, Imperial Germany controlled some valuable assets. Her national spirit of cohesion, if somewhat hysterical, was undoubtedly strong. Her industrial complex of almost continental proportions excelled in crucial lead sectors, especially steel, chemistry as well as electrical engineering; this in turn provided the goods that her growing world trade network was making available for exports. Observers of the new Germany were particularly struck by the pride displayed in all manifestations of *Kultur*: in arts and music, in the excellence of scholarship and in the quality of educational and research organisations.

Even though Germany's resources were deployed close to the existing centres of power and were readily mobilised, her long-term qualifications for world leadership were not as good as those of the United States. Germany basically was a continental rather than an oceanic power, with all the liabilities that entailed; much in the same way as France, she tended toward continental preoccupations governed by her long land frontiers each beset with a host of political problems (as, for example, Alsace-Lorraine in relation to France). The United States, on the other hand, was, and is, a continental-size island of oceanic orientation with basically unproblematic frontiers (the Canadian border was demilitarised after 1814 and definitively delimited after 1846; the Mexican border reached its present definition in 1854 in the Gadsden Purchase). Once settlement had been achieved, with the 'vanishing' of the last frontier in the 1890s, the country could be seen as a substantial platform for global interactions and, facing both the Atlantic and the Pacific, being as favourably situated in relation to the global system as Britain once was in relation to Europe. Already exceeding Britain's production by 1885, America's output was notable both for the range and quality of mechanisation as well as for high levels of productivity – with especial distinction in such industries of the future as petroleum (Standard Oil was founded in 1865), aircraft (the Wright brothers' flight of 1903) and communications (press and movies; the first motion picture was completed in Hollywood in 1908). By 1900 a two-ocean navy was being put in place that would soon equal Britain's.

While Anglo-German links were undoubtedly strong, those binding Britain and the United States proved even stronger. They were significant at the elite level where it mattered most, as the new wealth of the Reconstruction era began to be converted into transatlantic marriage links, the most famous early example of which was the 1874 marriage of Jennie Jerome, daughter of a Wall Street financier, to Randolph Churchill, a younger son of the Duke of Marlborough and soon a leading politician. They were even stronger at the popular level, given the common origins and the commonalities in political and other institutions.

Britain also had a part to play in these choices. Just as William of Orange helped to propel Britain into a position of leadership, so British leaders, too, would help to sway the balance one way or the other, most likely through the medium of an alliance. Where would Britain's choice go? Or was such a choice in fact necessary? Some contemporaries seemed to think, as Cecil Rhodes apparently implied

in his scholarship scheme (besides Americans, Germans, too, were sent to Oxford), that some kind of Anglo-German-American condominium was possible. But around 1900 Britain turned down proposals for an Anglo-German alliance and in effect threw in her lot with the United States. British policy supported the United States in the Spanish–American war over Cuba, reassigned her naval forces away from American stations, and received support in her own Boer war. While there is no need to underestimate the difficulties and frictions attending that relationship (as shown, for example, in Cameron Watt's recent account, 1984), soon a veritable Anglo-Saxon alliance bloomed in many colours and found bountiful expression in the First and Second World Wars.

This basic realignment occurred in the decades prior to 1914, thus giving evidence for the process of coalitioning that also brought France, Russia and Japan into the general coalition. But the final test of it was the global war itself. The United States joined the First World War in 1917 when Germany's all-out submarine warfare threatened the security of the North Atlantic area and when, more generally, West European independence seemed at risk. Broadly similar considerations governed American policies in 1940–41 even if the immediate occasion for joining the second round of the global conflict was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war that followed it. In both World Wars the United States fought as partner in large coalitions and soon found itself in a lead position. Woodrow Wilson's leadership took on moral as well as political dimensions but it failed to carry the country. In refusing to ratify the Paris Peace Accords and in choosing isolation the Senate in effect rejected world leadership. But the United States remained active in hemispheric matters and in the Far East and, after Pearl Harbor, promptly resumed a leadership position in the context of the 'special relationship' with Britain based on a close personal understanding and frequent meetings between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Yet it was not until the Greek crisis of early 1947 and the Truman Doctrine that the process of transfer of the mantle of leadership may be said to have been finally completed.

The chief mechanism of succession was the global war and, in its course, the Anglo-American core alliance. Quite likely, the novelty of shifting gears in the global system – from a chiefly Europe-based leadership to the larger proportions of a continental-sized, even if initially European-oriented, base – must be among the reasons why the process was less than smooth, and yet also why the process

itself must be regarded as innovative. The global system was in fact acquiring a lead unit more adequately equipped to handle a larger array of global problems.

But the process also involved other innovative elements linked to, but going beyond, the enlargement of the scope of global action. If a new stage had been reached in world development, possibly even in world culture, then the first need would be for additional means of clarifying the new situation, finding out about it in depth and researching it thoroughly. If, as Geoffrey Barraclough has argued, the end of the nineteenth century was indeed the beginning of a new epoch in world history, and if the Industrial Revolution, and all that, paved the way for it (it had laid the foundations of wealth and material abundance), then the time may have arrived to erect the needed infrastructure of truth for a higher-level global system. To do that it would be necessary to stress above all else education, science, technology and 'culture-maintenance' in a general fashion such that the age might in retrospect be called, perhaps, an educational revolution or maybe even a knowledge revolution.

The American role in this education–science revolution was much more substantial than it is perhaps credited with, and compares favourably with what at the beginning of the century would have been regarded as the superior accomplishments of German culture. The foundations of that role were laid, as might be expected, in the second half of the nineteenth century. In respect to higher education, for example, the decisive measures were the establishment of the land grant college system (Morrill Act 1862) and the introduction of graduate education and the research function into the university system (Johns Hopkins, modelled after German universities, leading the way in 1876). Between 1850 and 1914, in a massive wave of educational investment, more than 200 colleges and universities were founded, so that already at the beginning of the First World War higher educational institutions in the United States (over 300) were nearly equal in number to those in all of the rest of the world combined (maybe 400). Particularly striking were comparisons with Britain (about 30) and Germany (about 40) whose populations at that time were not that much smaller than the United States' (Britain 45m, Germany 70m, USA 100m, in 1914).

This large-scale investment in the future paid off in various ways, not the least of which was the quality of scientific life. Between 1903 and 1973 about one-third of the Nobel Prizes went to Americans. It is hardly surprising therefore that the most massive scientific-

engineering project to that date, the Manhattan Project to construct a nuclear weapon, was completed in the United States in the relatively short period of 1940–45, in time to fire the last salvo of the Second World War. This project reached fruition in the United States even though nuclear fission was first discovered in Berlin, on the eve of that war in December 1938. The leader of the project, Robert J. Oppenheimer, was a Harvard graduate who earned his doctorate in physics at Goettingen in 1927 and then taught at Berkeley and Caltech.

It is the creation of a large, diverse and self-renewing educational–scientific–technological complex in which innovation itself was being institutionalised that may indeed have been the United States' chief contribution to global development in that cycle.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The question is: Does a chain process concept of long cycles fit the evidence? The answer is: As a first cut, it does, and it does so, on the whole, better than could be hoped for. With the length of each cycle set at just over 100 years, a model of this kind matches well the record of major events over the past half-millenium and in two important ways.

(1) It documents the regularity of the long cycle. The waxing and waning of world powers, and their succession, propelled by those spectacular systemic decisions that have been global wars, accounts for the major beat of world politics. Five cases do not add up to a very large universe but they are a reassuring basis for tentative prediction. They portray world politics as a rational system of a coherent structure. They do not show the long cycle to be a war cycle but rather a basic political process that in the past five cases has been mediated by one distinct class of war, the global war that in itself is a critical political mechanism of decision in the sense of test or competition, and might in future be replaced by some other mechanism of lesser lethality. The regularity is reassuring as evidence of order and denies, so far, the possibility that the system is moving in the direction of chaos.

(2) The model also captures the evolutionary character of the system. The basic regularity governs not a dreary sequence of repetitions but rather the evolution of a 'live' system as it responds to problems of its own creation and gradually moves toward higher

levels of complexity in a cumulative manner. The emphasis on innovation draws attention to the precise mechanisms of this evolution. It further documents the claim that the system is a developmental one. It is both the strengths and weaknesses, both the notable successes and the mistakes, of the lead powers, that animate the successive cycles and lead to the structural solutions that it produces. It is in this way that, for example, Venice's solutions to the problem of East–West trade propelled the discoveries, just as the successes and the problems of the first British system produced a range of solutions that reconfigured both Britain and the world in the second system.

What About Origins?

The combination of regularity and change is a striking feature of the long cycle and summarises in one neat formula a half-millenium of world politics. A chain-process model, which represents a feedback system, is persuasive as an account of change but it does not, by itself, capture the origins of the process. These questions remain: What is it that set in motion the process of long cycles? What is it that started the long cycle in the modern world system given the fact that the pre-modern world system showed no such process?

The general answer to these questions must be given in terms of the analysis outlined in Chapter 1. Long cycles are a mode of operation of the global polity; hence long cycles begin when the global political system is born. That event occurred in 1494, but it did not happen entirely out of the blue of the Atlantic Ocean. If it may be posited that the evolution of the global system was prepared by developments extending over the previous several centuries, then the sources of these might be sought in two other blue seas: the Mediterranean, and the China Sea.

The argument so far has been that at some point in time the global system had engendered problems that a rising power successfully resolved with a set of innovations in the context of a global test-of-strength. While it portrays and accounts well for the role of Portugal in the discoveries, it does not quite explain why at the same time this successful operation not only solved these particular problems at hand but also set in motion, for the first time, a global-system process that would continue operating for at least five more cycles and that for all intents and purposes is still functioning.

Two sets of circumstances may have played a part in setting up

this global motion of long cycles. First, a process of a similar character, albeit on the more modest scale of regional interactions, may have been centred on Italy in the half-millenium prior to 1500. In this sense the modern long cycle may represent a scaling-up to the world level of a smaller sectoral process. Venice in particular was an obvious model to follow and it is a familiar point that it did in fact serve as a role model not only for Portugal but also the Netherlands and England. In a broader sense, all of Italy, since about the year 1000, may have served as a living source of learning for all early modernisers. If that is the case then the problem of explaining the origin of modern long cycles is pushed back to the years around 1000.

William McNeill recently suggested that a role parallel to that of Italy, in roughly the same time-scale, may also have been played by Sung China. According to him, Sung development based on South China, and including national integration, economic expansion, and political and cultural consolidation, may have lent an impetus to the entire world system: 'China's rapid evolution toward market-regulated behavior' *circa* 1000 AD may have 'tipped a critical balance in world history' (1983, p. 25). At about that time the population of the China–Japan area was approaching a size three times that of Europe (120m v. 40m), and that alone would have made it the world's largest market, and a search for routes to that market a major preoccupation of non-Chinese traders. The period is also notable for its rapid development of sea power. But the Sung pattern froze into a mould of Confucian stability rather than into a mode of steady innovation, and it succumbed to nomad 'barbarians' when the last Sung strongholds fell to Kublai Khan in 1279. The Mongol conquest set China back; but although the Mongols seized large expanses of Asia and the Middle East they never subdued either Western Europe or Japan.

Second, the conditions of 1500 may have been unusually propitious to the generation of the long-cycle process. Not only did a strong and effective organisation, the Portuguese nation-state, invest one century of effort into exploration and discoveries but it also functioned in a broader context that admired, applauded, appreciated, envied and competed with those efforts and also consumed their fruits. This was in striking contrast with the experience of the Chinese expeditions (the seven voyages of Cheng Ho starting in 1405 and ending with his death in 1435) that travelled to the Indian Ocean and the coasts of East Africa at about the same time. They were

well executed, and experienced no great technical or navigational obstacles where they went, but they failed to ignite enthusiasm and political support at home and were soon quietly abandoned. The world system *circa* 1500 may therefore have been a case of 'sensitive dependence on initial conditions' that touched off the macro-political process of long cycles.

In sum, both sets of circumstances, the regional antecedents and the special circumstances of 1500, must be considered in a full explanation of the origins of long cycles. At about 1000 the world system might have been sprouting two nuclei of a global system. China gained an early lead but then fell behind. The conditions were more propitious in Western Europe and it was Portugal that exploited them most adroitly.

A Summary View

In schematic form the narrative evidence presented at such considerable length in this chapter may be mapped out as in Table 4.1. For each world power this shows the principal events in the two internal,

Table 4.1 Internal and external phases of the long cycle (world power learning mode)

	Cycle phases		
	internal		*external*
	Clarification Coalitioning	Macrodecision	Implementation
Portugal 1430–1540	National consolidation Exploration and discoveries	Naval expeditions to Indian Ocean	Bases and trade
Netherlands 1540–1640	Internal turmoil Revolt against Spain	Global war against Spain	East India Co. (VOC) West India
Britain I 1640–1740	Puritan Revolution Restoration	Wars against Louis XIV	Bank of England East India Co.
Britain II 1740–1850	Seven Years War Industrial Revolution	War against Napoleon	Free trade Railroads
USA 1850–1970	Civil War Reconstruction	World Wars I, II	'Free World'

and the two external, phases of its cycle. The purpose is to suggest that in a broad view these events display a fairly orderly pattern of progression, from internal consensus and cohesion building, some taking the form of political disruption and revolution, to the external operations on a global scale, both of political execution and administration of world order. The sequence is not invariably as neat as such a view would predict; for instance, in the Portuguese case the process of search and exploration, that is exploration of issues relevant to global policy, is often coextensive with episodes of national consolidation but the general fit of the model is in fact entirely adequate.

The following additional points may be noted about this table. Global wars feature in this arrangement as the 'executive' phase of the two 'external' phases of the world-power cycle: the phase in which the macrodecisions are taken and executed that, by a public and world-wide trial of strength, determine world order in the next (systemic) cycle. This is how the territorial framework of world order has been laid out so far, and that is when the major coalitions that win global wars and shape world politics in the next phases are tested in a competitive trial for their endurance and viability. If this view of the global war is correct, if it may be described as the constitutional decision-making phase of the long cycle, the most 'political' of the four phases of this political process, then it is at least conceptually clear that global wars are no more than one of the ways by which such executive and decision-making processes can be carried out, and have in fact been carried out in the past. The door is open for inventing political devices that can accomplish the same aim without engulfing the world in another conflagration; in other words, for inventing a substitute to the next global war.

Where We Are Now

The implications of this analysis for understanding contemporary world politics are considerable.

(1) The United States *world power* cycle is now over. At some point in the 1970s – maybe 1971 (end of dollar convertibility), 1973 (oil embargo) or 1975 (end of Vietnam war) – that particular process, the 'administrative' phase of the US system of world order, came to an end. At the systemic level the world then moved into a phase in which the legitimacy of various aspects of that order – e.g. its

international currency arrangements, its oil regime, or the matter of military intervention – came under review.

(2) Granted that point, the world system is also at the same time in the first phase of its next world-power cycle, the initial phase of clarification wherein the candidates for world leadership are defining their purposes and reviewing positions for the next round of the competitive trials that are ahead. The qualifications required for world leadership in the next cycle were fully reviewed in the last chapter.

(3) A chain-reaction/feedback-process model just mapped out proposes that the principal innovations of the United States cycle have been (a) a scaling-up of world politics and (b) the launching of the knowledge (education–science–technology) revolution. If that were so then these two major developments are also likely to be the sources of major problems for the next cycle.

More specifically, the 'continentalisation' of world politics moves it beyond the format within which a fairly narrowly based, largely West European, elite could frame the issues and decide the major questions. New networks of solidarity are needed at the global level to serve as the infrasturcture of the coming world order, and this is seen as the major general problem of the coming cycle. Granted that education, science and technology were the major achievements of the era just past, it is clear, too, that these advances in their turn pose the greatest threat to its survival that the human race has encountered so far. They have made possible the weapons of mass destruction, the nuclear bombs first used in the closing stages of the last global war and since developed and refined to an unprecedented degree of destructiveness. Thus the main political question of the coming cycle must be how to resolve this dilemma through timely and effective innovation, so that the weapons are not used when the time for macro-decision comes – that is, in the next executive phase of the long cycle. This may not allow a great deal of time for finding alternatives for such a well-entrenched mechanism as the global war. But thanks also to the knowledge revolution, the writing is on the wall and the message is clear for all to see. Because the modern world system entails a learning process, the expectation that such new ways will in fact be found through major innovations is not unreasonable.

5 Learning

Phase-movement, the progress of a system through a number of distinct phases, is the essence of the cyclic process. Thus, the explanation of cyclic, i.e. regularly recurring change, must be able to account for the system's advance from one phase to the next. In the literature of the social sciences, Talcott Parsons's model of phase-movement stands out for its theoretical clarity and rigour, as well as its capacity for integration with other basic concepts and practical problems.

This chapter first recalls some evidence for the patterning of long cycles in a manner that suggests phases; next it summarises the Parsonian phase model and presents arguments why it might be useful in the present analysis. It then proposes that the long cycle, in fact, shows movement in a certain pattern and direction that can be interpreted as motion through phases as defined by the Parsonian four-function paradigm. When the model is matched against the empirical record of global politics, it becomes apparent that the long cycle is, in fact, a learning process. Finally, going beyond the phases of each long cycle, it is possible to argue that every long cycle may also be viewed as one sequence of a larger learning movement, the working of the global system.

THE LONG CYCLE AS PHASE-MOVEMENT

A phase may be defined as 'a stage or interval in a development or cycle'. The phases of the moon in respect of shape or output of luminosity, or the stages of the human life-cycle, are some examples of man's familiarity with phases as one of the elemental ingredients of experience. A phase naturally presupposes a regularly recurring process of development, or cycle, of which it is one fairly uniform sequence or episode. Parsons, Bales and Shils (1953, p. 167) describe the phases of an 'action pattern' as 'the major uniformities of process in a given time period as against those uniformities that precede or follow it in time'. Hence the question here now becomes: Are there, within each cycle, successive uniformities of process of such a degree that they justify the appellation of 'phase'? Moreover, do long cycles

themselves exhibit sufficient uniformity to merit the designation of phases in a superordinate process of the next higher system?

It was argued in Chapter 1 that the manifestations of global politics described as long cycles do indeed exhibit uniformities that can be described as phases, and additional evidence to that effect transpired in Chapters 2 and 4. At this stage the case will be made more explicitly in respect of the most uniformly homogeneous of the four phases of the long cycle, that of global war.

Global War Phase

The global wars of the modern world have been central to the identification of the five long cycles of world leadership. These great systemic decisions by test of strength punctuate the movement of the system at regular intervals across half a millenium. Because it is the global wars that repeatedly select the world power that will reconstruct the international order out of war-created chaos, they are also central to the operation of the global political system.

Most importantly for analytical purposes, global wars can be shown to illustrate in the clearest possible manner the characteristic of 'major uniformities of process'. If a global war is defined as a period of armed hostilities involving the global powers over the issues of the organisation and the constitution of the global political system, then it has already been demonstrated that prolonged, yet distinct, intervals of modern history have been occupied with precisely such major patterns of political action. Even at this time of writing, it is impossible to forget how profoundly the world is shaped by the First and Second World Wars, that series of major hostilities that ended in 1945. Of course, some students of International Relations act as though nothing of any importance whatever happened before that date.

But take a less obvious case, the period following the outbreak of the French Revolution. Between 1792 and 1815, Europe, together with other parts of the world system (the only important exceptions being China and Japan), were preoccupied with virtually continuous land and sea warfare, with just one short truce between 1802 and 1803. In that sequence of dramatic events that has become almost completely identified with Napoleon Bonaparte, France was the principal challenger, while Britain was the defender of the status quo and the keystone and element of continuity in a constantly shifting array of counter-coalitions. Britain's leadership of the world was at

stake, and the outcome of the wars was a reaffirmation of it, but at the cost of 23 years of almost unceasing hostilities, innumerable casualties, and the disruption of the global economic system. The period's distinguishing feature was the central importance of political and military activities: of alliances, campaigns on land and sea, brilliant battles and tragic defeats, as well as other occasions of collective achievement such as had not been seen in many decades and were not to be seen again, on such a scale, for another hundred years in the world wars of the twentieth century.

What is it that makes global wars distinct from other wars? To recapitulate, one must, after duration, emphasise size. These wars engage all the major actors of world politics in simultaneous combat, i.e. combat of the largest possible dimensions; for that reason, they are the 'limiting case' of war: more comprehensive forms of conflict on earth cannot actually be imagined. Consequently, they must obviously be long-lasting: the line-up of players is not easily exhausted or eliminated, and their cost in terms of human life and accumulated wealth is greater than any other on record. Rasler and Thompson (1983), for instance, show that the effect of past global wars on the public debt of Britain and the United States was qualitatively different from that of all their other wars; similarly drastic effects may also be demonstrated on the economy as a whole.

The second step in this recapitulation must consider the wars' global coverage: they are characteristically naval conflicts involving all parts of the earth and of the world's oceans; they also account for most of the naval battles of history. Last, but not least, global wars have been different from other wars because they were system-shaping events: the issues they raised and decided were turning-points for the quality of world order and for the direction of the peace to come. This makes the five cases of global war that can be identified with precision instances of major regularity in the world political process, distinct in nature and in basic features from what immediately preceded and followed them.

Viewed as continuous in their major features (even though most of them had intervals of truce and even peace), the five global-war periods of the modern world system lasted between 23 and 31 years, the mean duration being 27 years (Table 5.1). The wars of Louis XIV had an interval of four years after the Treaty of Rijswijk and, as already mentioned, the Napoleonic wars had a fourteen months' truce after the Treaty of Amiens. And the whole period between the start of the First World War and the end of the Second World

Table 5.1 Global wars and long cycles

Global war phase	*Length (years)*	*'Systemic' long cycle*	*Length (years)*	*'World power' long cycle*	*Length (years)*
Italian Wars 1494–1516	(23)	1494–1579	(86)	1430–1540	(111)
Wars of Dutch Independence 1580–1609	(29)	1580–1688	(108)	1540–1640	(100)
Wars of Louis XIV 1688–1713	(26)	1689–1791	(103)	1640–1739	(99)
Napoleonic Wars 1792–1815	(24)	1792–1913	(122)	1740–1850	(111)
World Wars I and II 1914–1945	(31)	1914–1973 (half cycle)	(59)	1850–1973	(123)
Mean (n=5)	27	(n=4.5)	106	(n=5)	109

War may be regarded as the fifth global-war phase, principally because the issues raised in the First World War were not settled or decided until 1945.

Table 5.1 singles out the global-war phase within long cycles, considered both in the systemic and the world-power modes. 'Systemic' cycles use as their basic marker the global-war phase and the phase that follows it; they have ranged from 87 to 122 years in duration, with a mean of 106. 'Systemic' cycles are distinguished from 'World Power' cycles each of which begins with the Delegitimation phase, ends with the World Power phase and averages 107 years in length. The mean duration of a systemic cycle is almost exactly four times the average length of the global-war phase ($27 \times 4 = 108$). On the average, therefore, the global-war phase has lasted about one-quarter of one long cycle, plus or minus no more than four years, with a slight tendency for a lengthening of phase (and cycle) toward the end of the entire epoch.

If the global war constitutes a clearly distinct phase of the long cycle, lasting one-quarter of the entire cycle, then it is not difficult to follow up this finding with the suggestion that the remainder of each long cycle may also be divided into three roughly equal parts

(with major events and processes, especially those involving the world powers, serving as boundary markers). When this is done, each long cycle can be seen to consist of four phases of about equal length. One uniformity present in each of the remaining three phases is, of course, absence of global war. But there may be others. A study employing a 'cobweb' model (Modelski and Thompson, 1981) has confirmed that in each long cycle four phases may be distinguished: one phase of large 'order surplus' followed by one of lower order surplus (or deficit), followed again by surplus, etc. The pattern is statistically significant in all but three of the seventeen phases for which empirical evidence was available. This suggests that a four-phase pattern is, prima facie, a reasonable way of cutting up the cake of the long cycle; thus the cycle is not a simple up-and-down movement, but a rather more complex double-beat or rhythm with a period close to 30 years.

But if these findings are correct for the long cycle, they also suggest the possibility of process uniformity at a level superordinate to the global political system. Might it not be that the long cycle as such is an instance of phase uniformity at a higher level, that of the global system?

Each long cycle, in fact, constitutes such a major uniformity, if only because it is composed of a regular series of phases of definable order, both regarding alternation and substantive content. Yet each cycle also has characteristics that distinguish it from what precedes and follows it: above all, every cycle has a particular world power at the helm, and a new set of challengers. The location of the active zone shifts with each cycle, and the principal issues animating it also vary.

A thought legitimately sprouts at this point: Is not each long cycle, viewed as a unit movement in the global system, a phase of a larger process whose broad framework has already been spelled out in Chapter 1? Though it may not yet be time to answer it, this is the question that arises out of the logic of this inquiry.

This makes it clear that the long cycle is not a purely political process that unfolds in isolation from other social processes. As noted in Chapter 3, it is seemingly synchronised with other co-ordinate processes such as the global economic process, and with the working of the lead economy (the national economy of the world power). In the same way, some degree of interchange might also be expected between the global polity and global 'pattern-maintenance' (that is, in fact, a social-reproduction system), and the global

community, too – in other words, between sub-systems 2, 3 and 4 of Table 1.1.

The argument can be carried further. If the long cycle relates the global polity to its co-ordinate sub-systems, then it might play a similar role in relation to its superordinate systems and, in the first place, the global system which is its next 'higher' system (meaning, sub-systems 1–4 of Table 1.1 viewed as a whole).

PARSONIAN PHASE-MOVEMENT

In what follows, the concept of phase-movement shall be given a Parsonian interpretation. The principal text for this discussion is the Parsons, Bales and Shils paper, 'Phase Movement in Relation to Motivation, Symbols Formation, and Role Structure' in *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (1953, pp. 163–269); other works consulted include Parsons (1951, 1966, 1969, 1970 and 1971) and Parsons and Bales (1955).

Possibly the most influential, as well as controversial, sociologist of the mid twentieth century, Talcott Parsons (1902–79) has been primarily concerned with the elaboration of a general theoretical system for the study of society. To date, Parsons's 'theory of action' is probably the most coherent and sustained attempt to clarify and determine the theoretical foundations of the social sciences. His writings have attracted considerable attention, including much criticism. A significant part of his work (especially in his later years) has a bearing on politics (a felicitous commentary on this aspect of Parsons's contribution is Mitchell, 1967; see also, Deutsch, 1963, pp. 116–24). To establish a link with his *œuvre* is an attempt at the same time to demonstrate the relevance to the social sciences of a theory of the long cycles and to show how that theory fits into a more general framework.

Much of Parsons's work has been concerned with the definition and classification of the key concepts of the social sciences, such as social action, social system, culture, personality. Critics have made much of the seemingly static character of his approach and of the evident lack of urgency in attacking problems of empirical validation. Indeed, questions of dynamic change are not too prominent in the outstanding corpus of his writings, but they are by no means neglected (see Effrat, 1976, pp. 672ff).

Broadly speaking, Parsons employed two distinct models in the analysis of social change:

(1) *The differentiation model* This was applied to the problem of the evolutionary movement of societies from the primitive to the modern in such works as *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (1966) and *The System of Modern Societies* (1971). It was also employed by Smelser (1960) in the analysis of functional differentiation in the English textile industry in the course of the Industrial Revolution (see also Parsons and Smelser, 1956). In both cases this model illuminated large-scale social change where the question was, What is the process by which new, more specialised and complex arrangements emerge? The differentiation model is basic to the concept of the modern world system as elaborated in Chapter 1.

(2) *The phase-cycle model* This was obtained by generalising Robert Bales's experiments on small group interaction and it was then applied to the examination of family association, hence essentially to the analysis of small-scale movement of group processes over time. The present chapter uses this second model.

The concept of 'action as a *process* occurring in or constituting boundary-maintaining *systems*' (Parsons, Bales and Shils, 1953, p. 165) is central to the phase-cycle model and to the analysis of phase-movement. The action process is examined with the help of 'directional co-ordinates' and the directional co-ordinates are the system's functional needs. The concept of functional need, also known as the four-function paradigm, is basic to Parsons's thinking; some regard it as the core of his deductive work.

That social systems have functional needs is a commonplace of sociological inquiry. Parsons's distinctiveness lies in insisting that the basic functional needs are four. This basic paradigm is derived from two postulates (Parsons, Bales and Shils, 1953, p. 166): (i) 'the *one-way* character of the action process, from motivational input toward gratification'; and (ii) 'the independence of adaptive and integrative tendencies': that is to say that the object of analysis is a boundary-maintaining system whose integrative exigencies must be considered independent of the problems of adaptation.

In other words, this fourfold classification of functional needs is arrived at by combining the ends–means schema (basic to the analysis of goal-directed social action) with the internal–external-needs distinction applicable to all living (that is, boundary-maintaining) systems.

In the Parsonian literature, the four functions are usually referred to as: Adaptation (sometimes abbreviated to A), that is concerned with 'external-means'; Goal Attainment (G), governing 'external-ends'; Integration (I), the domain of 'internal-ends'; and Latent Pattern-Maintenance (L), the sphere of 'internal-means' (see also Parsons, 1970, pp. 29–33). The entire scheme is also known as the AGIL formula or, when in reverse order, as the LIGA sequence.

In large-scale societies, the four functional needs are said to be met by distinct institutional complexes: adaptation functions are performed by the economy, and collective goal-attainment ones by the polity; integration is the function of the 'societal community' that creates identity and hence solidarity; latent pattern-maintenance functions are the arena of the educational, legal and constitutional systems. The process of differentiation is partly one of evolution of independent complexes serving these several functions.

As presented by Parsons, Bales and Shils, phase-movement (that is, progress of the social system through a number of stages) is thought of as the problem of 'maximizing the movement of the system in each of the four dimensions'.

> Since preponderance of all phases cannot be achieved at one point in time, the system goes through phases of time cycles in which first one direction or movement and then another is preponderant. The overt acts are thus 'addressed to' or are 'associated with' the solution of single problems, and by the frequency of their occurrence hold the system within given phases, and move the system from one phase to the next. (1953, p. 181)

The causes of phase-movement are not really mysterious. Mention might be made of three in particular:

(1) In the first place, phase-movement occurs because of the *similarity* between phases: 'each of the phases possesses certain attitudinal or object orientation similarities or consequences in relation to its adjacent neighbors' (1953, p. 188); that means, for instance, that phase A and G share a common 'external' dimension that helps promote the passage of the system from one stage to the next.

(2) Second, there is phase-movement because each phase emphasises *different* social needs and system requirements. 'The attempt to solve certain problems requires the specification, articulation and perhaps even the solution of logically prior ones' (Namenwirth and Bibbee, 1976, pp. 145–64). Thus the establishment of a structure of

norms and expectations is a prerequisite of striving for the common good.

(3) Third, and most generally, because a collectivity cannot deal with all its problems at once, the existence of some form of equilibrating process needs to be postulated: this could be a mechanism of '*compensatory alternation*', since 'given its limited resources, a social system cannot concentrate adequately on both instrumental and consummatory activities simultaneously; concentration on one type leads to deficits in the other which necessitates and promotes a shift to the diagonal of a given sector', for instance from G to L, or from I to A, 'in order to reestablish system equilibrium' (Effrat, 1976, p. 673).

Thus, phases are, at bottom, one basic mechanism of the social system: they are, ideal-typically, the response over time of a system coping with its problems.

PERFORMANCE AND LEARNING

Phases may also be regarded as the several states of a relationship between the system and its environment. The character of that relationship will vary depending on the nature of the action process. Generally speaking, *performance* processes are those in which change in the situation exceeds change in the system; these are the processes wherein goal-directed activity advances toward goal achievement and satisfaction. *Learning* processes, on the other hand, are those in which 'the significant change in the system exceeds that in the situation' (Parsons, Bales and Shils, 1953, p. 222); learning is here broadly conceived as including such cognate processes as socialisation, therapy, and social control. Performance and learning are, from this point of view, two aspects of the same process, and they both go on continually in all action systems; the distinction must be looked upon as analytical or as a matter of quantitative balances.

A basic difference between performance and learning lies in the sequence of phases characterising these processes (to the degree that the phases have been adequately characterised). The performance process, whose model was derived from Bales's research on small groups engaged in explicit tasks, ideally moves from an Adaptation phase towards Goal Achievement; Integration and Pattern Maintenance then follow in a sequence that is summed up as AGIL. In the learning process, the sequence is *reversed*: 'The patterns of behavior

which are characteristic of the later phases of a performance process, namely tension release and the affirmation of solidarity, must come in the early phases of social control and socialization; only when their consequences have been worked through is it then possible for the learning of specific content to take place' (Parsons, Bales and Shils, 1953, p. 171). Hence the ideal type of learning sequence is LIGA. In Figure 5.1 the performance process (a) is shown in the standard Parsonian notation as starting at A and finishing at L, while the learning sequence (b) begins at L and ends in A.



Figure 5.1 Performance and learning processes

As previously noted, the empirical basis for these distinctions have been Bales's interaction process analysis and the subsequent application of the categories to Parsons's work on the family and the socialisation process. In the *Working Papers*, Parsons, Bales and Shils expressed confidence that the type of analysis they were developing could be extended 'from the microscopic analysis of small groups under controlled conditions for short periods to large-scale phenomena over long periods' (1953, p. 170); and yet, to date, such an extension has not occurred. In 1976, Effrat wrote that 'the systematic application of the phase movement scheme and logic to more macrolevel problems remains to be done' (p. 173). Two exceptions, though, are the work of Namenwirth and Bibbee (1976) on American political party platforms of the past 100 years, and Weber's (1981) analysis of British speeches from the throne over two centuries, both

of which apply to the analysis of fluctuating value patterns a model of the performance process in the Parsonian mode.

One reason for the relative dearth of application is the fact that the models are in an important sense 'limiting cases', ideal or pure types whose existence, let alone visibility, depends on a range of exceptionally favourable conditions: '"unusual stability of input", a "relatively closed system", as well as the correct microscopic–macroscopic time range applicable, . . . [the correct] number of units, and . . . ease of communication between units' (Parsons *et al.*, 1953, p. 188). The application of these models cannot be undertaken with any hope of success unless these conditions have been met at least to a reasonable degree, and there may well be a limited number of social systems that do satisfy them all.

In contemporary social science there is no uniform agreement on the question of phase-movement. A recent review of social–psychological works on therapy groups, for instance, concluded that 'there are no typical phases within the group process'. The group process differs from group to group, from leader to leader, and also depends on the character of the participants and on the method used (Kutter, 1980). On the other hand, Tuckman's review of the literature (1965) produced hypotheses of 'developmental sequences' that closely relate to, without exactly duplicating, the Parsonian categories. In his latest work, Bales (1979, pp. 107–8) himself adopts (with Stephen P. Cohen) a middle-ground position. He warns against expecting phase-movements to happen 'uniformly or automatically' because phases are 'extremely vulnerable to all kinds of reversals, distractions, fade-outs, confusions, and catastrophes'. For that reason, they need to be deliberately instituted, and then they may assume positive significance. Yet he also retains the basic distinction between performance and learning processes; he sees task performance, on the one hand, and therapy and self-analytic groups, on the other, as products of a different sequence of activities. This last distinction, between task and therapy groups, continues to underlie much of the literature (see, for example, Tuckman, 1965; Cottle, 1976). Hare's (1982) work on creativity in small groups is the latest successful application of these distinctions.

CONDITIONS FOR PHASE-MOVEMENT

Given the Parsonian framework, two questions may be asked:

(1) Under what conditions is the phase model applicable to the study of long cycles?
(2) If and when applicable, should the long cycle be then viewed as predominantly a performance process, or a learning process?

Consider, for the present, the first question, that of the general applicability of the phase model to long cycles. It implies the following additional queries: (a) Are the global polity and the modern world system social systems in terms of Parsonian analysis? (b) Are the conditions of stable phase-movement present in these cases? (c) What social mechanisms might account for the length of observable long-cycle phases?

The Global Polity and the World as Parsonian Systems

The writings of Talcott Parsons give no clear warrant of the applicability of the concept of social system (and hence that of functional needs) to the human species viewed as one social system. Parsons's major essay in diachronic analysis is ambiguously titled *System of Modern Societies* (1971). It is an evolutionary account of the emergence and present character of the modern world which does suggest the existence of a system, that is, of persistent interdependence among units. But, unwilling to accord it the status of 'society', Parsons sees it primarily as an aggregate of – presumably distinct – societies. The reason for this may well be his inability to perceive in the world system what he regards as the prerequisites of any society: normative consensus and a value system. Some writers in the Parsonian tradition (for example, Robertson, 1976) take issue with the notion that the world might be considered as one social system.

But, on the other hand, it is also arguable that Parsons lacked the concept of vertical differentiation (as discussed in Chapter 1 and employed, for instance, in Table 1.1). If large social systems are in fact explicitly conceived as multi-layered and if in such systems there is layer-specific communication (which in itself presupposes some commonality of media) as well as layer-specific networks of solidarity and influence, then there is no need to require, as a precondition of the existence for such social systems, strong and overarching structures of community and one common and all-pervasive culture (and

patterns for maintaining it). Then the degree of dominance exerted by the global-layer structures need not be overwhelming for the whole to constitute a working system.

The modern world of the past half-millenium is a case in point. Politically and economically, it has acquired, and at quite an early stage too, a fairly comprehensive global-level structure, chiefly naval–maritime and commercial. This structure was adequate for coping with global problems of medium-level complexity, and in essence the same arrangements have continued until well into the twentieth century. But this global system could also function, and arguably was 'designed' to function, in the absence of a world culture and without full integration in the Parsonian sense. Literally speaking, it had no world language, but English (and French) have served quite well as substitutes for it, and the notions of diplomatic languages, or of a global lingua franca, are well entrenched. There is no world law, but a set of rules regulating inter-state behaviour is well understood and widely observed. The function of integration at the global level has been filled by influential elites, centred on the world powers (though not confined to them) and bound by a homogeneous culture, common life-style and convergent solidarities.

In other words, the present analysis posits a global social system based on and residing in a system of interaction that has existed since about 1500 and has revolved around the world powers. The four-function paradigm helps to identify within it the sub-systems already discussed in Chapter 1 (and depicted in Table 1.1): a global political system; a global economy, rudiments of global community as a function of central elite networks; and finally, the essentials of established norms of common conduct produced by the educational and legal systems. The concept of vertical differentiation makes it possible to see the global system as distinct and as having distinct requirements from those of the other layers of the world system.

The long cycle is a phenomenon (or mode of operation) of the global polity because it is primarily a political process. The polity, in turn, being a social (sub)system should be expected to have at least the rudiments of stable arrangements or structures for dealing with its own four functional problems: those of pure (or high) politics (to decide who governs); those of policy-making and administration (to allocate resources); opportunities for policy review and the definition of legitimate systemic issues; and areas of integrative process conducive to the creation of coalitions. As the global polity is conceived to revolve primarily around the world power (and its

successors and challengers), these relatively stable arrangements should be reflected in the activities of that type of nation-state. Party systems of the world powers (to be reviewed in Chapter 7) have especial significance for the latter two problems, whereas their executives (their chiefs of state, and their diplomatic and military aides) have been particularly important for the former.

Why Phase-Movement?

Conditions for the appearance of pure phase-movement are:

(1) *closure*: a closed system with well-defined boundaries and a steady rate of input–output flow;
(2) *continuity*: a time-persistent system (high stability);
(3) *communications*: a system rich in interaction media (Baum, 1976, p. 533).

Do the global polity, and the global system as a whole, satisfy these conditions?

Closure

This is an important condition of pure phase-movement. A system subject to substantial and unpredictable shocks from its environment will obviously have difficulty in operating through regular phases. Indeed, much of the theory (and initial success) of the physical sciences was premised on the assumption of closed systems; however, these do not include complex systems and living organisms that are open systems in constant exchange with their environment; and social systems are even more complicated. However difficult it is to conceive of any one social system on this earth as being closed (in fact, they must be regarded as open), there is just one case, indeed a limiting case, in relation to which the condition of relative closure begins to appear reasonable: this is the case of the world system. Viewed as the earth's social system (sub-systems 1 to 16 in Table 1.1), and assuming for it a stable environment in respect of individual personalities and culture, its boundaries can be said to be (as far as the physical environment – that is, roughly speaking, the biosphere – is concerned) quite stable, even allowing for the space probes of the last decades.

The world system has not been subject to catastrophic natural disasters possibly since the last ice age; the most recent such disaster was probably the Black Death that depopulated large stretches of

Asia and Europe after 1348. The world system is not, of course, totally closed even in its natural environment; it depends vitally *inter alia* on an input of solar energy to the biosphere; but this input has been, for the duration of the modern world, relatively steady (fluctuating by less than 1 per cent). The modern world system, therefore, could be said to rank at the top of all social systems in respect to degree of closure. To the degree that this world system is such a relatively closed one, then its major sub-systems, and the global system in particular (because it is topmost, and the most directly world-spanning), would be subject to coherence conveyed by that characteristic.

But that particular sense of closure may in fact be an excessively stringent requirement for phase-movement. No social (or biological, or, for that matter, any complex) system can be a closed system because its essence consists of exchanges with its environment. No social system can be an isolated one, living beyond fences of its own or others' making. All that is needed is that social (and other) systems maintain identity and boundaries, and that exchanges across boundaries do not threaten identity and therefore survival. There are no grounds for believing that either the world system, or its sub-systems, inherently or actually lack these essential features, and in Chapter 1 an argument was already deployed to that effect.

Additional arguments along these lines may be used in respect of global politics. It has already been noticed, and will also be stressed in Chapter 9, that the world powers have regularly been associated with insularity or pen-insularity. One characteristic of insularity is that it helps to maintain identity and facilitates boundary-maintenance, not only in the sense of physical security – though that can hardly be ignored in politics – but also in the sense of psychological identity and self-consciousness. It is this inner security that has simultaneously made the world powers open to global interactions (to which, as insular powers, they were in any event predisposed). It is that inner coherence that has made them the focus of successive global systems.

Continuity

The assumption of time-persistence is even more convincing. Obviously, a system lacking in continuity will have no opportunity to develop phases: phases consume time, and large complexes move slowly along their paths. The global system not only has a clear point of origin, around 1500, but also a full measure of uninterrupted

existence since then. This persistence endures strongly at the organisational level. States that have been world powers or challengers (in fact, all the global powers) continue to play a role close to the centre of the stage. While the precise locus of the active zone has shifted every century or so, the oceanic arena remains the focus of world activity. Economic organisations show less permanence than nation-states: the great banking and trading companies of the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries (the Fuggers or the Dutch and English East India Companies) have not survived, even though their lifespans of two or more centuries were impressive; but the centres from which they operated, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, remain vital to international commerce.

On the family-organisational level, too, there is surprising continuity in essential roles. Witness, for example, the House of Orange, crucial to the organisation of the system from the early sixteenth century down to the present day. Or the Churchills, from John Churchill, first Duke of Marlborough, key participant in the Glorious Revolution and its aftermath, down to Winston Churchill, the architect of the Anglo-American alliance in the Second World War. There is also significant continuity in the churches and the universities. Continuity is, of course, a mark of success and of being 'in phase' with the system. This continuity has not been just organisational, but in fact systemic: the global system as a whole, and its political sub-system, have been meaningfully continuous over the past half-millenium.

Communication

The last requirement of a system capable of generating phases is communication, and in particular the ready availability or access to the media of communication and interaction. Communications and media are the essential co-ordinators of systemic processes. The onset of the modern world did, of course, coincide with a communication revolution – the invention of the printed medium (an event comparable in importance to the beginning of writing more than two millenia earlier) – and coincided with a transportation revolution marked by the launching of sailing ships across the world oceans and the establishment of regular global routes. Electronic communications and air transport have further upgraded those systems in the twentieth century. It could be argued that, generally speaking, the strength of the media deployed in the political–economic spheres (i.e. those required for the operations of the global powers and the

world markets) have been most remarkable and effective. The system of residential diplomacy as a form of intergovernmental communications, supplemented today by satellite networks, has been useful to the functioning of alliances, as well as that of great economic organisations. The immediacy and intimacy of communications required for the sustained operation of the 'internal' requirements of the global system seemed to be lagging behind until television created the initial preconditions for a 'global village'.

Thus the conditions of phase-movement just specified (the three Cs: closure, continuity, and communication) appear to be quite favourably supplied. If, indeed, such conditions as continuity and rich communications are relatively uncommon in social systems, phase-movement would be relatively rare too. But to the extent that the global polity satisfies these three conditions it should be capable of phase-movement in the Parsonian manner.

Phases and the Generations

Before leaving this discussion, a word on the related questions of length of phases, generations, and the life-cycle. What might be the mechanism accounting for the roughly 30-year span of the average phase, empirically observed in studies of the long cycle? Quite evidently the process of filling the position of leadership in the world system is a long and ponderous one, and it could hardly be otherwise given the size of the system and the gravity of the issue at stake. Not even decades appear to be the right units for measuring it – but, rather, generations. A generation is an age cohort sharing common experience, and its effective length has commonly been put at about 30 years.

Answering a similar question – What determines the length of the interval between major wars in his 'war-and-peace cycle'? – Arnold Toynbee (1954, pp. 319–26) resorted to employing the concept of a 'physical generation cycle as a psychological regulator of social change'. He argued that 'the survivors of a generation that has been of military age during a bout of war will be shy, for the rest of their lives, of bringing a repetition of this tragic experience either upon themselves or their children'.

Toynbee was quick to point out, too, that this condition might be responsible for the alternations of war and peace at intervals of about the average length of a generation, but not for the interval between what he called 'general wars' and 'general peace', nor for his

complete war–peace cycle that had the aggregate length of some four generations. But he maintained that if such a cycle were viewed as a 'vehicle of social change', as occurs, for instance, in families experiencing social mobility, then it is not difficult to see how a concatenation of four generations might also determine the wavelength of the war–peace cycle. It may be assumed here that the agony of general war (in Toynbee's sense, see Chapter 1 above) makes a deeper and more lasting impression on the psyche than a comparatively anodyne round of minor wars.

It might be observed, empirically, that Toynbee's generalisations might be applicable to the effects of the world wars of the twentieth century and of the Napoleonic wars, but probably not to the three earlier global wars, because in earlier cycles the distinction between global and other wars was less clear. Nevertheless Toynbee's analysis remains significant in two respects: it injects the concept of generations into the study of long cycles, and it links it with social change and evolution that is mediated by the traffic of generations. For social change will not be lasting unless the experience of one generation is meaningfully related, and is transmitted in a learning process intact, to the next. That experience also is a mechanism that produces that uniformity of process upon which phase-movement may be seen to depend.

This analysis can be carried further. If, as Toynbee argues, a general (that is global) war, because of 'uniformity of process' in fact entails a series of experiences that marks one generation in a distinctive way, and if other phases of the long cycle also create distinctive experiences, then, generally, the long cycle is a process creative of generational experience: long cycles give substance to the generations. On the other hand, if long cycles are processes of social change, then the successive phases of each cycle might imply the need for different skills, capabilities and orientations that could be supplied by succeeding generations ('each cycle phase requires a new generation'). In that sense, the existence of generational differences might be an essential mechanism for the functioning of such a long-range process of social change, especially at the level of the global system, and in particular in respect of world powers and their competitors.

Proposing a Parsonian version of the phase model to explain processes of value change in American politics over a period of one hundred years, Zvi Namenwirth and Richard Bibbee strongly endorse the generational model: it is a critical assumption of their

analysis that 'value orientations do not change much during a generation's lifetime. Committed during its early stages, a generation most often carries its value commitments into the grave. So conceived, the time to work through four value types will take four consecutive generations.' They do, however, admit of the possibility that 'the life span of a generation . . . is variable' (1976, p. 154).

While stimulating, this conception leaves some important questions unanswered. If a generation acquires its values early, meaning in a phase that differs from the one in which it spends its active and working life, what makes its values relevant to, or effective in, the latter phase? By definition, each generation prepares itself for life in a social context that will be substantially changed when, in due course, it assumes responsible positions in the social and political arenas. Prima facie, this seems a recipe for inter-generational conflict and confusion; it suggests that care must be taken to distinguish generational from lifetime effects. Yet because of similarities in the nature of succeeding phases (for example, the transition from G to A is a transition between two 'external' phases), some of the problems might be attenuated.

Another matter to be explained is that of the nature of the relevant generations. Are they political generations – that is, generations of political activists and leaders, including possibly the informed public or even 'world opinion' in a broad sense – or are they generations of elites spread across all the major functional sub-systems of society? Might they conceivably be generations that include the whole world population? Or are these generations of participants in the global system? The last would be the most conservative solution, but a clear and simple answer is not really at hand.

Finally, what might be the mechanisms ensuring uniform value orientations? Presumably something that embodies a response to the problems encountered by the last generation; for instance, fear of, or aversion to, war, and tolerance for hardship acquired in a global-war period (as suggested by Toynbee); or contempt for affluence developed in a post-war period of 'materialist' adaptation. Are these forms of inter-generational conflict, of rejection of the generation-in-power mediated by the educational system and disseminated by the media? Are they, in fact, forms of the inter-generational process, 'dissimilar learning influences and experiences, which foster unique outlooks on politics' (Beck, 1984, p. 516)? These are the grounds for arguing that as a Parsonian process the long cycle is mediated by generational mechanisms.

Long Cycle as Parsonian Process

The preceding observations suggest that, overall, the concept of phase-movement as applied to the long cycle has theoretical support and visibility; added to the earlier empirical evidence they make a good case for the thesis of phase regularity.

Assume that in its world-power mode the long cycle also describes the operation of the global political system. That global polity needs to satisfy the requirements both of internal coherence and debate and of external accomplishments; it has to attend both to the means of its own functioning and to the ends it serves its own members and the community at large and the world system. Two of these requirements are those of internal 'politicking': clarification of issues and agenda formation, and selection of values and consolidation of the political community; the other two requirements are those of 'politics' proper: executive action, and administration. Assume, moreover, that this global polity cannot satisfy all of these requirements at once but must do so in orderly and determinate sequences.

Given such assumptions, one unit of time of the global polity may be defined as a sequence in which each of the four major functional requirements is satisfied in turn. One phase in that sequence is the period in which one functional requirement is maximised. A long cycle consisting of four completed phases is the temporal unit of the global polity: the global political system in its unit time dimension.

Viewed in terms of Parsons's four-function model, the long cycle might therefore be said to consist of four phases, each of which maximises one of the four functional problems of the relevant global system, as follows:

Parsonian terminology (functional problems)	*Long-cycle phases* (systemic)
Goal attainment (G, politics)	Global War
Adaptation (A, economics)	World Power
Latent pattern-maintenance (L, culture-reproduction)	Delegitimation
Integration (I, community)	Deconcentration

It is a matter of some satisfaction that the labels chosen for the four phases of the long cycle correspond quite well to the Parsonian paradigm. The areas of collective goal attainment (the 'G' phase of

gratification and satisfaction) has long been recognised by Parsons as the province of politics *par excellence*. Gratification in politics is the achievement of power and the enjoyment of its fruits. In world politics, global war is that period of tension and deliberate activity that decides, by the outcome of a very stressful process (a quasi-electoral 'trial by strength' form of politics), who is to be in power: it is an *ad hoc* but systemic solution to the problem of world order.

The global war is followed by an 'A' phase of Adaptation, that is a period when the administration of the system is brought into line with the new power structure: this is the time for establishing and cultivating a new political and economic order that will manage the system successfully – call it 'the World Power phase'. But it is also clear that this period of growth and prosperity that maximises economic values and achievement cannot last for ever. The growing-pains and exercise of power in the preceding phases prompt measures for 'internal' renovation: the revitalisation of the system's normative foundations by means of effective 'latent pattern maintenance' (the 'L' phase) – that is, through 're-legitimation'. It is here that global politics, in the past, has failed to renew itself peaceably. The world powers, as a rule, have stood by as their legitimacy eroded without a great deal being accomplished in the way of finding substitutes for it, or even much thought being given to such. The constitutional centre of the system faltered and lost its hold; hence, this phase of the cycle has been called the phase of De-legitimation. The system loses track of its means of self-preservation and flounders in the cross-currents of nascent nationalisms.

This marks the transition to the fourth of the Parsonian functional requirements: the need to assemble the several components of the system, much strained and altered in the preceding phases, into a meaningful whole that has coherence, identity, and is capable of generating conviction, adherence and solidarity. Such a test the global polity has failed to execute peaceably in the past. It is the Deconcentration phase. The power that had 'held it all together' now dissolves; the system fractures and gives way to a 'multipolar' order. This might more correctly be called the 'disintegration' phase, because the Parsonian requirement of Integration ('I') is manifestly flouted (even though the coalitioning preparatory to the next trial of strength is already under way). Past global systems flunked the integrative test because the mechanisms and rituals of community and identity were not up to the occasion. Instead, the world has regularly watched helplessly as its major elements separated into

irreconcilable and ultimately warring camps: Catholics and the Reformed; upholders of the divine rights of kings, and their opponents; the defenders of legitimacy and the revolutionaries; and the two great camps of the two world wars of the twentieth century that have led to the confrontation of democracy and its enemies. Meanwhile, the diplomatic and legal rituals of common interest are poor substitutes for a true community.

Granted, then, the validity of the Parsonian paradigm, the phases of the long cycle can be seen as successive attempts to satisfy the requirements of each of the several sub-systems of the global political system.

On a broader view, the long cycle may be said to actuate the entire global system (sub-systems 1 to 4 in Table 1.1). Each of that system's four major functional arenas could be generating functional requirements in a manner similar to the global polity. This is a challenging thought and an ambitious extension of the idea of the long cycles; it will be taken up again toward the end of the present chapter.

In this way, the Parsonian paradigm is indeed helpful in differentiating the four phases of the long cycle.

PERFORMANCE OR LEARNING

In the meaning given to these terms by Parsons, is the long cycle a performance process or a learning process? Seldom if ever is this question asked about world politics, basic though it may seem. For in the conventional understanding, politics (and foreign policy in particular) is primarily an ends–means pattern of rational action; one in which, in Walter Lippmann's classic (1943) formulation, means have to be brought into balance with the desired ends if solvency is to be preserved. But surely this is the case only so long as the essentially task-oriented nature of foreign policy is not challenged as the correct definition of the rational approach to decision-making and international affairs. Even the most up-to-date conceptions of world politics view it as a process wherein arrays of global problems such as 'overpopulation' or 'desertification' are mastered through the mobilisation of resources and concerted action. Two studies of American and British politics cited earlier (Namenwirth and Bibbee, and Weber) take it as self-evident that the processes they were analysing (essentially rational in character, but having global impli-

cations since they pertained to the United States and Britain) were performance processes.

Yet, if the Parsonian model holds water, the question is of considerable importance. What, then, might the criteria and procedures be that decide whether the long cycle is, analytically speaking, chiefly a performance process or, in broad terms, a learning sequence? In the light of the preceding discussions, three criteria are here offered:

(1) The direction of the actual phase-movement.
(2) The extent of system change.
(3) The presence of an agent of learning.

For Parsons, Bales and Shils, the direction of the phase-movement is a matter of great theoretical import:

> It was an entirely unexpected outcome of the work done in preparation for writing this chapter that the basic pattern of phases which Bales had developed in the study of small groups and which appears to be capable of generalization beyond that for a variety of types of performance processes, turned out to fit with remarkable exactitude the basic process of social control and socialization, if it were applied in *reverse*. (1953, p. 171)

This finding proved to be a source of major insight and much fertile theorising. For long cycles, the problem becomes, in simplified form, one of deciding whether the AGIL (performance) or LIGA (learning) model fits the evidence better.

Parsons's other 'rough empirical' yardstick is the degree of system change versus change in the situation. Deutsch, too, describes 'the "learning" of a system as any structural change within that system, which causes it to give a different – and thus possibly more effective – response to a repeated external stimulus' (1963, p. 164), and defines the 'learning capacity' of a system as its uncommitted resources. These are, in practice, difficult criteria to satisfy without having explicit and operational standards by which to judge what are the relevant system and the relevant situation for this purpose. One solution is to point to the degree of system change that is observable as having occurred in the global polity in a given period.

The last criterion is not discussed by Parsons but is implicit in his work. A performance group characteristically centres upon an acting agent. By contrast, situations of social control and learning typically depend on an agent of learning (teacher), of socialisation (a parent),

or on a therapeutic agent (a doctor). These roles tend to be circumscribed by norms that differ significantly from those of pure action. Might the role of world power or global leadership be one that admits of a definition that includes the concept of learning?

Directionality

The most important question in deciding upon the character of the global political process is that of directionality. Is the actual phase sequence in the long cycle AGIL or LIGA?

The long-cycle concept underlying the present analysis, and the best evidence at hand, suggest that the LIGA scheme is the one that best describes the process. In its earlier stages, the analysis of the long cycle usually began with the Global War phase. It continued with World Power, Delegitimation, Deconcentration, and ended up again in the Global War slot as its culminating point. In Parsonian terminology the sequence was GALIG; it has earlier been referred to as the 'systemic' cycle because that is how the process appears at the global systemic level. But if, alternatively and on equally good grounds, the process is initiated in a 'world power' mode, at the Clarification (that is, legitimation) stage, then the result is LIGA.

For the student of politics the two most interesting and the clearest phases of the long cycle are, of course, those of Global War and World Power. As noted earlier, Global War attracts attention because of its exceptional visibility, its well-defined temporal boundaries and its decisive and acknowledged role in international history. It is hardly revolutionary to view Global War, in particular, and its product, the ascent to World Power, as the central organising features of a whole systemic era. But it does not necessarily follow that Global War and/or World Power are the initiatory phases of the long cycle, theoretically conceived as a social process.

Parsons's work shows that the initial stage of a social control process is the L phase. More generally, he argues that the social–emotional conditions need to be consolidated before the system can reach goal attainment and adaptation. The L phase clarifies the situation and establishes or re-establishes the norms within which the process will subsequently unfold; the integration phase consolidates the identity of the system and prepares the scene for external processes to begin.

What then is the difference between those earlier, systemic, accounts of the long cycle, and the hypothesis that suggests starting

the series with the L phase? The distinction lies in differing perspectives on the LI stages of the LIGA process. From the point of view of the 'incumbent' world power, the LI phases appear as the 'down' (or 'D') phases of Delegitimation and Deconcentration, periods when things appear to be falling apart. But from the standpoint of a 'rising' or 'upcoming' power, these are the 'up' (or constructive) stages of Clarification and Coalitioning, when the foundations are laid for greater things to come. In the LIGA sequence, therefore, the LI phases emphasise the 'internal' process of the emerging new or potential world power; in the earlier, systemic, version, the stress was on the weakening of the internal process of the global polity as a whole. In other words, the LIGA paradigm fixes the gaze on the preconditions that a future world power must fill if it is to meet successfully the challenge of its role; it models the long cycle in its world-power mode.

In as much as the empirical evidence (as in Table 4.1 that summarised the last chapter) broadly matches the four-phase model of the world-power cycle, it also demonstrates that this version of the long cycle may be broadly interpreted as a learning process. If Talcott Parsons was correct in arguing that social phenomena that exhibit the LIGA sequence are in fact learning processes, and if the long cycle lends itself to interpretation along these lines as a process that passes through the (political) phases of Clarification/Coalitioning/Macrodecision/Implementation, then this is good evidence for regarding the long cycle as a political learning process. This in turn lends additional support to a process model of the long cycle in which innovation plays a crucial role.

By way of further illustration, consider the 1848–1973 period of global politics. It opened with a spectacular collapse (that is, delegitimation) of the Vienna settlement of 1815, brought about by the successful unifications of Germany and Italy. The pressures of rising nationalisms severely hindered Britain's role on the Continent and cleared the ground for a serious challenge to its extra-European interests. Alternatively, the period may be viewed as that of the rise of new challenges to Britain's position: across the North Sea, the emergence of Germany as the focus of continental order; in Asia, Japan's self-renewal through the Meji Restoration; and in the Americas, the final consolidation of the American Union in the Civil War. Britain herself withdrew into the shell of her empire, while the Royal Navy concentrated on meeting the threat of the new German fleet.

As already observed in the last chapter, the outlines of the world

public interest were easily lost sight of in the ensuing plethora of competing imperialisms. But the cores of new systems were also forming. The United States and Germany overtook Britain in industrial production and as sources of innovation for the world economy. The United States strengthened its community links with Britain in the Anglo-Saxon movement that blossomed at the turn of the century. But Germany, whose Bismarckian system of alliances had first appeared to be the foundation of a continental order, instead became the hub of one of the two rival camps into which the system ultimately dissolved. The Hague peace conferences and the institution of the Nobel Peace Prizes were the only significant global rituals of this era, bleakly presaging the armed violence to come. The phase encompassing the two world wars (1914–45) took time to deliver a decision, but after a period of intense world-wide political activity it finally produced a new world leader and a new world order. The post-1945 phase was one of consolidation and administration of that order. It included some notable political crises, those of Korea and Vietnam for instance, but its principal characteristic was an unprecedented surge in world prosperity and trade, with the rise of new industries, growth and modernisation all over the world. Only in the mid-1970s did this great boom period seem to abate.

In that way, between 1848 and 1973, the global polity moved through a sequence of phases that closely approximate the LIGA paradigm, with the proviso that L and I may be interpreted positively with respect to the aspiring world powers, but also negatively as far as the general quality of world order was concerned. On this analysis, too, the global polity is, at the time of writing, again in the L (latent pattern-maintenance) phase of the long cycle, with the normative (that is, *inter alia* constitutional) needs of the system under maximum pressure. Similar sequences can be delineated for earlier cycles.

The study of directionality thus shows good support for the LIGA model, and for the view of global politics as a learning and social control process. But one important caveat needs to be entered. In certain conditions the difference between learning and performance sequences is not very great. For if the empirically least ambiguous case, global war (the G phase), is assigned the same historical period in both LIGA and AGIL, then, as is shown in the table below, the two models do produce different results; but the differences are not all that drastic.

In Table 5.2 (covering the world-power cycles IV and V), the G phase has been assigned the same period (1792–1815) in both

Table 5.2 LIGA or AGIL?

Periodisation	1739–1763	1763–1791	1792–1815	1816–1847	1848–1873	1874–1913	1914–1945	1945–1973
Learning process	L	I	G	A	L	I	G	A
Performance process?	L	A	G	I	L	A	G	I

sequences, and consequently it also occupies the same period when it occurs the next time around. This also places the L in the same slot in both cycles. The difference, then, pertains to the identification and labelling of the intervening phases. Thus, for example, should the 1873–1913 period be described as one of disintegration (in the broader sense proposed here), or as a phase of adaptation with special salience for the economic function? In defence of the latter option it could be argued that despite the frequent identification of a major part of it as an earlier 'Great Depression' (1873 to *circa* 1900), toward the end of the period it was a time of growth in new industrial sectors and of considerable (but slower) economic expansion, albeit combined with much commercial rivalry and economic imperialism. The first view is favoured here, but, admittedly, additional and stronger criteria need to be developed to permit a more clear-cut answer to this problem. Nevertheless, over the entire sequence of the five long cycles (as also shown in the evidence of the ordered narrative of the long cycles in Chapter 4) the LIGA sequence is the one that is convincing.

System Change

The traditional approach to international politics relies on the assumption of the universality of its propositions. States are thought to pursue their goals with varying degrees of success, but the system remains unchanged, hence capable of generating 'universal laws'. This premise of unchanging performance is basically compatible with a performance view of the matter. In fact, a cyclical process suggests a repetitive kind of performance, hence also an unchanging system repeatedly returning to its original state. In that light, the long cycle would seem to advocate a static 'realist' view of international processes.

But the experience of the long cycle has been richer than that. While clearly repetitive in its pattern the process has also been associated with undeniable (though difficult to specify with precision) variations in system performance. For it is precisely such changes in performance levels that are brought about through learning. But can changes in the performance levels of the global polity be, in fact, identified?

In Chapter 1, it has already been argued that developmental and evolutionary change of a positive-feedback type is to be expected in the context of long cycles. In Chapter 2 evidence was adduced for supporting this notion, and the narrative in the last chapter adds to that support, in particular by bringing out the role of innovations in effecting change at the global level.

This problem can be explored further under two other headings: (i) social control and (ii) socialisation. These are facets of the learning process in the broad sense of the term; the first concerns coping with disorder, while the second inducts new members into the system. Social control deals with existing members and their problems, socialisation with replenishing and adding to the membership. A system's performance may be said to have reached a new level when its record of order-keeping has risen significantly, and when it succeeds in adding to its membership rather than merely replacing it.

If it can be argued, as I believe it can, that the global order-keeping record over the past half-millenium has been a gradually improving one, then how to explain such a learning curve, is such it be?

Imagine the global polity as a capacious laboratory for social experiments conducted by the world powers. They themselves are, of course, one of the experiments in progress; each world power, in its cycle, represents an attempt at a novel way of organising international affairs; not an altogether unprecedented way because it draws lessons from classical and Italian models, yet sufficiently new so that its outcome is in suspense. Each world power, in its own time, is home to a host of subsidiary political innovations: each manages a nation-state in original and previously untried fashions; each adds to the repertoire of international norms and practices. All world leaders, and their challengers, are pathfinders in devising new technologies for global reach, some of which prove eminently successful. Each bout of global warfare can be regarded as a test for such innovations. The world powers generally come out as the winners in these experimentations and their innovations are mainly

responsible for that; the experience provides reinforcement in a succession of learning experiments. As a direct result of this phenomenon today's world politics is significantly different from, and more complex than, what it was only five hundred years ago.

Turning to socialisation, all social systems need to induct new members; successful systems enlarge their membership. The global polity has, over its several cycles, steadily extended its scope, absorbing new states and refashioning others. Each new cycle produced a fresh batch of recruits for the system, in the shape of new nation-states, gradually including them in the network of diplomacy and international organisation. In a broader sense the modern world has been busy all along, 'incorporating' not only economies into the world market but whole communities (and in the process changing much of their character). The post-1945 process of decolonisation is no more than an instant in a movement that has been going on since 1500.

These 'system change' themes are large and important and cannot be done justice in a few paragraphs. The three chapters that follow will, in fact, adduce additional evidence of system change in three separate areas of nation-states, party systems, and dependency reversal. In each case, important changes in the world system occurred in the modern era in tandem with long cycles; and these variations may be interpreted as signs of learning. They surely are more compatible with the hypothesis of a learning process than with that of a stable and unchanging 'international environment'.

Teaching Agent?

Finally, the question must be asked: If this is a learning process, where in the long cycle is the place for the teaching agent, the agent of social control? For each of these processes requires the assistance of an agent whose role is typically defined by reference to wider values and institutions, rights and duties, often characteristic of a 'professional' relationship.

The world power holds a position of leadership in the long cycle. Leadership is a role associated with the mobilisation and organisation of effort and resources to attain collective goals. In Parsonian terms, it is the key role of the external ends–means nexus in a straightforward exercise of task performance. Could it be viewed in a broader context and in the different light of a learning process?

The question is easier to ask than to answer. Adducing both

Pericles and John Stuart Mill, Karl Deutsch (1963, p. 191) reminded us that states should be evaluated not just in terms of their efficiency but far more in terms of the types of personality and character they produce among their citizens. But contemporary interpretations simply do not view great international issues as opportunities for the exercise of a learning function. More needs to be known about the self-awareness of the world powers and their competitors concerning their roles and the objective consequences of their activities. How do individuals in leadership positions act on these matters, and how are states' policies planned and executed?

All that can be said at this point is that some personalities (e.g. William III, W. E. Gladstone, Franklin Roosevelt), certain features of Portuguese, Dutch, British or American policies (e.g. those directed at discovery and exploration, at the initiation and institution of new rules such as free trade, or the creation and maintenance of order over large areas), could be interpreted as having a teaching, control or socialisation component. The world powers themselves served as models to emulate, and their polities and economies were successes to imitate: the teaching was done by example. Nor should the part played by challengers be ignored, for they too, sometimes by negative example, often by competitive alternative, served the same purpose. In any event, the role of each of these powers was short-lived in the historical perspective, and this would tend to reinforce the view that they vacated their position once their function was seen as having been accomplished, as having no more to offer others in the way of learning experience.

In summary, the long cycle qualifies as a Parsonian learning process because: (i) the directionality of its phase movement supports that interpretation; (ii) its developmental character makes it a process of system change; and (iii) the role of world powers in it can be regarded as a teaching one.

The notion of long cycles as a process of political and social change was first introduced in Chapter 1. It was then evident already that this was part of the developmental thrust of modern society. But development or growth can be of two kinds: it can be the unfolding of a pre-programmed performance, as in the growth of a biological unit governed by its genes; or it might be a learning process that includes, for the acting unit, the possibility of re-programming – in the light of experience in the preceding time-period – the instructions for operating the global political system. It is the implication of this

analysis that through its feedback mechanisms the long cycle is in fact a learning process of the latter kind.

In what sense is the global political system capable of learning at all? Is this not an instance of reification? Individuals can, and do, learn. So do organisations, when and if their decision-rules, and in a broad sense, their culture, change. Similarly, the world system and its sub-systems learn when their culture changes. Culture is the store of instructions for operating the social system, not unlike genes in biological systems. However, unlike genes that cannot be changed by the organism they instruct, culture can be changed by the social system. Cultural movement does occur, even though it may be slow. To the degree that the culture of global politics holds more information, is more highly structured, allows greater self-consciousness and is more widely understood today than 500 years ago, then the global political system may be said to have experienced learning. Global political culture may then be seen as the product of the long cycle, and innovations the mechanism by which such change is brought about.

A GLOBAL-SYSTEM CYCLE?

If long cycles make sense as Parsonian learning process, gaining coherence in part from general laws of behaviour of social systems and also because each one can be regarded as a unit on account of the lead role played within it by the world power, then the next obvious step is to ask whether the long cycle, viewed as a unit, may not itself be a phase in a process that spans several centuries, a process of larger dimensions superordinate to it and based on the global system.

Such a cycle would be a movement of the entire global system and not just of the global polity. As noted earlier, the global system might perhaps meet well one of the conditions of phase-movement, namely closure. Long cycles being essentially a political phenomenon, they would be no more than a frame carrying a wider structure, a skeleton giving it some, but not all, form; the other functional areas of the global system would each have to play their part too. If one long cycle is just over one hundred years in length, and if it is assumed, in line with the earlier discussion, that each long cycle, as one phase of a superordinate process, were to maximise (that is, give the fullest expression to) one of the four principal dimensions

of the global system, then one such complete mega-process, comprising four phases, would last something over four hundred years, i.e. close to half a millenium. The carrier of each phase of that type would be one world power, and the relevant phase would therefore be determined by the world-power mode of the long cycle (as in Table 4.1) which has just been shown to be its learning mode also.

The question arises, Is this a learning process in the form of a LIGA sequence? To be more precise, does such a general tendency or set of requirements shape the general character of a long historical era for the global system? Here, again, the direction of the process is one of the chief clues to its dominant tendency. But is it at all sensible to talk of one entire long cycle as being decisively coloured by one single functional requirement of the global system?

Take the example of the Industrial Revolution. There is little argument today about designating the passage from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries as the Industrial Revolution, culminating in the 'Age of Capital' around 1850. For the modern world this is a clearly demarcated era with respect to country of origin (Britain), major industries involved (textiles, iron, railroads) and the rate of spread to other areas. As described in the last chapter, the process did start around 1770 in the English cotton industry; it engaged other industries and had a second major phase in the railroads in the first half of the nineteenth century. Western Europe and the eastern seaboard of the United States were soon drawn into it: the market system took hold over previously traditional regions with dramatic effect, and the reaction to its excesses was prompt. The rest of the world became the markets and raw-material suppliers of the 'industrialised' centres. Cities changed their character, population surged, agriculture lost primacy, and even the arts and sciences were deeply affected. The spirit of the age was indelibly marked by the preoccupation with economic questions.

If the age of the Industrial Revolution may be seen as imposing one dominant character upon the global system as a whole (instituting the primacy of economic values and activities), then perhaps in relation to it, similar functional concerns may be assigned in a tentative way to other (preceding and following) eras, in a LIGA order. This is shown in Table 5.3. Following the LIGA pattern, the age of discoveries (centred on 1500) and that of religious wars (centred on 1600) may be regarded as laying the socio-cultural foundations of the global system. The Renaissance, which was a period of rapid

Table 5.3 Phases of the global system

Start	*LIGA sequence*	*Global problem*	*Vector (global carrier)*
1430	L	Exploration	Portugal
1540	I	Religion	Netherlands
1640	G	Constitutionalism	England
1740	A	Industrial Revolution	Britain
1850	L	Knowledge Revolution	United States
1975	I	Integration	

cultural innovation, produced both a differentiation of secular society from religion, and the revival of classical learning; it laid the groundwork for science, rationalised society and effected a drastic revision of the entire world perspective. Its base was Italy, with extensions to Northern Europe; more specifically it was mainly Venice, Florence and the Netherlands.

But from the perspective of the global system, the most important achievements of the Renaissance were the explorations executed by the Portuguese and the consequent opening-up of the world to oceanic communications. The Reformation was not coterminous with that process but rather followed it. In global perspective, again, its characteristic feature was the resolution of the problem of religion as the foundation for societal community at the global level. The means was the consolidation of the Reformed Churches in key areas of Western Europe and North America. If, following Parsons (1968, p. 638), the main developmental line of Protestantism may be seen as represented by the Calvinist wing of the Reformation, then the consolidation of the Reformed Churches in these areas may be regarded as creating the central core of the global system of solidarity: the inner community that, by means of elite networks covering key nation-states, integrated and lent cohesion to the successive leadership elements of the global system, without at the same time instituting a world religion. It is in that sense that Parsons is right in maintaining that there has been 'since the Renaissance and the Reformation a broad general stability in the main *patterns* of value orientation that have become institutionalized' (1971, p. 123). This conclusion is persuasive even though it goes against

the grain of the conventional understanding of the Reformation as disintegrative and fissiparous.

Once the social–emotional foundations were laid, however limited they might appear in world perspectives, the primary sources of innovation over the next two long cycles have been in the political and economic spheres. First, a political basis for the modern constitutional state had to be established, and this was accomplished in England by the Glorious Revolution. As already shown in Chapter 4, the foundations of parliamentary and party government were put in place in this period: this consolidated the structure of political stability that was to become the precondition of industrial growth, an example for others to follow. The Industrial Revolution sprang from that basis: a century of unprecedented expansion in the manufacturing and transport industries that, in the view of the present analysis, was the culminating point of a major phase of the modern world system.

If the Industrial Revolution was the capstone of one global-system cycle, then the initial phase of the next such cycle could be expected to be, in Parsonian methodology, another phase of 'pattern maintenance' and 'tension management' – indeed, a 'culture-maintenance revolution'. For it is a new Renaissance and educational–scientific revolution that since the mid nineteenth century is giving the world basic literacy, a system of world universities, a remarkable explosion of science and learning, and a knowledge foundation for reshaping the international milieu. Late in the nineteenth century, Germany led the world in these fields (including also the organisation of scientific research for industrial purposes and the quality of graduate education), but in the twentieth century it was the United States that assumed the lead from a new global position.

That is why a LIGA sequence, hence a learning process, makes sense as a major interpretative theme for the evolution of the global system (that needs, however, to be clearly distinguished from the modern world system as a whole). In broad outlines the LIGA scheme was already implicit in the 'ordered narrative' of Chapter 4, and it seems, overall, persuasive and well fitting.

Comparisons with Parsons

In its main themes this outline of the global-system process in the modern world accords quite well with Talcott Parsons's view of the evolution of the 'system of modern societies'. But some differences

of detail and emphasis need to be mentioned. Parsons minimises the role of Italy and altogether ignores the experience of Portugal and Spain; regarding the Renaissance and the Reformation as preparatory, he places the onset of the modern world in the seventeenth century in northwest Europe. The solution of the global problems of exploration and religion may indeed have been preparatory to the later two stages, but in long-cycle perspective it does make better sense to set the start of the global system at before 1500, and that is why the Italian and Iberian experiences are essential to the present story. What is more, while Parsons is quite emphatic about the importance of the 'three revolutions' (1971, p. 117) – the political, the industrial, and the educational – he regards the political one as primarily democratic and most clearly expressed in the aspirations of the French Revolution. The present analysis stresses England's earlier constitutional achievements and the practical consequences of the institutional innovations spawned by it.

Two more substantial divergences from *The System of Modern Societies* also need to be brought out. The first concerns questions of timing; Parsons is not at all precise about these matters. By contrast, it seems important to the present purpose that each of the global-system phases be assigned a well-defined character and a distinct time-period, and that the global-system phases (about one century in length) should broadly coincide with long cycles in their learning aspect and follow each other in clear succession. Each global-system phase also has a locational aspect, a carrier or agent, and is associated in its most prominent characteristics with the world power as predicted by long-cycle theory. Furthermore, Parsons lacks an explicitly theoretical framework for his three revolutions. Now and then he does mention 'phases' (as when, in 1971, p. 143, he discusses the 'coming phase' of the modern world system), and he may well have been using the LIGA pattern implicitly as his framework of orientation (see, for example, 1971, pp. 123–4). But there is no reference to his earlier writings on phase-movements, and one can only speculate why not. He might have had the scheme in mind but lacked a mechanism for the process. In fact, the interpretation proposed here, starting a 'LIGA' cycle with the explorations, accords better with the historians' conception of the modern world as originating in the age of discoveries.

One important point of convergence does, however, come to light in the closing passages of Parsons's book. On the question of the nature and character of the next macro-phase (1970–2100?) – a

matter of no little theoretical and practical significance – Parsons advanced the view that the 'coming phase' will 'centre on integrating the consequences of all three of these major changes' (that is, the three previous 'revolutions') 'both mutually and with the exigencies of the societal community' (1971, p. 143). This means that he did see the character of the next global-cycle phase as principally integrative and the major functional problems of the system centring *not* 'in the economy, the polity, or the value system' but in the 'societal community'. Parsons's conclusion is indeed supported by the present interpretation of the directionality of the global system in its learning mode, but it would also have to be seen as relating the principal integrative needs not to the needs of the 'modern societal community' of the nation, as he seemed to imply, but rather to the needs of a global community, viewed as requiring integration, an extended conception of solidarity and an explicit definition of the global public interest. This is indicated by the direction the global system is taking as a preliminary to new political and economic accomplishments.

All these are major themes that demand much additional thought and research. Furthermore, it is notable that most of the labels that have been assigned to the phases of the global system, while quite familiar today and widely accepted, were unknown in their own day. The Industrial Revolution, for instance, was so-dubbed by the English economic historian Arnold Toynbee as late as 1884, more than a century after its inception. The 'educational revolution' is a term only just popularised, *inter alios* by Parsons. Past generations evidently were slow in defining the special flavour and achievements of their age; theoretically equipped as we are, can we do better? Might we even be in a position to anticipate the needs of the future?

DISCUSSION

The three main findings of this chapter are as follows:

(1) The long cycle may plausibly be thought of as a form of Parsons–Bales–Shils phase-movement. It is a process whereby the global polity, viewed as a social system filling the requirements of the four-function paradigm in the Parsonian mode, moves through its four phases in a recurrent manner. Support for this thesis rests both on the factual existence of phase-like uniformities in the process of global politics, and on the congruence between the expectations generated by the Parsonian model and the empirical evidence of the

course of events. The presence of conditions favourable to phase-movement, such as closure, continuity, and communication, also encourage this interpretation.

(2) The long cycle also may be interpretated as a learning cycle in the Parsonian mode. The grounds for thinking so reside in the fact that the sequencing of phases in the long cycle is consistent with the predictions of Parsons, Bales and Shils. The extent of system change observed over the duration of long cycles, and even the character of the systemic roles played by the world powers and their challengers, also support this interpretation.

(3) Each long cycle may also be considered one phase of a sequence that describes the operation of the global system. This mega-process, too, has the basic characteristics of a learning cycle. The evidence here, again, concerns the distinguishing features of each such phase and those also seem to be directly and causally linked to the world powers. The last long cycle, viewed as a phase of a superordinate learning process, was, on that interpretation, a culture-maintenance process with superior attainments in the educational–scientific area; and it would thus follow that the next cycle will be concerned with maximising the values of community and solidarity in the global dimension.

Obviously, the implications of this analysis can only be summarised here in the briefest manner.

The study of long cycles can no longer be regarded merely as an island of theory, a problem of a special kind in the vast array of questions facing the social sciences. Viewed in their correct dimensions of time and space, the problems of world politics are part and parcel of the fabric and substance of modern society, even if certain specialised techniques and understandings are needed for the elucidation of their full meaning. This enhances the explanatory status of the theory and the standing of its predictive insights.

Important questions of determinism arise here, but they also lend support to a positive outlook on the future of the world. The entire global system, not only the global polity, might now be viewed as a living process and not just a field in which a few act to 'get what they can'. This is a fruitful and intriguing thought: world politics seen as groping its way toward greater coherence and higher (more differentiated) forms of social order, with mankind lifting itself by its own bootstraps, so to speak, toward new ways of living.

While recognising the role long cycles play in giving shape to the processes of world politics, students must also beware of reifying the

phase-movement and the learning process. Instead, the long cycle and the global-system process may need to be conceived of as ideal movements, as functions to be satisfied and lessons to be learnt: a set of values or group norms that will not be realised much of the time without the understanding efforts of all participants. As Bales and Cohen (1979, p. 108) counsel, it is important 'to formulate conceptions that have proved useful' and to 'articulate group norms and expectations' that group members ought to try to implement, and not to suppose that there is some 'law of group development' or 'law of inevitable phase movement' that will 'automatically operate with optimum results'.

Finally, this analysis raises intriguing questions about the past and future role of the United States in the world. If correct, the analysis further strengthens the view that one cycle of world leadership (in its world-power mode) has now reached its close, and the foundations of another cycle are now being laid. If the analysis of the direction of the global-system process is correct, too, the United States' role in the cycle now passing consisted not in striking displays of economic and military power (important and dramatic though they were), but rather in its advances in the broad area of cultural attainments of world-wide significance: in the universalisation of education at all levels, in the high quality of science, learning and research processes, in the freedom afforded to the media to grow and to promote ways of communication and interaction unknown only a century ago. If that is a valid proposition, then the next phase of the larger cycle will necessarily be focused on questions of integration, solidarity, and the expansion of the global community.

So much for the driving mechanism of the long cycle, and of the global-system process. In both cases, the process goes from one phase into another and then returns to its original position, because that is how a fairly coherent, continuing, large but communicating system may be expected to behave. The four phases are evocations of the several functional needs of such a system, and in a cyclic process each need 'takes its turn' to be satisfied. The functional requirements of the global polity drive the long cycle; the general functional needs of the global system drive the superordinate process. The two processes mesh because the world power is the carrier of both.

Does this sound overly deterministic? Not really. All it means is that large-scale, differentiated social systems set limits to human

behaviour and reinforce certain types of it. Within limits set in this case by functional requirements (there are other limits too) such behaviour confronts a variety of options and could proceed along a significant number of alternative courses. Overall, however, the options and alternatives conducive to optimal movement for the system will be well regarded and well rewarded. At times of general hostilities, for instance, the war-leaders and the generals will be the heroes; in periods of economic expansion, entrepreneurs and great financiers hold the centre stage; they will be generously compensated because they also maximise social welfare: needs that must be met at that particular time. Within these limits there remain possibilities of choice, and it is those choices that some of the most crucial aspects of world politics are about. But if it does sound deterministic, so much the better. If the learning model is valid then it allows for a degree of predictability that informed opinion often regards as unattainable in world politics.

So much for explaining the long cycle. In form, this is how the global political system might be expected to operate through time reckoned in terms of generations. In substance, this is how the global political system might be expected to operate if it were a Parsonian learning machine. Each part of the interpretation supports the other and both stand on foundations laid by Parsonian social system analysis modified by additional insights. Both the global polity and the learning process interpretations have good support in empirical evidence and in historical narrative.

PART II
Ramifications of Long Cycles

Ramifications of Long Cycles

In the modern world system, everything, broadly speaking, is related to everything else; every process connects with every other. So much may be taken as axiomatic; more important it is to determine how precisely these connections operate and propagate.

The long cycle is one of a family of world system processes; it is a process that charts the course of global wars, and the structure of leadership that successively emerged from each of these wars. Its distinctiveness has now been argued, and demonstrated. What remains is to show how this process relates to, and ramifies with, others.

Three cases will be examined. First, the relationship between the long cycle and the rise of the system of nation-states. This latter development, one of differentiating a distinct national level of interaction and organisation world-wide (cf. Chapter 1) is a modern world system process, and one of major import. The interesting point here is that it cannot be properly understood unless studied in close interaction with the long cycle.

The second case is the relationship between the long cycle and the rise of the party-systems, in the political structures of the global powers in particular. This development is one of differentiating among the functional sub-systems of the global level of interaction and organisation, hence it is a global system process. Parties and party systems may be seen as linkages connecting the global political system with the global community that is based on the world power. In as much as world powers are nation-states, the working of their party systems has also served as model for other nation-states, and has promoted a diffusion of that form of political activity through political systems at all levels. In as much as the party systems of the world powers are at the same time national party systems, this subject also concerns the evolution of prominent national institutions.

The third case is the relationship between long cycles and the processes of dependency creation and reversal. Dependency creation describes the impact of world system processes on societies around the world. For instance, the differentiation of the global and national levels, in and of itself a basic innovation in world organisation, has disrupted existing imperial and local structures and a host of other

social arrangements, while at the same time creating national and global structures of remedial effect.

Additionally, two other related theses will be pursued. (i) Over the modern period, each of these three areas (nation-states, party systems, dependency) shows evidence of systemic change of a nature consistent with the expectations of a learning process. (ii) Over the same period, each area also manifests instabilities that can be interpreted as the costs and liabilities of that process.

In the first place, the discussion is intended to point to the evidence of developmental change both in global politics and in the world system at large. Such evidence includes: the increase in the number of nation-states and the world-wide adoption of this basic political institution; the steady growth in the number and sophistication of party systems that are also crucial to the effective working of the modern state; the process of dependency reversal that diffuses innovation. Each one of these processes may be shown to be closely linked to long cycles, as aspect or consequence.

In each case the aim is to show that the performance level of world politics has risen in the context of the operation of the long cycles: the world is more productive and better administered; its public is better informed and party systems conduce to more enlightened debates of global politics; and dependency is not permanent and ineradicable. Furthermore, this higher performance level is not just incidental or accidental but has been institutionalised in such forms as nation-states and party systems. Finally, education and learning themselves have been institutionalised and contribute to higher levels of performance.

To the extent that the evidence is convincing it would tend to support the view that the long cycle is a learning process, a surprising finding in a field that assumes international politics to be the province of 'immutable realities'.

In the second place, the discussion also makes clear that the long cycle is not just a string of unalloyed blessings but also a generator of instabilities. The two critical elements of long cycles also give rise to problems: recurrence, in the form of repetitive global warfare, brings turmoil and destruction; and learning, through a variety of innovations, creates inequalities.

More particularly, the rise of the nation-state has been closely linked to the great wars of the modern world and the problems connected with them. The party systems, while they have greatly enriched the political life of world powers and the states associated

with them, have grown asymmetrically: they have been conspicuously lacking from the experience of the principal challengers. The learning and innovation that have been the hallmarks of the modern era have created dependency over large areas of the globe and the reversal of that dependency has been a slow process. Much of the operation of long cycles is self-regulating, as when problems created by overemphasis on one issue in one phase, or one cycle, are attended to in the next phase, or the next cycle. But not all problems seem to be self-correcting in this way.

Overall, this discussion highlights the complex ramifications surrounding long cycles, and clarifies certain positive and some negative aspects of these processes.

6 Nation-States

A definition of the nation-state is entirely appropriate before entering upon this discussion. A nation-state is, in the first place, a state that is a fairly advanced, differentiated, comprehensive and autonomous political organisation disposing of armed forces and the taxing powers needed to support them, and some arrangement for making these responsive to a concept of public interest. In the second place, that state's 'public' is defined in a broader manner than that of a city-state, and in a yet different manner from that of an empire. If Venice may be taken as a standard case of a city-state then the political community in such a state may be seen to be confined to citizens of the city proper; the inhabitants of other territories ruled by Venice, for instance those of Crete or of the 'mainland', had no part in its public life; nor did that community respond to the concept of 'Italy'. Portugal or England, by contrast, extended their political communities beyond their capital cities, to the limits of the national domain. In the third place, a nation-state is not an empire; it has no universal or global aspirations but rather some inherent limits to its extension. These could be geographical limits, such as those of islands and peninsulas; or some related concept of natural frontiers such as France had. Or it might include in its political community all those of similar ethnic background, or speakers of a certain language and no others, or, finally, all those loyal to, and served by, that state. The concept of nation implies limits; and the identity of a particular nation is a definition of the limits observed by it.

The nation-state not only shares some characteristics with the ancient city-state (such as classical Athens or Renaissance Venice) – a state that is cohesive, well-organised and has continuity through time; it is, in one sense, a city-state *writ large*. But that also means that it is usually *larger*, drawing on more diverse resources and capable of facing greater challenges from a hostile environment. Just as city-states used to, the nation-state has a tendency toward parochialism, and in particular toward insularity: and for obvious reasons, since the most successful nation-states have in fact been located on islands, while others have been islands psychologically and in aspiration. In any event, autonomy is easier to preserve in an insular or isolated position. But even in a nation-state the metropolitan city looms large, too, if only because it is the seat of govern-

ment. In most nation-states the capital is home for a substantial fraction of the population; it claims a larger than proportionate share of the powerful, wealthy and influential citizens. All in all, the nation-state is the characteristic political structure of the modern world system.

The nation-state has played a consistently crucial role in the modern system of world order. The following questions will be reviewed in the present chapter:

(1) What has been the link between nation-states and world powers?
(2) How were long cycles associated with the formation of nation-states?
(3) Did nation-states contribute to systemic instability?
(4) Did the role of nation-states vary as a function of the long cycle?

WORLD POWER AND NATION-STATE

In the modern world system, successive world orders were each created by one world power. The world powers in turn have all been nation-states. Portugal was 'the first of the modern European nation-states' (Boxer, 1969, p. 4); after attaining her territorial ambitions by 1249, she consolidated her national identity in wars with the Moors, and with Castile (1383–1411). The Dutch state, forged in civil war with the Spanish Monarchy, launched into a global role soon after the formation of its basic national institutions in the Union of Utrecht. England, too, found her destiny in the Tudor age and the Elizabethan struggle against Spain, although Britannia did not emerge fully fledged until she was ready to rule the waves early in the eighteenth century. The United States is among the world's oldest and most successful nation-states.

This is the empirical evidence for positing a basic link between nation-states and world power. Further analysis suggests that the association has been a two-way one. Nation-state status led to world power; that is, the successful establishment of an effective national political system, as in the cases of Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, has been the precondition of successful global action. The nation-state proved to be the only organisation capable of spearheading and then sustaining large operations at long distances and on a global scale. Papal co-ordination was tried but generally found wanting in the organisation of medieval crusades; city-states such as Venice

were quite successful on their own in the Mediterranean but were too small for oceanic ventures. Powerful continental empires such as those of the Hapsburgs in Europe, the Ming dynasty in China or the Mughals in India did not or could not succeed because they were pre-modern organisations. The nation-state mobilised the resources and also supplied the coherence and the motivation and unity of purpose required for such extraordinarily ambitious and far-flung enterprises. While both the Dutch and the English nation-states, in their earlier phases, relied in some of their efforts on trading companies, these too had clear national identities, were closely co-ordinated and were only one of a set of elements deployed; naval and military efforts, and administrative organisations, were inseparably bonded to them.

But this association also worked the other way. Global power, in its turn, strengthened those states that had attained it relatively to all other political and other organisations. Furthermore, other states competing in the global power game developed similar organisational forms and similar hardiness. They, too, became nation-states – in a defensive reaction, being forced to take issue with or to confront a global power: France against Spain, and later Britain; or, in imitation of its obvious success and effectiveness, Germany following the example of Britain into *Weltmacht*; or, earlier, Peter the Great rebuilding Russia on Dutch and English precepts and models. Thus not only Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States became nation-states, but also Spain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan. The short and the most parsimonious answer to the question, Why did these succeed where 'most of the European efforts to build states failed' (Tilly, 1975, p. 38)? is that they were either global powers or successfully fought with or against them in major warfare.

A process of diffusion was thus set in motion. Its first stage was the development of global activities by a few states; the second step was competition among the major powers; and the third stage was the universalisation of the nation-state as the most viable and most obviously desirable form of political organisation at the next-to-local level. Not only were the major powers who competed among themselves selected out as nation-states, but they also became models for the whole world to imitate, irrespective of needs, special conditions or requirements.

Table 6.1 provides some empirical backing for these statements. It gives information on the nine powers composing the global political system since 1494 (cf. Chapter 1). The dates in the several columns

Table 6.1 When did the global powers become nation-states?

Global power	*Decisive war or national revolution*	*Constitutive union or independence proclaimed*	*National territorial domain attained*
Portugal	1383–1411 war against Spain		1249 conquest of the Algarvae
Spain	1492 fall of Granada	1479 Union of Castile and Aragon	1512 Navarre
France	1453 end of Hundred Years' war with England		1766 Lorraine 1860 Nice
England	1485 end of the war of the Roses		1543 Wales
Russia	1552 Conquest of Kazan		
United Provinces of the Netherlands	1572 Dutch revolt	1579 Union of Utrecht 1581 Act of Abjuration	1648 Treaty of Westphalia
Britain	1689 'Glorious Revolution'	1707 Union with Scotland	
United States		1776 Declaration of Independence	1898 Hawaii
Japan	1868–89 Meji Restoration		1615 end of Sengoku era
Germany		1871 German Empire proclaimed	

are intended to serve as indicators or events marking the transition to the status of nation-state. The second column refers to those more fluid but nevertheless decisive processes of major war or revolution that accelerate and complete the process of the formation of a national identity and a national authority. For Portugal it was the great war of independence against Spain that lasted close to a generation; for England, the prolonged civil strife known as the Wars of the Roses that brought in the Tudor monarchy. In Japan, at the end of the 'Country at War' (Sengoku) period, the Tokugawa Shogunate was firmly established over the whole of the national domain by 1615 (Sansom, 1978, p. 444). The nation-states emerging in the cycles that

followed may be recognised from more obvious points of demarcation, such as proclamations of independence (as in the American case in 1776) or formal announcements of a union of states creating a national entity (as in the case of Great Britain, finally completed in 1707). The last column shows the date by which the state reached the extent of its 'natural' or 'physical' limits, a question that is easy to answer for some, such as Portugal, but not so easy, for instance, for Russia.

The general point may be made, in extension of the initial generalisation, that all the decisive participants in the global politics of the modern era, and not just the world powers, have been nation-states. Other types of state simply could not, and did not, make it in the 'global' class, and fell by the wayside. The Hapsburg monarchy based on Vienna dominated Central and South-East European politics for four hundred years until 1918 but never developed a global or even a true Mediterranean capacity. The Ottoman Empire was a formidable fighting machine in the first long cycle and controlled the Mediterranean for a good part of the sixteenth century but soon started to weaken; it survived as long as it did largely through well-chosen alliances with the ascendant world powers of the North Atlantic. The great Chinese empire of the Ch'ing, ruled by the Manchus, never ventured afield at all.

But it is also possible to differentiate among global powers. The world powers have been, on the whole, older, earlier established, and more secure in their status as nation-states than their challengers. By and large, they have also been the most successful nation-states. Of all the global powers, the Germany of 1871 has had the shortest career as a global power and the most uncertain status as a nation-state. Russia/USSR, too, has a weaker claim to stable and secure nation-state status. Its national consciousness was first formed in relative isolation from the four other earliest nation-states, during prolonged contests against the Tartars of the Golden Horde when the Grand Princes of Muscovy set about uniting the Great Russians in one powerful state, after about 1450. The event that 'might be said to have brought the nation to birth' was the ending of the Tartar menace by Ivan IV's conquest of Kazan in 1552 (Grey, 1973, p. 150). But as time passed, the limits of that state kept expanding; formally an 'Empire of all Russias' in 1721, substantial numbers of its subjects were outside the national community of Great Russians. Proclaimed a multinational state after 1917, and striving to develop through a new set of institutions and rituals a concept of 'Soviet' nationality,

the USSR has yet to arrive at a stable definition of its national identity. For it might oscillate between the extremes of, on the one hand, universalism initially based on Byzantine-Roman models of empire, now fuelled by Communist ideology, and on the other, Great Russian xenophobia that was painfully evident in the nationalist excesses of the late nineteenth century and could again surface in the future. The continental states found it less easy to reach a stable identity than those based on islands.

LONG CYCLES AND NATION-STATES

Accepting the data presented in Table 6.1, and in particular the dates for decisive wars and revolutions as marking the birth of nation-states, it is easy to conclude that the emergence of four such states – Portugal, Spain, France and England – coincided with the opening of the first long cycle. On that evidence, however, it can hardly be claimed that this first long cycle 'generated' the initial batch of nation-states, especially since the Portuguese monarchy in particular was well established even before the start of the first cycle. Nevertheless, the fact of their existence and availability made it possible for the critical global operations to be launched from a firm base and – unsurprisingly – by those two states, Portugal and then Spain, whose national bases were the first to be consolidated. The success of Portugal (as a naval power in particular) and of Spain (as a continental military power whose infantry 'terzios' inspired fear throughout Western Europe for over a century) put this new political formation on a strong footing, and they dominated the 'launch' phase of the long cycles. France and then England followed their lead into world affairs several decades later, and in the second cycle came the Netherlands, and also Russia that remained virtually isolated for a still longer period.

As soon as France and England emerged as nation-states they entered the competition for global stakes and in the process laid the foundations for the nucleus of an 'inter-nation' system: the 'international' system (formally recognised by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) that is still dominant today. Thus it cannot be said that the 'international system' antedates the modern world. The inter-state system arose out of the same processes that created the modern world system and is inextricably part of its processes. To repeat, the international system came into existence in the 1490s when four

fairly powerful national states emerged in Western Europe and were connected by a network of permanent alliances; it received formal recognition in treaty law some 150 years later.

Given the initial set of major players, it is easy to see that nation-states became, in effect, the favoured components of an evolving structure. They functioned better in global competitions and had a better survival rate in wars. Gradually the mechanics of the system made sure that nation-states became the rule: all other forms of political organisation were now exceptions – that is, 'pre-modern' or 'traditional' formations. The processes of the long cycle did not create the initial line-up of the principal players, but they made sure that the successful states that followed them would in fact conform to the same image.

Gradually but at a steadily rising rate, the number of nation-states and their relative weight in society have been climbing until, in the past one hundred years, nearly the entire world was covered with them; and quite recently this growth has come to a halt. The processes of global politics have, over the past half-millenium, helped to produce the most basic of the secular trends: the rise of the nation-state as the dominant world organisation (Modelski, 1972, ch. 7). This process can be described both by an exponential growth curve and by a learning curve that has now flattened out. In its entirety, it must be viewed as a product of the operation of the modern world system.

But the journey has been far from smooth. Another glance at Table 6.1 reveals that the truly stable nation-state has proved to be relatively rare. For even if nation-states have fared better than other forms of organisation, and even if among nine global powers, eight (that is, all but Germany) show virtually continuous existence since their inception, the stability of even the global powers is comparatively recent, especially if their territorial bases are considered. Portugal, Spain and England, and possibly the Netherlands and Japan, can trace the continuity of their territorial base through most of the modern age. But France rounded off her 'hexagon' relatively late, in the eighteenth century; and she was still adding to it in the nineteenth (Nice in 1860) and fighting for it in the twentieth (Alsace-Lorraine). The United States grew vastly in the nineteenth century, while Russia/USSR continued to expand as recently as 1945. The great majority of the nation-states in existence today date back to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus, while inherently 'limited' in their claims, nation-states have by no means proved a

stable base of world politics, even while becoming the prevailing form and the ruling norm of political organisation.

NATION-STATE AND SYSTEMIC INSTABILITY

While the fact of long cycles may now be taken as given, it does not follow that a global system must inherently be subject to long cycles of the type known so far and discussed in this book: century-long patterns of events centring around intense global warfare. Both on practical and on theoretical grounds it can surely be argued that such warfare cannot be an inherent feature of long cycles, and that its absence might induce the emergence of other types of global political system that are less fatally polarised and more dispersed, more solidary and better integrated, and therefore also *less* liable to experience such great, costly, and dangerous instability.

Some economists, for instance, argue that dispersed – that is, free – market systems of low concentration have greater stability than highly concentrated markets of competition among the few. According to John K. Galbraith (1973, p. 179), 'the market system, like the classical combination of competitive firms and small-scale monopoly of which it is the modern prototype, is broadly stable. Fluctuations . . . are self-limiting and eventually, self-correcting. The planning system (of large corporations) . . . is inherently unstable.' In as much as the global political system might in future shed some of its characteristics of concentration and move in the direction of greater power dispersion, it might also become less prone to violence.

The critical question at this point is: What might be the characteristics of the modern global system that make it produce not just regular phase-movement but violent and potentially disastrous fluctuations?

Some properties of the Global Polity

To account for these special features of the global political system, the experience of the last five orders created by the world powers must be considered in some further detail. For each one of these orders, the following distinguishing characteristics will be observed:

(1) their origin and formative experience in global war;
(2) the power monopoly they rested upon originally;

(3) their specialisation on political and economic problems;
(4) their seemingly irresistible drift toward territoriality.

Global war

Past systems of world order each found expression in a great outburst of activity that was both creative and destructive, and closely linked to conditions of global conflict and large-scale violence. Each sprang from institutions and arrangements forged either during or in the immediate aftermath of such wars. As previously noted, these global conflicts have accounted for a high proportion of all war-related casualties. In an important sense, moreover, they have also included certain features of civil and internecine warfare, notorious for its deadly character. The Italian wars that inaugurated the modern age could be seen, at a pinch, as the continuation of the more than three-centuries-old rivalries between Genoa and Venice. The Dutch war of Independence was, in origin, a civil war. The French and the German wars of more recent experience, too, were fought among ruling groups and populations bound by close relationships. For example, William III of England was a cousin of Louis XIV, and Wilhelm II of Germany a grandson of Queen Victoria. The impact of such wars upon the human consciousness and spirit (ready to cope only with so many disasters) was at various times enormous.

Global wars are not the ideal breeding ground for world order. In the most simple formulation, world wars produced an order that generated more world wars, and in that unusual but important sense perpetuated itself. National political systems whose path to the present leads through violent civil strife (for example, the French Revolution, the American Civil War) do not easily shake off the burdens of such heritage. They are marked by polarities and cleavages, expectations of more violence, want of participation in decision-making and lack of consideration for the interests of large segments of the population. They tend to be short on features that help with smooth self-maintenance and early renewal.

The great wars and the prodigious discharges of energy they generated have been the catalysts of global systems; but once that energy had spent itself the systems were left with few mechanisms for recharging their batteries, so to speak, and on the contrary still laboured under the weight of earlier disasters. Inevitably, they drifted into decay.

Monopoly

The structural-maintenance problems of a world order are inextricably tied to its second basic property, the monopoly of global power on which this order was based initially. Linked to extensive global conflict, the world orders that ensued have tended to rest substantially upon a distribution of military power that evinced high degrees of concentration in armed capacity for global reach (as documented in Table 2.2). For the first four global systems this meant, in essence, a preponderance of naval power and the capacity to organise and when necessary to interdict maritime communications. The British elevated this requirement to the status of a high art, devising a doctrine of 'command of the sea' which Mahan (1890) later rediscovered as sea power, and they made it a decision rule always to outbuild rival navies by a substantial margin, the 'two Power standard' (Moll, 1969, p. 11ff). In the contemporary global system the United States' control of ocean, air and electromagnetic space was uniquely preponderant and gave it unilateral deterrence until the early 1970s.

Monopoly (which is never absolute but requires a substantial control of the relevant system) creates rents (see also Kindleberger, 1981, pp. 244–6 on 'leadership surplus' and monopoly rents). This means that to its holders accrue rewards larger than they would be, for instance, in a more dispersed system. In the past these benefits have revolved around greater-than-average security (which can be reinvested in capacity for higher organisation and productivity); preferential access to better knowledge of, and superior bargaining power in, global transactions and communications (bringing additional wealth through trade and services), and a heightened capacity to 'set the rules' in world affairs (Perroux, 1979). In each cycle, such benefits helped to create a 'golden age' for the world power, making it an object of admiration and respect, acclaim and imitation: a 'model of development'.

But monopoly rents also attract rivalry and competition. Hence, in due time, each world power also faces the necessity of confronting other great powers willing and ready to reach out for world status. From an initial unipolarity (that is, a situation where over 50 per cent of the world's military capacity for global reach is held by one power) the system moves into bipolarity and multipolarity. The original preponderance gained in world conflicts cannot and does not last because it inevitably provokes rival power centres. Past its prime, the global system becomes the arena of 'oligopolistic rivalry',

wherein a number of major powers strive to maximise their (usually short-run) advantage; it is a time when long-term considerations of world interests become increasingly secondary. In the latter stages of the second British system this phase is known as one of 'imperialism', but parallel processes may also be observed in others. Interspersed with periods of collusion, rivalry drifts into increasing animosity and cut-throat competition and may eventually deteriorate into anarchy.

Moreover, the elements legitimising monopoly in world arrangements have steadily declined. The King of Portugal lost little time proclaiming himself 'lord of the conquest, navigation and commerce' and proceeded to exclude all other powers and their ships from the major part of the world ocean. But each of the succeeding world powers was less exclusive in its claims, the Dutch and English monopolistic trading companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries being succeeded in the nineteenth century by the universalist doctrine of Free Trade. Thus competition was spreading even as the opportunities for monopoly were shrinking. The Information Revolution is a great solvent of monopolies.

Specialisation

The third important characteristic of recent world orders concerns their narrowly specialised base and extreme preoccupation with external problems. This had to do in part with the significant role economic motives and policies played in all global systems. The early explorers frantically and purposefully searched and ransacked large areas of the world for gold; then they carried off spices and other valuables. In the nineteenth century they went on to make the world a safe market for Manchester cottons or for the oil to light the lamps of China. The overemphasis on economic matters went in tandem with enforcing monopolistic practices by force and extracting advantages through superior power; it also was the reverse side of lack of emphasis on the other necessary elements of stable political systems: development of bonds of sympathy and solidarity, and of a cultural consensus. Absence of wider political institutions, in turn, meant areas of inflexibility and incapacity for adjustment, and a predisposition to sharp swings rather than smooth evolution. Narrow specificity fostered inequalities and on such counts brought added fragility, brittleness and instability.

Territoriality

Finally, there is the drift to territoriality. In its pure conception, world power concerns global functions and the desire and the ability to solve global problems. In its concrete aspects this means capacity for marshalling resources for global reach, mobility over long distances and the operation of complex networks of communication. While all such activities require *points d'appui*, that is, nodes or bases, and some headquarters areas, they do not call for extensive territorial control in the imperial mode.

The essence of world power is functional network control. It is the accomplishment of the maximum of global functions with minimal territorial burdens. The negative aspects of this attitude are policies explicitly designed to minimise territorial entanglements. Early in the modern period, English statecraft developed the rule of avoiding continental acquisitions, and this, more than anything else, made possible Britain's role as keeper of the balance of Europe, and consequently also its status of world power. An island state found it easier to adopt such policies. In a positive sense, the Portuguese grasped right away the possibilities of network control; and the system of bases created by Albuquerque on instructions from Lisbon served them well. But even they tried to have too many bases and wasted scarce manpower and ships in vain attempts to hold on to them. The Spanish went straight for territorial conquest and while the land they seized was useful it did not leave them quite free to embark upon global programmes. The Dutch and the English East India Companies slowly but inexorably transformed themselves into mechanisms of territorial rule. Britain profoundly strained her first system, through the futile attempt to hold on to the American colonies. When her second global system came under pressure after 1870 she once again sought refuge in territoriality and for a while took pride in acquiring large chunks of unspoken-for lands in Africa and elsewhere. The British Empire looked good on the map but the fading spirit of world order could not be recaptured through such irrelevancies.

Territoriality is the final nemesis of world power. It is a defensive response to the challenge of oligopolistic rivalry. It preserves the forms and illusion of control where the substance can no longer serve a useful purpose. The defence of fixed positions and distant frontiers consumes disproportionate resources and drains vitality from the global network. It leads back to layer confusion (Modelski, 1972, pp. 173, 284–5), the fusion of world with national and local tasks; it

invites conflict with national and local leaders and adds to the general climate of animosity and disorder.

A closer look at the properties of the global system that account for its lethality and that have just been reviewed tends to show that they are due to the fact that all world powers are nation-states. Global warfare being the activity of global powers, the association between warfare and nation-states is particularly strong.

(1) Nation-states have proved the most effective units for fighting *global war*; other competing organisations have been selected out. The basic unit of world order has become the one best fitted to survive a world conflict of major proportions.

(2) The *monopoly rents* earned by world powers accrue to members of a nation-state and non-members are excluded from such gains. This exclusion and structural inability to redistribute effectively the proceeds of world status are the main incentive for rivals to enter the competition.

(3) The national identity of a world power puts severe limitations to the bonds of solidarity it can extend to non-nationals, and to the lines of communication, education and culture it can establish to lend strength and flexibility to the global system. Hence, *specialisation* on political and economic questions makes even mutually advantageous deals appear oppressive or exploitative.

(4) For nation-states, the confusion between territorial control and national safety is an error particularly easy to fall into. Past world powers tended to decline into colonialist states, yet as nation-states they have great difficulty in assimilating colonial dependencies and are liable to surrender to continual anti-colonial pressure. States with world missions that are reduced to defending some remote frontier become stagnant empires vainly trying to keep the barbarians from the gates. The maintenance of bases (Singapore for Britain) or the protection of vital channels of communications (the route to India) come to be seen as irreducible priorities long after their most useful life has passed. In the tension between functionality and *territoriality*, the nation-state – aptly described by Stein Rokkan as 'essentially an agency for real estate management' – is peculiarly liable to succumb to the temptation of clinging to the land.

NATION-STATES AND CYCLE PHASES

For the purposes of this particular argument the (systemic) long cycle may be divided into two sets of phases: the ascending phases and the descending phases. The ascending phases (namely those of Global War and World Power) have their origins in the disorder and disintegration from which a global war starts. The creative and constructive elements of that war – its solidarity and coalition building, the definition of common goals and global purposes that emerges, its projects and accomplishments in goal attainment – also belong to the ascending phase.

The great post-war settlement (such as Vienna) mostly ratifies that which has emerged, but it also marks the formal ending of a period of sustained warfare. The ascending trend continues for a time – on past record, for a generation – only to experience a gradual loss of energy (in phases of Delegitimisation and Deconcentration). Global problems arise but remain unattended, or they are taken up by emerging new leaders and competitors; conflicts are generated that do not seem to yield to solutions. At some point the curve turns and begins a descending pattern until such time as the disintegration of authority and the unrestrained assertion of narrow interests lead to a new global conflagration. The destructive aspects of this process mark the lowest point of the descending phases.

The nation-state plays distinct and contrasting roles in these two types of phases of the long cycle. In its ascending phase the world power responds to global problems, creates new national-governmental or transnational institutions and meets the most important needs of the constituents of the global system. In consequence there is little incentive for other states to take care of such problems. Moreover, the conditions of turmoil and disintegration that characterised the preceding (descending) phases having shown the inadequacies and weaknesses of smaller states (especially their inability to withstand the ill winds of world insecurity and the titanic pressures of great wars), such conditions lead directly to what E. H. Carr (1942, ch. 3) has called the crisis of self-determination: doubts about the basic viability of nation-states. Or, as John Herz (1957, pp. 473–93) put it a few years later: 'as a matter of fact, the meaning and function of the basic protective unit, the "sovereign" nation-state itself, . . . become doubtful.' The positive and wise response to global disorder then becomes – as Walter Lippmann (1943, ch. 10) saw it at the same time as E. H. Carr – a solidary alliance of

Great Powers, such as was aimed at in 1943–6, or at the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1814–15, or even earlier.

But the process contains within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. While nation-states in general seem for a time to appear irrelevant, possibly even destructive to world order (do not great wars seem to start out as quarrels among the small?), it is also true that the powers that are constructing and upholding this order are themselves nation-states too. In fact, the world power is itself the 'most perfect' of them all, and the most imitated; hence nation-states never really become completely irrelevant. Moreover, global power is basically tenuous because it is not strongly institutionalised; nation-states, even as world powers, are not the devices best suited for tackling the complex and delicate problems of a world system (only the most simple among them: waging war). Finally, world power 'carried by a ruling nation cannot in the long run be supported solely by the powers of the people of that nation'; as Campanella, a commentator on the Spanish universal monarchy, noted early in the seventeenth century: in its relations with other peoples such a power must 'satisfy them and give them an interest in the continuance and stability of the whole' (quoted in Meinecke, 1957, p. 105).

As the capacity of world powers to meet global problems declines in periods of peace and increasing complexity of relationships, demands on other nation-states mount, and nation-states generally begin to assume new functions and increasing responsibilities. They become more prominent problem-solvers. They regain their hold on popular loyalty. At times of rising security their ability to maintain peace appears quite adequate. In the next phase, as the monopoly position of the world power erodes, competition for world status and regional leadership among the other nation-states (for are they not nation-states too, with as much right . . .?) sets in. The appeals invoked on behalf of opponents of the world power are varieties of nationalism and counter-nationalism. The major powers' competition for the support of minor powers also takes the form of mutual 'nation-building': foreign aid schemes developed into schemes for the erection of national political systems. Thus oligopolistic rivalry leads directly to the strengthening of all nation-states and an all-round intensification of nationalism.

It can therefore be said that such a model predicts that the role and salience of the nation-state in the global system will differ according to the phase of the long cycle under consideration. In the

ascending phases that role will tend to diminish, while in the descending phases it will be on the rise.

THE FUTURE OF THE NATION-STATE

On this analysis, the future of the nation-state depends on two processes: the long cycle as recurrence, and the long cycle as evolution; the two processes, in their turn, might be seen as modes of functioning of the global system.

As a process of recurrence the long cycle has been a determinant of the nation-state's role in world politics. As has been shown, the nation-state is a characteristic feature, and crucial to the operation, of the long cycle; the phase-movements of that cycle have determined the relative position of nation-states in the world picture.

Given the model of the long cycle and granted its empirical referent, it follows that at the present time the global system has passed the ascending periods of the systemic cycle and has already entered the phases of decline. If that were so, then the model would predict, for the next quarter-century, increasing salience for the nation-state, and rising nationalisms linked to major power confrontations and animosities. Attempts to meet global problems would be met primarily by relying on national solutions. However, given the limitations of national action at the global level, the prospects for satisfactory settlements do not appear to be especially bright; hence the likelihood of rising shortfalls in the balance of world order.

That much can be predicted from the model. But the model is nothing more than an explication of the functioning of the global system as it has been known and experienced over the past few centuries. One cannot altogether exclude the possibility – however small it might be judged – of sufficiently profound changes in that system to alter its basic *modus operandi* that concerns global war.

Such a new direction might be away from a system that relies too much on the steady, if long-spaced-out, progression of global wars, and finds it difficult to reach more stable patterns of development. But such a restructuring would also affect the role of the nation-state (especially in relation to global solidarity), and might possibly diminish its importance quite considerably in relation to emerging international communities.

As an evolutionary process, on the other hand, the world-wide proliferation of nation-states might now be nearing completion

because that process is reaching the quantitative limits of its geographical setting. If, as argued, this trend might be described by means of a learning curve then the late twentieth century is seeing the levelling-off portion of that curve. Qualitative and intensive growth might yet continue but physical coverage of the globe's surface is setting obvious limits. For this particular trend, therefore, the stage of rapid growth is over. If the formation of nation-states has been a product of the functioning of the modern world system, then the completion of that process, in some respects at least, must also ultimately have important repercussions back upon global politics.

Are nation-states a vital element in the operation of long cycles? Yes, they are indeed, and their contribution has been both positive and negative. Positively, they constitute a principal organisational form through which long cycles have operated. Without them it is hard to see how a regular succession of world powers (that is, the significant regularity of this process) could have occurred. Negatively, their share of the onus of being linked to global wars, and therefore of making the cycle a basically violent movement, has been great. Long cycles will tend to continue in a traumatic way as long as single nation-states remain the principal keepers of world order.

Overall, however, the greatest significance might lie in the fact that the process of formation of nation-states is basically over and that the system of nation-states is now in place. The stage could be set for new departures.

7 Party Systems

In striking fashion, the rise of nation-states to a dominant role in the politics of the modern world era is closely parallelled by the evolution of party systems. Parties, as such, are of course much older, and factional conflict even more so. What is relatively recent and most noteworthy is the reliable functioning of party systems.

ANTECEDENTS

It is, of course, a matter of record that parties and party strife were known and observed in earlier times and just as often frowned upon by thoughtful observers. In Athens' golden age (fifth century BC) the democratic party led by Pericles routed the aristocratic party; according to Plutarch (Pericles, 11–15) this meant that 'political opposition was at an end' and its leaders went into exile. At the zenith of its power, therefore, Athens did have parties but it did not have a regularised party system. During the Peloponnesian wars, civil war between the democratic and the oligarchic parties 'gave birth to every kind of iniquity in the Greek world' (Thucydides, Bk. III:83).

The formative stages of the Italian system of city-states were marked by a conflict between two major 'parties', the Guelfs and the Ghibellines. That conflict was part of the struggle waged for dominance over Italy by the German Emperor and the Pope from about 1150 onward. By 1240, and beginning with Florence, the supporters of the Emperor came to be known among the city-states of Italy as the Ghibellines, and their opponents, the ultimate winners of that contest, the pro-papal party, as the Guelfs. Most often, pre-existing factions in the cities adapted either one or the other set of attitudes without losing their individual character or abandoning local interests. But the result of this polarisation of local aristocratic factions by two external forces was not a reasonably stable interplay of parties but a zero-sum conflict: usually the exit or exile of members of the losing faction and loss of their properties (Waley, 1961, pp. 208–18). It is significant that Venice, politically the most successful of the city-states avoided such strife by staying neutral and banning 'factions' while Genoa, its principal rival in the thirteenth

and fourteenth centuries, was seriously weakened by it. Venice's aristocratic institutions could be worked without a party system, yet in a constitutional manner observing the rule of law.

It is Sung China (960–1279), sometimes referred to as the period of Chinese Renaissance, rather than Renaissance Italy, that furnishes the closest approximation to a modern party system. Economic growth and political development in that era, combined with the rise of a literate class aided by the spread of printing, created the conditions for the appearance in that large polity of 'two opposing political and philosophical parties' that 'disputed with equal fervour for their own particular interpretation of the classical books, and for the actual political control of the empire'. C. P. Fitzgerald (1950, pp. 389–407, 418–21) refers to these 'parties', respectively, as the Innovators and the Conservatives. The Innovators (such as Wan An-shih) sought to cope with the problems of the empire and its rapidly growing society by instituting a variety of reforms, administrative, financial and military. They were opposed by the Conservatives who were Confucian scholars manning the bureaucracy and who in the end prevailed and succeeded in establishing their own brand of Confucianism as the ruling orthodoxy for succeeding dynasties.

In the Yuan (Mongol) era (1279–1368) controversies about the respective merits of the sea-route and the canal route for transporting tribute grain, still formed, in the opinion of Joseph Needham, 'ample material for party politics' (1971, p. 312). Under the Ming dynasty it was the opposition of what he calls the 'Confucian anti-maritime party' (ibid, p. 525) that put an end to the great voyages to the Indian Ocean in 1435. What this suggests is the fact of political debate among the literate public on major issues of public policy involving well-established interests: the agrarian and landed interest allied to the Confucian bureaucrats and scholars, versus the emperor's personal staff, the eunuchs in particular, and rising groups pursuing maritime and mercantile exploits. These were substantial debates and in retrospect may be seen as central to the evolution of the world system, for they decided that the global system would not be developed by Chinese enterprise.

Important though they were, these were little more than factional struggles for the emperor's ear and did not cumulate toward the evolution of a regularised system. The central government of the empire had, in addition to a secretariat and an implementation bureau, a separate 'opinion' department whose members had the right to challenge imperial edicts. In the Sung era these opinion

officials became a focus for public debates but their importance gradually declined. Their right of challenge disappeared in the Ming era, and by the time of the Ch'ing the emperor forbade 'party and clique rivalries' of all kinds and thereby made despotism perfect (Miyakawa, 1955). These promising beginnings of party life disappeared and nothing remained but the ossified orthodoxy of Confucianism (and its 'School of the Way').

MODERN PARTY SYSTEMS

It is only in the case of the modern world powers that evidence can be found not just of factional strife but of that major political innovation known as the party system. It is an innovation because it is a major step in the evolution of political society toward stable ways of institutionalising conflict. The party systems of the lead states have been successively more and more adept devices at constructively managing civil strife in such a way that it would not interfere with their pursuit of global functions but in fact would help place it on a solid foundation.

Viewed in this light, the party systems have been the forms through which world powers coped with a succession of global problems. Party systems are devices for linking government and policy to the needs and interests of the community they serve and represent. In as much as the world powers have functioned as the core of the global polity, their party systems have been the connecting links between the executive actors and decision-makers of global policy, and that broader, though still small, community that has debated and contested, and has been moved and actuated by, world-wide concerns. In that sense, the evolution of party systems of the world powers is a step toward differentiating more-effective policy guidance at the global level, even though the location of these systems has been in one particular nation-state.

The simultaneous evolution of the nation-state was, of course, a precondition of the success of party systems. The nation-state constituted a larger, more inclusive, platform than the city-state, and within it a contest of parties could take shape based on a substantial electorate. A larger state required a party system for optimum functioning, in a way which the small city states did not. The inclusiveness of the nation-state and of the national community it represented was superior to an empire and naturally called forth a concept of common

national interest around which the party contest would unfold and by which the boundaries of permissible conduct could be demarcated. Finally, the demonstrated continuity of nation-states made possible a more relaxed view of party combat and created opportunities for a regular alternation of parties in power. Of course, not all nation-states evolved successful – that is, stable and lasting – party systems, and herein lies a tale.

In the modern era the world powers came to be associated with party systems but their principal opponents did not. Moreover, the world powers were, generally speaking, the oldest and the most stable of nation-states, while the challengers were the more recent and the less well consolidated and stabilised in identity, experience, and territorial domain. In a general way, therefore, the operation of long cycles, in as much as it favoured the world powers, also favoured the evolution of party systems, but also in a somewhat one-sided manner.

This evolutionary trend, the association of party systems with the operation of long cycles via the political systems of the world powers, is the main theme of this chapter. The other is the failure of the party systems of the world powers to spread and to function as stabilisers at the global, rather than merely at the national, level and chiefly for the world powers and their associates. In the same way that nation-states have been associated with some of the more disturbing characteristics of the long cycle it can also be argued that the inability of party systems to penetrate in a symmetric fashion all the major actors of world powers, and to evolve autonomously at the global level, has been another structural weakness and a factor contributing to the unsteadiness that marks the cyclical process in the modern world.

WORLD POWERS AND PARTY SYSTEMS

As should by now be obvious, the theory of long cycles fixes attention upon a discrete set of actors and processes that have proved qualitatively significant in the affairs of the modern world: that is, upon the world powers and, in the next place, upon those that have contested their leadership on the issue of world organisation – Spain, France and Germany, to which Japan and Russia/USSR might also be added. It thus fulfils the most important function of a theoretical

framework: it makes it possible to delimit the area of inquiry and to ask some interesting questions.

The first such question to ask is: What type of party organisation and arrangement was associated with the world powers at times when they were exercising functions of world leadership? Table 7.1 summarises the information that will shortly be developed and is a preview of the argument showing in particular the striking parallelism of developments in the five cases of operative two-party systems. For if parties are defined – broadly following Ralph M. Goldman (1983, p. 8) – as dedicated to placing their representatives in government leadership positions, hence also to shaping public policy, and party systems defined as those in which more than one party strives in that fashion, then party systems thus formed (or, more precisely, two- or two-plus party systems) may be found in all the known world powers.

Table 7.1 World powers and party systems

World power	*Parties*	*Party type*	*Major issue*
Portugal	(oceanic) (continental)	proto-parties	Oceanic enterprise v. territorial expansion in Iberia, Morocco
Netherlands	States (republican) Orangist	proto-parties	Peace or war with Spain; role of House of Orange
Britain I	Whigs Tories	parliamentary parties	Revolution Settlement; maritime v. continental policies; trade v. empire
Britain II	Whigs→ Liberals Tories→ Conservatives	electoral parties	Reform; free trade; empire
United States	Democrats Republicans	mass parties	Internationalism v. isolation

In the first two cases, those of Portugal and the Netherlands, the question of organisation is somewhat uncertain; the reality of the electoral process and the distinctiveness of parties as specialised political sub-systems being vague, the parties therein identified will be referred to as 'proto-parties'. In the British case of the eighteenth

century, the stage of the parliamentary party is reached and shows the dependence of party systems not just on the nation-state but also on representative and parliamentary institutions. By the nineteenth century, something approximating mass parties is being attained and comes to be realised, in many important instances, in the twentieth. In each case the record shows not just one but two parties contending on crucial issues of national policy in the context of a common reading of the national interest; both parties being, in Sartori's sense (1976, p. 25), not just contentious, self-interested and destructive factions but legitimate 'parts-of-a-whole'.

PORTUGAL (XV–XVI CENTURIES)

In this early case the evidence for party organisation is rather weak. But evidence is good in favour of the argument that the major issues facing the newly emerged Portuguese nation were being shaped by political forces that found expression in the debate and competition engendered by a proto-party system.

A decisive moment in the rise of modern Portugal was the revolution of 1383. This consolidated the national identity established in the course of the previous century in spirited resistance to Spanish attack, in co-operation with England and on the basis of an alliance between the newly installed Aviz dynasty and the trading towns against the old nobility that sided with Spain and lost.

As soon as the new political system reached a degree of stability (when 'perpetual' peace with Spain was finally signed in 1411) the country faced the challenge of how, profitably and yet in an orderly manner, to channel the newly released turbulent energies of the nation. The alternatives were, roughly speaking, either territorial conquest (in the Iberian pensinsula, possibly Granada, or in Morocco), or trade, island settlement, and oceanic exploration. Ceuta, a commercial port trading in gold, ivory and slaves, situated on a narrow isthmus opposite Gibraltar and defensible from land attack, was the first goal of Portugal's expansionist policy, but once it had been seized in a successful amphibious operation it also became clear that the possession of the city would not by itself grant control of Morocco, and other, more expensive, expeditions would have to be launched.

At that point, writes the distinguished Portuguese historian A. H. de Oliveira Marques (1976, vol. I, p. 131), two 'parties' appeared:

a 'war party' as he calls it, favouring an expansionist policy, and another, led by Dom Pedro, that might be called the oceanic party. The old King counselled prudence, but when he died the expansionist party prevailed and ultimately instigated a disastrous expedition to Tangier (1437). That debacle set in motion a reaction successfully led by Pedro and backed by a 'large part of the bourgoisie and the lower classes of Lisbon and other cities'; the Prince's opponents, backed by the Queen, were organised in the League of Torres Novas (1439) (Martins, 1973, p. 321). This association of disgruntled nobles is the only clear case of an 'organisation' that can be identified in the Portuguese case. It is a matter of some interest that this take-off of party-like activities in Portugal occurred at the precise moment when on the other side of the world the Ming government had just abandoned plans for further voyages to the Indian Ocean in conditions of increasingly curtailed debate.

After a brief test of strength a compromise settlement was reached and Pedro assumed the regency. Pedro had an unusually broad background. In 1425–8 he had travelled widely in Europe, visiting his relations in England and the Netherlands, inspecting the Arsenal of Venice and bringing back to Portugal a copy of Marco Polo's *Travels* and a map of the world (Rogers, 1961, pp. 46–8). The decade of his regency saw a high rate of expeditions of discovery, voyages down the African coast south of Cape Bojador, and the consolidation of Madeira and the Azores. The unhappy end of Pedro's regency and his death (1449) swung national policy once again toward continental expansion. Tangier was finally seized in 1471, Morocco became the target of frequent raids, and dynastic ambitions led to an invasion of Castile (1475).

Defeat in Castile restored the influence of the oceanic 'party'. John II (Pedro's grandson), in charge of oceanic expansion since 1474, swiftly subdued the two most powerful noble families in the land. With the support of the lower nobility, the cities and the professionals (the legists) he launched the nation onto an ambitious and well-designed programme for reaching Asia by the Cape route. His successor, Manuel I, carried this plan to a successful conclusion. Two critical debates occurred in the Royal Council in 1496 and in 1501. Both revealed a division of opinion between a majority favouring the forcible capture of the intercontinental spice trade, and others resisting such distant enterprises on grounds of expense, the hostility it would arouse and the difficulties it would pose for maintaining the positions already achieved in West Africa (Diffie

and Winius, 1977, pp. 196–7; Magalhaes-Godinho, 1981, vol. 2, pp. 173–4). In effect these were divisions among the King's councillors about the best way of executing policies of oceanic expansion, though they did also echo the themes of earlier debates.

The dilemma facing Portuguese policy remained a choice between oceanic exploration and trade, or nearby territorial or dynastic conquests. As the royal family and Lisbon merchants drew closer to Spain and the country turned in a conservative direction after 1540, the latter option came to predominate. It led directly to the great Moroccan disaster of 1578 and the loss of independence to Spain two years later. In this last period the *élan* of maritime enterprise had clearly subsided. It seems hardly possible to speak of parties any more but in a broad sense the anti-oceanic policies did prevail and in the end brought a swift end to Portugal's role as a world power.

It is in this general sense that Portugal's policies changed according to the character and preferences of the people in power. The term 'party' used here was, in fact, the historian's own expression. A more correct term would be 'proto-party' because the evidence for organisation is weak and the knowledge of the mechanisms of responsibility is inadequate. While both the towns and the nobility were represented in the Cortes, the frequency of the meetings of that assembly declined over time and its influence is difficult to gauge. But it is also important to underline those features of the process that lend greater support to the 'proto-party' thesis: the fairly even power distributions and regular alternation in office (cf. Sartori, 1976, p. 180) and the reasonably moderate character of political competition and the concept of national policy therein implied. The two 'parties' were not merely self-aggrandising factions but represented competing visions of the nation's future. Contemporary Portuguese historiography continues to debate the concept of 'two national policies' that underlies those early modern debates (Rogers, 1961, pp. 254–7). The broad periodic swings of policy appear entirely persuasive and are clearly linked to competitive changes in governing personnel.

NETHERLANDS (XVI–XVII)

The independent status of the United Provinces of the Netherlands derived from the Act of Abjuration (1581). The political institutions of the new state that started taking shape after the success of the

second Dutch revolt in 1572 were, as defined in the Union of Utrecht (1579), basically confederal, and relatively weak. They took time to consolidate and their fate was governed in significant degree by military developments in the field and by the play of world politics. But party-like alignments sprang up almost immediately.

After both Henry III of France and Elizabeth of England rejected the offer of sovereignty, the States-General, the effective centre of power in the Republic, chose an alliance with England (1585) as the keystone of their foreign policy. But the Earl of Leicester, whom Elizabeth sent to the Netherlands as her representative and whom the States-General proceeded to invest with considerable executive powers as Governor-General, also promptly assumed the nominal leadership of what James Motley dubbed the 'Calvinist democratic party' (1895, vol. 1, bk. 2, p. 67). Inevitably he also soon came into sharp conflict with the emerging 'States-Party'. 'The hatred between the Leicester faction and the municipalities became intense, for the foundation of the two great parties which were long to divide the Netherland commonwealth was already laid.' The mercantile patrician interest embodied in the States of Holland and Zeeland and inclined toward religious toleration, was opposed by a strict Calvinist group that was controlled by religious refugees from the South but that nevertheless also 'indulged in very democratic views of the social compact'. Wilson (1976, pp. 161–2) describes Leicester as repeating the mistakes of Duke John Casimir a few years earlier (1578) who also allied himself with the extremist Calvinists and tried to undermine the influence of the Regents (whom Motley on that occasion referred to as the 'liberal party' (1856, pp. 769, 776)). Leicester's recall and inglorious return to England put an end to the influence of the 'Leicestrians' (though not to the English alliance as such) and left the States party in full control of the Republic for the next generation.

For the United Provinces, the principal political issue in the first decades of their existence was their relationship with Spain who for some time after 1580 was also in control of the global system. The shape of the next world order therefore ultimately became a major preoccupation of Dutch politics. The Twelve Year Truce signed in 1609 in which Spain grudgingly and only indirectly acknowledged the independence of the Republic put a temporary halt to decades of vicious civil war. Nevertheless, the two or three years preceding that event were years of vigorous political activity and strife in the course of which a proto-party system surfaced again, this time

composed of a 'peace party' and a 'war party' (Motley, 1895, vol. 2, bk. 4, pp. 293, 477, 501, 517; Parker, 1979a, p. 252).

The forum was the States-General, the assembly of some 100 delegates from the States of the member provinces, in turn representing the towns and the nobles. The debate was country-wide and took the form *inter alia* of political pamphlets known as blue-books. The peace party of the regents centred on Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the Grand Pensionary of Holland and for the previous two decades the political leader of the war against Spain. Oldenbarnevelt now stood for peace with Spain, freedom to trade with the East, and a republican political system. The war party, led by Prince Maurice of Orange-Nassau, stood for the Calvinist clergy, the city of Amsterdam, and the southern exiles. Maurice was adamant in his mistrust of Spanish intentions and determined to carry the war deeper into the Iberian possessions in the Americas and in the East. At issue were policies that would most effectively overthrow the Iberian world order as well as such more-mundane matters as the country's political structure and who would win or lose more from the discontinuation of hostilities.

The truce was ultimately signed and a compromise arrived at between Oldenbarnevelt and Maurice. Nevertheless, the political divisions thus engendered came to be entangled over the next few years in a spirited theological dispute then engaging the Dutch Reformed Church: between the followers of Arminius, a professor of theology at Leiden, and Gomarus, another professor at that same university. At issue was predestination (the doctrine that God has eternally chosen those whom he intends to save), and liberal, or moderate, versus strict interpretations of the religious calling. The Arminian doctrine found most ground with the regents; the Gomarist creed proved attractive to the clergy and was favoured in Geneva. The municipal authorities asserted a right of decision over basic religious questions while the Comarites contended that sacred matters should be the province of the church. Oldenbarnevelt was a chieftain of the Arminians (no connection with the inhabitants of Armenia!) but as the conflict unfolded Maurice assumed the leadership of the Gomarites. When Oldenbarnevelt was executed on trumped-up charges of treason, the Gomarites prevailed in the Dutch Reformed Church and at the Synod of Dort. Arminianism, however, was far from extinct and the Orangist–anti-Orangist division continued as the organising principle of the politics of the Netherlands.

Prince Maurice and the House of Orange now assumed quasi-royal prerogatives. His successor married his son into the House of Stuart (1641) and gave the Orangists a pro-English orientation (Geyl, 1969). Upon the sudden death of the next Stadholder (1651) the leadership of the country reverted again to the States (republican) party based on Holland, led by its Grand Pensionary, Johan de Witt. Hard put to defend Dutch trade against English encroachments and not averse to dealing with Paris, de Witt represented a French tendency in Dutch politics. But when Louis XIV launched a sudden attack (1672) that the Regents seemed unable to cope with, de Witt was lynched by an enraged mob in The Hague. In an atmosphere of factional struggle that could hardly be regarded as exemplary of the working of party systems, William III assumed full power on a wave of pro-Orangist sentiment and ultimately gave the Netherlands a decidedly pro-English tilt that lasted for decades.

The historians of the Netherlands seem quite free in using the term 'party' in relation to all these events even though the term 'proto-party' would, once again, do better service. A recent biographer, however, makes it abundantly clear that Johan de Witt:

> operated without the advantage of an organized party system, which clearly sets friend and foe apart, gives rules to the game of winning and losing power, and establishes links, however tenuous, between ideological principles and day-to-day practice. But such parties had been created nowhere in Europe; organized political groups were called 'factions' by their opponents and were at best considered to be on the verge of the law, at worst, incipient rebels. What we call de Witt's 'States party' . . . was known at the time merely as the *Staatsgezinde*, literally 'those inclined toward the States' or, more loosely, 'the adherents of the States', although opponents gave them the opprobrious name of 'Loevenstein faction', in memory of the imprisonment of the six deputies in Loevenstein House in 1650. The States party was a loose alliance of groups brought together by one or more interests; republican (or anti-stadholder) ideology, the benefits of patronage, family connections, or simply acceptance of de Witt's leadership. An Orangist pamphleteer described it in hostile but not inaccurate terms: 'since the death of the Prince all affairs of the country are managed by only a few persons; . . . it is the same and similar persons who rely upon each other, put everything into the hands of committees and then have themselves named to the committees,

> and bask in each other's light.' On the other side were the *Oranjegezinde* or *Prinsgezinde*, the adherents of Orange or of the prince. The prince's party was even more loosely organized because it had little more than sentiment for the House of Orange and antipathy to the ruling group to hold it together; at the center it merged with the house, toward the edges it was scarcely more than a mood. (Rowen, 1978, pp. 138–9)

Indeed, as Roorda argues (1966, pp. 188–221), both 'party' and 'faction' (in the sense of interest group of local potentates) were part of Dutch political life in the seventeenth century. Therefore, both the Statists and the Orangists should be regarded, again in Sartori's terms, not as factions but as parts-of-the-whole, serving as channels, however imperfect, of crucial national debates.

ENGLAND (XVII–XVIII)

Political evolution in seventeenth-century England had much in common with what was happening in the Netherlands. The issues were quite similar: relations with Spain and France, the powers of the executive-military authority versus that of the representative body, and questions of religious doctrine and organisation. There was also direct influence and interaction between the political processes of the two countries: the Stuarts aligning themselves with the House of Orange; the Puritans (those intent on 'purifying' the Church of England, and strongly influenced by Calvinism) sensitive to developments in the Dutch Reformed Church. The Synod of Dort (1618–19), which laid the theological basis of the Reformed Church and declared Arminianism contrary to the Scriptures, was attended by delegates from England, as well as Scotland, Germany and Switzerland. Yet prominent Anglican churchmen, among them Archbishop Laud, opted for Arminianism. In a series of famous resolutions that anticipated the chief issues of the civil war, the House of Commons in 1629 denounced 'Popery and Arminianism' (Trevelyan, 1929, p. 390). A small community of Puritans sought refuge in Leiden, eventually to seek a new life in America, travelling on the *Mayflower* with the backing of a London stock company. As a consequence of Laud's policies they were followed by greater numbers in the 1630s. When civil war finally broke out in England in 1642, the King and his Cavaliers had the support of the Dutch

Stadholder; the Amsterdam oligarchy sympathised with the Long Parliament and the Roundheads.

The English party system arose, much like those of Portugal and the Netherlands, out of civil war and the conditions of settling it. Both the Tories and the Whigs first surfaced in the Restoration Parliament (1661) that marked the end of the disturbances of the civil war, also known as the Puritan Revolution. The Tories were the successors of the Cavaliers. They represented the landed gentry and the Anglican Church, now organised on Arminian lines. These constituencies were generally those that had lost the civil war but saw their position restored with the return of the Stuarts. The Whigs were the successors, though not the true heirs, of the Roundheads. They represented the merchant and maritime interests of London, the trading and cloth towns, also the Dissenters who had taken root, and others who had acquired land during the upheavals. While England rejected the Puritan coercion as practised during and after the civil war, and drove Dissenters out of polite society, the English character ingested a strong dose of Puritanism nonetheless.

But the origin of the English parties is not the same as the origin of the party system (Mansfield, 1964). The English party system acquired definitive shape only after the Settlement of 1689 when William III of Orange, the Stadholder of Holland, in a bold international coup seized the English throne on the strength of his Stuart connections. William was, of course, neither Whig nor Tory. Like most Princes of Orange before him, he was a Gomarist, the tenet of predestination being 'the keystone of his religion' (Macauley, 1979, p. 170). But he combined this with the practice of religious tolerance. In putting together a European coalition against Louis XIV, William successfully formulated the principle of defending 'the Protestant interest' as the basis on which, internationally, princes of various denominations could coalesce; and on which domestically, too, in England, Whigs and the main body of Tories could unite. While not himself a Whig, William worked more closely with Whigs who tended to lean in his direction and gave greater support to the war on the Continent. But Tories also had a share in William's government. Thus, the English Settlement brought the two parties together under the umbrella of the national interest in the context of a global war; both made a significant contribution to the war effort. Hence, the full practice of party government only emerged after the Settlement had been consolidated by successful compromise policies.

The two-party system thus crystallised at a moment when England

was for the first time moving into a position of world leadership. Although the spirit of the times was more Whig than Tory, the period of global war saw both Whigs and Tories in office, including an era of strong Tory influence between 1702 and 1714. Indeed, it was the Tories who brought about the peace of Utrecht. The Hanoverian Succession (1714) and the Jacobite Rebellion (1715), for which a faction of the Tories had sympathies, restored power to the Whigs and launched them onto an Ascendency that lasted until 1761. It is therefore during the Whig Ascendency that the framework of Britain's world power position was erected, the Whigs being the party that 'through the successive eras of Malborough, Walpole and Chatham' led the country 'to the acknowledged leadership of the world' (Trevelyan, 1929, p. 473).

George III's attempt after 1761 to do away with the party system, by setting up a cabinet of the King's Servants, misfired despite help from the Tories. The defeat in the American war, amidst the most serious threat to Britain's position in two centuries, seems to confirm the observation that a functioning party system is a prerequisite of effective decision-making on the global scale. The Rockingham Whigs, who succeeded in bringing the war to an end, introduced essential reforms to the political system and were the first to evolve a theory of party organisation in the House of Commons. Yet, for the Whigs, time had about run out.

BRITAIN (XVIII–XIX)

Britain fought the Napoleonic Wars and defended her world position largely under Tory leadership. The party system, while strained by the French Revolution, in fact gathered strength. The idea that those who opposed the government were responsible people who one day might succeed it was not easily accepted; yet, alternation in power had in fact been the great experience of the eighteenth century (as documented in Foord, 1964). When the phrase 'His Majesty's Opposition' was first used in the House of Commons in 1826 it was greeted with laughter (Lean, 1970, p. 223). But Parliament was now clearly the centre of the nation's political system. It evolved procedures that assured its autonomy and complete mastery of the processes of government, having by 1830 regularised the turn-over of power. It was only a matter of time before the parties within it would become well-honed instruments of government. The Dutch,

in their heyday, never had a parliamentary system by which to test their parties, only a conference system of the States-General attended by delegates of the corporations of seven loosely confederated provinces. It was Edmund Burke's achievement in 1770 to have recognised this problem and defined the role of members of Parliament not as that of delegates but of representatives, paving the way at the same moment for a theory of party as 'a body of men united for promoting . . . the national interest' (in Williams, 1960, p. 186).

The Tories' hold on power ended in 1832 when the question of reform of Parliamentary elections brought back the Whigs. The resulting enlargement of the parliamentary constituency in turn induced a transition from parliamentary to electorally-oriented parties. The Tories evolved into the Conservatives and developed an imperial vocation, while the Whigs transformed themselves into Liberals, favouring free trade and allying themselves with the Radicals of the industrialising North mobilised by Richard Cobden. The Liberals dominated the period of political transition that lasted until 1870. A more regular alternation between Liberals and Conservatives marked the closing decades of the century. The Liberals led the government that entered the First World War. The party system now functioned so well that both World Wars were fought, and won, by coalition cabinets. A direct descendant of Marlborough (who had helped at the start of the British world system) now arranged for an orderly transfer of power to the United States.

UNITED STATES (XIX–XX)

The American Revolution may be regarded as the product of the temporary breakdown of the British party system after 1761, a sort of 'colonial Whig', anti-Tory affair much like the English civil war; it was waged against a king who imposed unjust taxes, disrupted existing constitutional arrangements and insisted on ruling according to his own personal wishes. As soon as the new federal constitution had set up the necessary governmental institutions, a party system formed itself around the issues of national unity and international alignment in the then raging global war: Hamiltonian Federalists (effectively pro-British) standing for centralisation and neutrality, the Jeffersonians coming out for states' and individual rights,

suspicious of monarchical and aristocratic tendencies and sympathetic to the ideas of the French Revolution. The Federalists did not survive for long once the national framework had been established, and the party system remained fluid until the mid nineteenth century. One of the new parties took the name of Whig Party (1832–56), hoping to pin the label of Toryism on the Jacksonian Democrats, the successors of the Jeffersonians. In this era, some notable innovations in party organisation were introduced, including the institution of the national party convention.

The contemporary American party system emerged out of the major realignment of the 1850s and the polarising turmoil of the Civil War (1861–5) (Sundquist, 1983). The Republicans and the Democrats became the two chief political parties. They have been the parties that have governed America's participation in world politics. Originally the party of the national interest, the Republicans presided over industrialisation and the peopling of the West, and they reconsolidated their hold on the party system in the 1890s. Between 1918 and 1944 they adopted an isolationist stance that discouraged the assumption of international responsibilities. The Democrats took the United States into the First and Second World Wars; they came fully into power in the major realignment of the 1930s, and controlled the Presidency over two-thirds of the time and Congress most of the time between 1932 and 1980. Essentially it was they who shaped the United States' role in the world as that role evolved after 1941.

The term 'major realignment' has just been used here in the sense of an occasion when one party displaces another as the majority party (rather than in Sundquist's sense of a substantial shift in voters' attachments). On that criterion, the changes of the 1890s do not qualify as major realignment. The first such occurrence in the story of the modern American parties, that of the 1850s, was produced by the issues of slavery and states' rights and was in a broad sense about the place of the United States in the modern world. America could not have assumed a world role if it had not thus modernised its political system. The other occurrence, that of the 1930s, was brought about by the catastrophe of the Great Depression. If the depression is recognised for what it was, a product of the failure of world leadership both in the economic and the political fields, then that realignment, too, may be regarded as a function of changing views about America's place in the world and the need to adjust to such changes. Thus even if Sundquist (p. 379) may be right in not regarding either of these major realignments as produced strictly by

a foreign policy issue, both did in fact turn upon issues of major consequence to the world system.

SOME GENERALISATIONS

The following generalisations are supported by the preceding account and will be discussed in greater detail below.

(1) In its cycle, each world power had a two-party system.
(2) The party systems of the world powers show significant structural similarities, and an evolutionary progression over time.
(3) None of the principal challengers had, in the relevant cycle, an effective two-party system.
(4) Principal challengers sought transnational linkages.
(5) A good instance of transnational community nurtured by the world power was the Calvinist International.
(6) The three socialist internationals were a response to the problems of the Industrial Revolution.

World Powers Favour Party Systems

The basic link between world power and competitive, mostly centripetal, two-party systems has now been satisfactorily documented. Each world power has been shown to meet, in its cycle, all the following conditions: (a) the essentials of party activity centring on at least the rudiments of organisations for seeking government office; (b) serious national debates relating to this party activity and often focused on dichotomous choices of national and global policies; (c) significant consequences for government policy deriving from office-holding by one or the other party. Over time, there is a clear evolutionary trend toward increasing strength in all three conditions, in as much as these show a much greater degree of institutionalisation at the end of the period than at the beginning.

The two-party systems did not preclude the existence of other parties (for instance, the situation was far from clear in mid-nineteenth-century Britain), but these other parties lacked both coalition- and blackmail-potential, and therefore the capacity to change the direction of party competition from centripetal to centrifugal (Sartori, 1976, p. 123). That is why the party systems functioned continuously and lent a high degree of stability to the political life

of the world powers. None of them evolved into absolutist or one-party state types of polity. One of the two parties usually was ascendant but it never proceeded to the total elimination of its rival. An inter-party dialogue was thus kept going even if sometimes in muted form. Excesses such as the execution of Oldenbarneveldt or the lynching of de Witt have been unusually rare and they did not alter the fundamentals of the system.

This is a notable set of data, and it seems that the positive association between world powers and the two-party system is established. What might be the explanation of this phenomenon?

The party system must be regarded, next to the nation-state, as the basic political innovation of the modern world. There could be no party system without the nation-state because parties as 'bodies of men united for promoting the national interest' required the nation-state as the framework of their activity. The city-state did not need parties; the nation-state moved the preferences and resources to be mobilised on to a higher order of magnitude; once nation-states were established (Portugal being the first operating instance of one), party systems became the way to manage them properly.

Not all nation-states acquired party systems though. It can be shown that the principal challengers of the world powers, those who fought global wars against them, did not develop parties or did not use them well. This helped to confer an advantage on the world powers, contrary to the widely held suspicion that parties are divisive and inefficient because they are 'factious'. Party systems simply made the world powers more efficient managers of global policy. To have two teams of potential office-holders, ample opportunity for policy debates, and possible alternation of policies, is also to have better means for coping with the practical demands of acting in the world system and managing its changing phases. Party systems helped to produce more-effective, rather than 'strong', states.

Party systems helped to formulate for the publics of the world powers – and most often for an even broader constituency – rival programmes for the future of the world system. A global war, in particular, simplifies world politics to something like a two-party system in which, among other things, membership of one or the other coalition has repercussions for national party organisation. Theorists such as Arrow (1963, p. 48) have argued that in situations in which the number of alternatives for social choice (including the number of candidates for office) is two, the method of majority decision is a decision-rule that satisfies his conditions of optimal

choice for social welfare. This is the 'Theorem of the Two Alternatives' and Arrow regards it as the 'logical foundation of the Anglo-American two-party system'. In the light of the present analysis this idea could also be extended to the other world powers; this would help explain the prevalence and stability of the party system even when faced by complex and difficult choices.

Finally, the party system, being an important innovation whose utility would ultimately become obvious to all, helped the world powers attain the status of lead polity: that is, a state leading in political innovation of universal significance. It also tended to enhance the stability of the political system, lent it an air of freedom and toleration, and helped in providing an example for others to imitate. This is not to claim that the world powers were oases of complete tranquillity. In all five cases, accession to world leadership was preceded, one or two generations earlier, by a national revolution. In each case, a considerable national upheaval, commonly focusing on a question of land ownership and agrarian organisation, was needed to clear the decks before entering the global lists. But, on the whole, the party system helped lay the basis for one of several sets of requirements expected of a world power: in that sense, the basics of a party system could be seen as a prerequisite for world power status.

Structural Similarities of World Power Party Systems

These were not, of course, identical party systems. Not only were they from four different nation-states and spread over five centuries, they also varied along such dimensions as size of constituency (by a factor of at least 100 between Portugal and United States) or social base (merchant oligarchy and nobility in Holland or mass democracy in the twentieth century) as well as degree of differentiation and general effectiveness. None the less, there were some important structural similarities. In the first place, as already noted, they were all two-party systems. While this may appear to be trivial it is well to remember that true two-party systems are relatively rare, even, or especially, to-day. Sartori (1976) shows only a handful of two-party systems world-wide.

Reference back to Table 7.1 reveals certain other similarities. For each world power two parties are given. It may be observed that all first-listed parties, i.e. Democrats, Liberals, Whigs, etc., share certain important features and so do all second-listed parties, Repub-

licans, Conservatives, Tories, etc. These similarities, as well as the distinctions, may be seen along three dimensions. First, as to social base, the similarities are among groups engaged in political or economic innovation, particularly those relevant to structural changes in the world system and involving prominently the trading and maritime interests, professional classes, industrial inventors, innovators and explorers. On the other side are those representing the landed and territorial interests, the social establishments, the propertied groups.

Second, as to general political orientation, the differentiation seems to run along the liberal–conservative spectrum, with the first tending toward new enterprises and global solutions based on maritime operations, with a preference for free trade; the second inclining toward actions defensive of territorial control, land warfare, and imperial security. Third, the tenure of power by one or the other of these parties had distinct consequences for global policies; the first toward the expansion of global task activities, the second toward the consolidation of positions already captured. The expansive phases of long cycles were characteristically managed by 'liberals' and the contracting ones by 'conservatives'.

At least three reasons may be given for structural similarity: (i) political exigency, i.e. the problems faced by each world power had been similar and, in response to them, similar political and economic structures have evolved; (ii) learning, i.e. much of the experience of each party system – its operational rules, doctrines, even names – were transferred by learning from earlier to later systems, e.g. Dutch controversies informed English practice, British (and Dutch) practices underlay American experience; and (iii) homology, i.e. common origins were significant in each linkage. Both learning and homology made the gradual emergence of large-scale and effective party systems in the most recent cycle an evolutionary process, one leading in a straight line to the sophisticated political arrangements of the contemporary democracies.

Challengers Lack Party Systems

Of even greater eloquence than the positive association between party systems and world powers is the negative association between party systems and the principal challengers. Of the nine global powers of modern world politics, only four (the world powers) had a party system or something approximating it in their relevant cycles. The challengers, the major states contending for world leadership

(Spain, France under Louis XIV, France under Napoleon, and Germany, also in alliance with Japan, as well as the USSR) did not.

Spain was the Netherlands' major adversary for close to a century. This great monarchy failed in that time to cultivate even a proto-party system that could help it cope with the great decisions of state. In contrast with the Netherlands, where basic decisions such as those of 1608–9 were subjected to lively debate by an informed public, in Spain the decisions were made by the King alone. Factions were, in fact, found at Court and in the King's Councils but these had no autonomous standing and depended entirely on royal favour. In the first half of Philip II's reign, the faction led by Ruy Gomez de Silva, Prince of Eboli (scion of an aristocratic Portuguese family), voiced an 'open' and a 'federalist' (Burgundian) approach to the problems of the empire; it was repeatedly opposed in the Council of State by a Castilian, hardline, nationalist faction symbolised by the policies of the Duke of Alba. Alba's failure in the Netherlands (1573) left his faction in disgrace; the arrest of Antonio Perez (1579) finally eliminated the Eboli faction and nothing took its place (Elliott, 1969, pp. 258–68). Braudel (1973, p. 1177) calls these the 'peace' and the 'war' parties respectively; 'not' parties in any modern sense but 'more akin to factions'.

Louis XIV's court afforded even fewer opportunities for the emergence of political parties. Even if different ministers of the King, say Colbert on one side and Louvois on the other, stood for competing priorities of public policy (for instance, economic and maritime expansion against territorial and military conquest), they had no political base of their own and were entirely at the mercy of the monarch. Having defeated the Fronde (of the Parlement of Paris and of the Great Condé) early in his reign, the Sun King had no inclination to tolerate any such 'domestic strife'. One historian (Wolf, 1951, p. 83) reports the appearance of a 'peace' party at Versailles after the battle of Blenheim (1704), toward the end of the King's long reign, but it was only a court faction.

The French Revolution was, of course, started by a National Assembly (1789) that soon evolved party organisations and a party system of a kind similar to their English and American contemporaries. But when the moderate Girondists were destroyed by Robespierre's Reign of Terror (1793–4), and the Jacobins' Club was in turn closed down (1794) after the fall of Robespierre, the parliamentary experiment had about exhausted its momentum. The successful military coup of 18 Brumaire placed political power into the hands of

Napoleon Bonaparte (1799). Proclaimed Emperor in 1804, Napoleon had no need for parties. He shared this opinion with the revolutionaries because, strikingly enough, and despite the incipient flowering of parties, 'on one point did the French revolutionaries remain of the same mind and speak with one voice: they were unanimous and persistent in their condemnations of parties'; Saint-Just, one of the foremost leaders of the Revolution, declared that 'every party is criminal' (Sartori, 1976, p. 11).

The German national state, founded in 1870, included a lower chamber, the Reichstag, based on universal suffrage. A multiparty system emerged within it. The important party groups were: the National Liberals (the heirs to 1848), the Conservatives, the Centrists, and the Social Democrats. Indeed, by 1913 the last were the largest single party and the driving force in the Second (socialist) International. The powers of the Reichstag over the executive were left vague, however, regarding the Chancellor (head of government) and military appropriations (voted once every five years). The real power was elsewhere: with the Emperor, who regarded foreign policy as his personal prerogative; with the Chancellor, who was appointed and dismissed by the Emperor; and, in wartime especially, with the Army High Command. When the war came in 1914 a political truce was proclaimed by which all parties agreed to abstain from criticism of each other and the government, and the Social Democrats voted for war credits. The war was left to the Imperial Government and the General Staff to carry on. In no sense did the party system remain functional in wartime Germany. The party system was revived after 1918 but seemed unable to cope. After 1933 Germany became, of course, a one-party totalitarian state.

Russia never even got as far as a working party system. Autocracy was the salient characteristic of the political system when Peter the Great lifted her to the ranks of the global powers, and it remained so through the nineteenth century. The reforms that followed the defeat in the Crimea (including the institution of provincial assemblies and the abolition of serfdom) preserved the principle of autocracy and did not provide for a national assembly. Following another defeat and in the glow anticipating the Triple Entente with Britain and France (1907), a Duma (Parliament) was elected in 1906. It functioned fitfully until the February 1917 Revolution, but had even less power than the Reichstag. The 1914 war was conducted by the Tsar's government alone. Upon the Tsar's abdication, a provisional government based on parties that had emerged in the preceding

generation was set up by the Duma committee but it succumbed to the Bolshevik coup of October 1917. The Constitutional Assembly, whose election had in the meantime been organised, produced something of a party system; it gave an absolute majority to the Right Socialist Revolutionaries and one-quarter of the seats to the Bolsheviks. When it convened for one day in January 1919 it was promptly closed down by the Bolsheviks who based their power on the Soviets (Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies). The Bolshevik regime rapidly transformed itself into a one-party dictatorship, and by 1920 all rival opposition parties were dissolved and their leaders exiled. The parties that had shown promise and some growth in the decade between 1907 and 1917 vanished without a trace.

Finally, a note on the Japanese experience before and during the global war period of the twentieth century. The Meji Restoration, first managed by a group of senior leaders, gradually created a system of parties, beginning with the founding of the Liberal Party in 1881. This democratising trend in domestic politics went hand in hand with the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902 that brought Japan into the First World War on the Allied side. But the discontents of the inter-war period and the dissolution of the alliance strengthened the hands of the military and the nationalists who claimed that parliamentary government was 'unjapanese'. The Meji Constitution was never completely abandoned; but after the Mukden Incident (1931), provoked by the Kwantung Army, the military increasingly dominated the government until, in 1940, on the eve of Japan's entry into the world war on Germany's side, political parties were merged in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. The eclipse of the party system neatly coincided with the inexorable drift to armed conflict with the United States and Britain.

Transnational Links of Principal Challengers

In their own time, though lacking party systems, each of the principal powers contesting the control over global politics had its own approach to transnational relations, aimed to win friends and influence allies.

In the early seventeenth century, Spain led what historians have described as the 'Catholic International' (Parker, 1979b, p. 74). Spanish funds, political and military support, were extended to Catholic rulers or governments faced with the threat of a Protestant takeover. The Catholic League of Princes of Germany, led by Bavaria,

had been created largely by the Spanish Ambassador to the Empire. Major Spanish resources were seriously but unsuccessfully engaged in France in the decade after 1585: Spanish support in Bohemia in 1620 proved decisive in saving the Austrian Hapsburgs.

During the first half of his reign, Louis XIV pursued a policy of glory and prestige for French culture, programmes that did not ideally lend themselves to transnational linkage. After the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) that had guaranteed Huguenot rights, his actions acquired an anti-Protestant dimension. Following the Peace of Ryswick (1697), the Catholic Party in Germany became the beneficiary of his campaigns.

The armies of the French Revolution promoted regimes of liberty, fraternity and equality along France's borders: in the Netherlands, in Italy, and even in Ionia. Within a few years these became little more than provinces or satellites of the Napoleonic Empire.

In the two world wars of the twentieth century, Germany (as well as Japan in 1939–45) sprouted schemes to disrupt the British and Russian Empires. Areas such as India, Egypt, the Caucasus, Finland, Persia and Malaya became favourite targets of covert operations. One of the most effective of these operations was the secret transfer of Lenin and other anti-Tsarist revolutionaries from Switzerland to St Petersburg in 1917, arranged in co-operation with some German Social-Democrats (Fischer, 1967, p. 120ff). The real aims of German policy were self-serving, and the satellite regimes that were set up while hostilities were still on had little life in them and few prospects for independence.

In all, none of the principal challengers developed significant or lastingly successful transnational party linkages. The reason might well lie in the fact that their own party systems were non-existent or weak.

THE CALVINIST INTERNATIONAL

Like their principal challengers, the world powers, too, pursue transnational linkages and party-like arrangements, more often in war but also in peace. If, as asserted earlier, the global policies of world powers tend to be shaped by an alternation in office of two major parties, then it should also follow that the transnational activities of these powers would receive at least their colouration, if not their basic impetus and direction, from the party in office.

One early and less well-known case illustrates the importance of and the uncertainties associated with transnational linkages: it is the Calvinist International in relation to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Netherlands. This case had two important phases: the formation of the Dutch Republic *circa* 1572, and an activist phase *circa* 1618.

In the middle of the sixteenth century Geneva became the capital of the Protestant world. John Calvin (1509–64), a native of Picardy (a French province bordering on the Netherlands), had settled there and made it into a model community. Geneva became a mecca for exiles from all over Europe, as well as a centre for instruction in, and the dissemination of, the reformed creed. A Geneva academy, founded in 1559, counted Netherlanders among its early graduates, and in 1575 it served as the model for Leiden, the first university of the Dutch Republic. As the Peace of Augsburg (1555) stabilised relations between Catholics and Lutherans in the Holy Roman Empire, Calvin turned his attention beyond Geneva. His missionaries and pastors scored great successes in France, in particular among the urban mercantile and maritime classes who became Huguenots in large numbers, but also in Scotland and, to a degree, in England. New Calvinist cells were being formed in the Netherlands, with the help of exiled communities in England and North Germany; an additional boost came from the influx of refugees from France. The 'iconoclastic fury' that precipitated the first Dutch Revolt (1565–8) began in west Flanders when an organised body of image-breakers, who had come from England, swept through the region and then moved on to Antwerp and beyond, igniting other outbursts elsewhere (Parker, 1979a, pp. 74–81). The revolt that followed was soon suppressed but the Calvinist exiles continued to organise in England and Germany. By 1570, the Dutch Reformed Church held its first national Synod in Emden. This 'coalition building' laid down the infrastructure that made possible the successes of the Sea Beggars who seized Brill on 1 April 1572, and thus sparked the Second Dutch Revolt. Shortly, a new order by William of Orange (who became a Calvinist in 1572) was firmly in place in Holland and Zeeland (even while the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre of August dealt a severe blow to the French Huguenots). It was a Calvinist order, though recent studies (Parker, 1979a, p. 154) show that fifteen years later only one-tenth of the population of the United Provinces may have been Calvinist: 'There can be no doubt that the professed Calvinists formed only a small minority of the

people in revolt against Spain throughout the sixteenth century.' Another student of this period (Koenigsberger, 1955) describes the Calvinists in the Netherlands and the Huguenots in France as having the characteristics of a 'determined minority', 'yet also of an international party'.

This was the first Calvinist phase of the Dutch experience. In the decades that followed the successes of 1572–3, the alliances with France (influenced by the Huguenots whose chief became king of France as Henry IV, and who were granted important freedoms by him in the Edict of Nantes of 1596) and with England (also Calvinist-influenced in the Protestant interest) became the foundation of the foreign policy of the United Provinces of the Netherlands.

This Calvinist International, first devised as an 'ecclesiastical reality' in the 1560s under the guidance of Theodore Beza (1519–1605), Calvin's successor in Geneva, gradually became also an 'economic and military reality' (Wilson, 1976, pp. 120, 122). Initially the work of Gaspar de Coligny (who died in the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre) and of William of Orange (died 1584), this more political 'international' was later to be the principal achievement of Oldenbarnevelt and of the States' Party. It was the winning coalition in the war against Spain's universal monarchy and, even more important, the first concrete implementation of the structure of international solidarity that was to bind the modern world system at the elite level.

The Twelve Years' Truce (1609–21) with Spain seemed to signal another high watermark of Calvinism in European politics. The Edict of Nantes had consolidated the Huguenot position in France. In 1608, under the patronage of the Elector Palatine, the Calvinist Princes of Germany, with some Lutheran allies, formed the Union for the Defence of Evangelical Religion, a military alliance that was a direct result of the disastrous Reichstag meeting of that year and the failure of that assembly to contain the religious conflicts of the Empire. The Elector of Brandenburg, who had turned to Calvinism in 1609, scored (with Dutch support) some important territorial victories on the Lower Rhine in 1614 (the Julich succession), and again in 1618 when he succeeded to the Duchy of Prussia; by these three moves he laid the foundations of what would soon be Prussia's rise to power. Several other German Princes also chose Calvinism: Mecklenburg, Anhalt, Hesse-Cassel. The Synod of Dort, as mentioned, leaned in the direction of Calvinist orthodoxy. Perhaps the most important accretion to Calvinist strength might have

occurred if Frederick V, the new Elector Palatine and the King of England's son-in-law, had been successful in maintaining himself on the throne of Bohemia after he was crowned in Prague in November 1619 amid enthusiastic crowds. This Calvinist Prince's elevation jeopardised the very core of the Hapsburg's dominion over Central Europe, but his reign was short-lived.

Maurice of Orange, who had just acquired dominance in Dutch politics, tried to help, but it was a case of 'too little, too late' (Parker, 1979a, p. 263). The political crisis that culminated in the execution of Oldenbarnevelt, the architect of Dutch foreign policy for the previous three decades, cannot but have left strategic thought confused and directionless. The following year Frederick was decisively defeated (with Spanish help), and lost not only Bohemia but also his own land, and ultimately had to seek refuge in the Netherlands. The Hague then became a nodal point in the web of alliances designed to redress the defeat in Bohemia; a web so intricate that Dutch historians have also dubbed it an 'international' (Parker, 1979a, p. 225), as opposed to the 'Catholic international' organised by Spain.

The most prominent, though by no means the most promising, creation of that 'international' became the Treaty of The Hague (December 1625). It brought together the now traditional allies (the Dutch Republic, England and France) for the purpose of restoring the fortunes of the Protestant cause in the Empire. The King of Denmark was to set up an army to march south and, hopefully, join with the Prince of Transylvania who had granted protection to the Calvinists. Links were established also with Venice which had evinced an interest in Calvinism (and where a 'Party of the Young' developed an active and anti-Spanish policy: see Lane, 1973, pp. 393–5), with Muscovy, and such other Spanish enemies as the Ottomans, Morocco, Algiers and Tunis.

All these carefully laid schemes came to nought. The German campaigns misfired for lack of support, among other reasons. In France, the Huguenots lost the strategic stronghold of La Rochelle. In England, it was becoming clear that future developments would follow episcopal rather than presbyterian paths. The future of Western and Central Europe would not evolve along predominantly Calvinist lines. In the absence of popular support it did not prove possible to maintain Calvinist governments solely through the activities of influential minorities. Nor was the Dutch Republic, even under Orangist leadership, willing to stake everything on prolonged

military campaigns on the continent of Europe for the sake of religious solidarity. It was obvious that its real strength did not lie there, even at the height of its world power. Altogether correct in its approach to its global functions, it refused to stretch its resources to a dangerous extent for the sake of continental domination.

This brief review of the Dutch case of transnational linkage and its impact suggests the following observations:

(1) In the first phase, probably unique in its significance, the network of transnational loyalties based on Calvinist organisation strongly affected the course of the Revolt and the Republic's rise to world power. This 'networking', a phenomenon that could be described as party-like, may also have been of lasting importance because it created the nucleus of community that provided coherence and stability to the global system over the next few cycles.

(2) The victory of the Calvinist orthodoxy (the Gomarists over the Arminians), associated with a period of activism in the international sphere, turned out to have been, on the whole, unfruitful. By 1630 the 'international' had little life left in it, and the United Provinces returned to a more traditional form of foreign policy. Evidence would seem to suggest that in the case of the other world powers, as in the case of the principal challengers reviewed earlier, such phases of active policy relying on partisan sympathies have not been very prominent or successful. Attempts to extend principles that had earlier proved to be successful in the global system to a variety of national- and local-level situations turned out to be inherently problem-ridden.

THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALS

A study of the party systems of all the global powers thus shows a close association between their evolution and the trajectory of long cycles. The gradual spread of parties in Europe, the Americas, Japan and Australasia during the nineteenth century created a new demand for the co-ordination of their activities on a global basis. One of the responses to that need has been the three 'internationals', that is, the international co-ordinating and leadership bodies of the socialist movement. Their efforts at transnational party organisation have been important institutional innovations in this field that became significant features of the world scene from the mid nineteenth century on. In a broad sense the socialist internationals were a

reaction to the social processes set off by the Industrial Revolution in the previous cycle. Looked at in more detail, they also appear to have been closely attuned to the phase-movement of the long cycle.

The untrammelled economic expansion that marked the age of the Industrial Revolution, in Britain in particular, met the first signs of serious questioning and resistance during the delegitimation phase that started after 1848. Industrial workers and newly urbanised labour began to organise not just in trade unions but also in quasi-socialist political parties. The latter, in turn, resorted to transnational organisation as an obvious means of adding to their strength and sources of support (for example, by means of sympathy strikes). The established parties being slow to respond to the workers' demands, the new organisational forms grew rapidly and put down strong roots. At a mass meeting in London in 1864, leading British and French labour unionists, though not party leaders, founded the International Workingmen's Association, later to be known as the First International. Karl Marx was elected one of the thirty-two members, and soon became the leading personality of its General Council, which continued to meet in London until its disbanding in Philadelphia in 1876.

Despite severe disagreements in its ranks (between Bakunin's anarchists and Marx's centralising socialists) the organisation exerted considerable impact as a focal point of the workers' unionising efforts until well into the 1880s; this during a turbulent era in the history of the newly industrialising countries, of Western Europe in particular. In its origins the First International may be seen as the product of a period of ferment in British politics, hence also an outcrop of Britain's still-leading role in world politics. In its ultimate fate, the First International was also a failure, in part, possibly, because of its weak links with the British party system, itself slow to respond to the needs of the industrial workers: the British Labour Party was founded only in 1900. As such, the failure may be regarded as a symptom of the declining vitality of Britain's role in the world.

By the time the Second (Socialist) International was being formed in 1889, that decline was proceeding apace; and Germany was emerging as a serious contender for world and industrial leadership. That challenge was reflected in the prominent role assumed by the German Social-Democratic Party in the new organisation. Designed as a federation of socialist parties, the Second International decried centralisation; after 1900 it had only a weak International Socialist Bureau in Brussels. Its main concern became the prevention of the

approaching global war and the issuance of stirring peace manifestos. Thus, it could not survive for long the outbreak of the First World War, in the opening days of which the German Social-Democrats (as well as the French Socialists, etc.) voted for war credits and generally supported the military policies of their respective countries.

Viewed as evidence of the collapse of that international solidarity on which the organisation was based, these events destroyed the Socialist International and reopened the competition for leadership. The most notable feature of the September 1915 meeting in Zimmerwald (Switzerland) of (minority) socialists opposed to the war, was the presence of Vladimir Lenin as the leader of the new radical left of the movement; he urged class war and the end of the Socialist International. Lenin's proposals were in fact defeated by the centrists at the meeting by a vote of 19 to 12 (out of 38 delegates); but his policies laid the groundwork for a Russian bid to leadership of the world movement, a bid that presaged great ambition. Four years later, following the Bolshevik's seizure of power in Russia, it was made good in the founding of the Third (Communist) International (First Congress 1919, Second Congress 1920).

Thus the First World War effected a shift in the centre of gravity of the world socialist parties away from Germany and the capture by Moscow of the radical wing of that movement. Founded on Soviet initiative, headquartered in Moscow, the Comintern quickly developed a centralised form of organisation, with its chief executive empowered to take decisions binding all member parties; this meant tight Soviet control, the principle of 'Socialist internationalism' coming to mean putting the interest of the Soviet Union above all else. The Comintern soon became the pliable tool of Soviet foreign policy – so much so, that it was officially dissolved in 1943 when Soviet needs for aid from the Western Allies made it expedient. After 1945 the leadership of the communist movement once again served to legitimise Soviet claims to a world role; the co-ordination of Communist parties under Soviet leadership became the direct responsibility of the CPSU Central Committee and of the top men in the Kremlin. A new *socialist* international was not re-established until 1951, this time headquartered in London.

The story of the three internationals vindicates the generalisations advanced earlier about the transnational linkages between parties and the structure of world leadership.

(1) Party organisations at the global level have moved in agreement with the long cycle and in response to major world problems. When

the Soviet leaders, in an early bold move, assumed the leadership of the radical wing of the socialist movement, they also implicitly foreshadowed their future challenge for world leadership.

(2) Such association between world leadership and the internationals was neither particularly nor lastingly successful for the challengers and the internationals alike. It would seem that an international party organisation at the global level requires a degree of organisational autonomy from national authorities as a pre-condition of its effectiveness.

WHY NO WORLD PARTIES?

This analysis strongly suggests that the modern world has been generally favourable to the rise of party systems, especially so in states that functioned in positions of world leadership. Over time, and as part of the processes of world politics, party systems acquired a greater differentiation and increased effectiveness; they have become more widespread as gradually more and more nation-states acquired and domesticated them, including states such as France, Spain or Germany that had earlier worked without them.

The spread of party systems in national politics contrasts with their general weakness as transnational institutions. Those instances that have occurred and have been adduced in this study cannot be counted as notable successes for the cause of the growth of world parties (cf. Modelski, 1969). Why has this been so?

A major tendency in the politics of the modern world has been toward the device and structure called the nation-state. Party systems became part of that movement: they flourished in the successful nation-states to the degree that 'the distinctive institution of the modern polity . . . is the political party' (Huntington, 1968, p. 89). Conversely, the success of nation-states went step in step with weakness for global institutions. There have been no world parties because certain preconditions for their existence (fully differentiated global political institutions and differentiated global military institutions) have been absent. The world powers, whose political activities have formed the core of the modern global polity, while performing global functions did not differentiate them sharply enough from the national purposes; nor were military structures similarly differentiated, even though navies (and now strategic forces) could be regarded as moving in the direction of globally differentiated military structures.

Noteworthy is the fact, though, that the competitive domestic party systems of the world powers did function as arenas for the review and resolution of global problems. Witness the cases mentioned earlier, such as the debates of the Portuguese on exploration policies, of the Dutch on peace with Spain, of the British on free trade in the 1840s, and the Americans on isolationism (1919–20), Marshall Aid (1947–8), or SALT (1979–80). This has made these national-level activities, and the parliamentary institutions they animated, articulators of global issues and critics of global policies, hence participators in the working of the global system.

Among the major contestants in world politics, on the other hand, there existed, and continues in prominence, a striking asymmetry in political organisation. All the world powers have had well-functioning two-party systems, but their chief rivals have not. Hence there never was a real chance for a mutual exchange of political solidarities on a balanced basis, as could be expected to occur in a conflict system wherein each participant is composed of two parties. Thus, for instance, the Tories dominated most of the governments that conducted the wars against the French Revolution and Napoleon; they offered ready hospitality to French royalist émigrés, while some Whig leaders (such as Charles James Fox, Samuel Whitbread, Lord and Lady Holland) expressed pro-Napoleonic leanings or sympathies (Lean, 1970). But there was no really equivalent party system on the French side that could counterbalance the basic adversary relationship. Continuously weakened by ongoing military activities, the texture of French party politics, instead of being able to attenuate or to moderate them was too thin to sustain transnational party linkages. The absence of generalised party systems thus may have contributed to those instabilities in the modern political system that have characterised the long cycle.

Are the conclusions, then, all negative? Not really. The major conclusion is that competitive party systems arose out of, and have been powerfully shaped by, world politics in the course of long cycles of world leadership. Such party systems, moreover, have been selectively favoured by that process in as much as states with competitive two-party systems have been in a position to exercise leadership over a wide array of global issues. Furthermore, if modern world politics were to continue undergoing systematic transformation in a learning process, then the conditions that have so far hampered transnational parties may also be due for a change and may ultimately

begin to favour the emergence of rudimentary world parties in a progress of rising 'sociality'. The universal international organisations that have emerged in the twentieth century, the various international regimes that have been differentiated, the contemporary alliance systems, the transnational parties, numerous interest and pressure groups that have gathered strength at the global level, are all likely arenas where changes will be experienced and experimented with and where new party systems may well play increasingly important roles. The evident ending of the process of creating new nations (discussed in the last chapter), and possibly even of much of the nationalism that went with it, opens new possibilities for party linkages on a world-wide basis. Such tendencies, together with the growth of more general networks of global community, are likely to be among the significant phenomena of the next long cycle.

8 Dependency

Much of that which is of interest in the theory of long cycles centres on the world system's 'active zone' (an expression of Francois Perroux's (1979)) and amounts to a commentary on the activities of the world powers and the relations between the world powers and their challengers. A more rounded picture also requires attention to the other aspects of the world system, those of the consumers of world order and, in effect, therefore, also to those of North–South relations.

A body of writing addressing this last problem in recent years is that on *dependencia*. This literature, while hardly homogeneous, does have in common the fact that it concentrates on that single concept in its explanations of the contemporary conditions of less-developed countries: '*dependencia* causes underdevelopment' (Dos Santos, 1970). In that light, North–South relations are determined by, and more specifically the experience of the 'South' (especially in respect to its economy) is traceable to, dependency on a world (capitalist) system over whose processes the Third World has no control and in relation to which it has been in a state of passivity.

In its attention to the role of global (that is, external) factors in relation to national development, the *dependencia* argument appears particularly well fitted to be reviewed in the context of long-cycle theorising and it may be contrasted, broadly, with modernisation theories that focus primarily on national (that is, internal) prerequisites of development (Bach, 1982). For in addition to shedding some new light on the *dependencia* situation the long cycle also makes it possible to explore, symmetrically, the possibilities of dependency reversal. For much of the writing in that field suffers from the tendency to consider *dependencia* as a rigid, if not fatal, condition; irreversible, certainly, as long as 'capitalism' lasts. A more flexible concept of the world system, on the other hand, adds credibility to the concept of reversal.

A precondition of discussing reversal is, of course, an understanding of the make-up of dependency, because in a clearly delineated theory of dependency the possibilities of reversal will transpire from the full analysis of its causes. Yet that initial concept, and the propositions that go along with it, are not at all free from ambiguity and the causes of dependency are not as clearly understood as they

might be. That is why the first priority here will be to outline the causes of dependency as seen from the perspective of long cycles, and the second task will then be to determine the potential for, and the processes of, dependency reversal that may be deduced from such an account.

DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Dependencia and Dependence

The starting-point of this discussion is the now widely accepted distinction between *dependencia* and dependence (cf. Caporaso, 1978: who, however, uses the term 'depencency' to refer to what has just been described as *dependencia*). It is certainly important to recognise the special characteristics of the *dependencia* writings, those pioneered two or three decades ago by writers principally living in Latin America, holistic, even historicist in tendency, much concerned to elucidate the conditions of the less-developed countries. The burden was to show that lack of development, chiefly economic development, was attributable to a set of conditions characterising the relationship of those countries with the centres of world development. More recently this line of thought became less specifically Latin American, more systematic and broader in conception, as exemplified, for instance, in the work of Galtung (1979), Wallerstein (Hopkins *et al.*, 1982), or, for instance, in Russett's research (as reported in Duvall, 1981, or Thompson, 1983) that is explicitly designed to formalise the basic propositions of the *dependentistas*, specifically Cardozo's (Cardozo and Faletto, 1979). As Cardozo (1977) has argued, it is useful, however, to distinguish the *dependencia* tradition from positivistic research in comparative politics and international relations that treats the condition of 'dependence' as one variable that needs investigating by means of correlational or regression techniques.

Dependency

The present study differs from the *dependencia* and world-system approaches (that share a common framework of economic determinism) principally by its reliance upon a social system framework that, in addition to considering the economic factors in dependency

also gives weight to the requirements of solidarity and the factors of culture-maintenance and, by its emphasis on long cycles, stresses above all the political process.

On that latter view, *dependencia* writers overload their explanations of basic social processes with economic explanations, and neglect the facts and the evidence that is required to give adequate treatment to crucial political variables as well as the more general social structure within which these are situated. Furthermore, while a long-cycle approach espouses a global perspective and accepts the need for a clear overall conception of the world system, it is not committed to an unduly rigid view that might imply full system dominance. It allows for the possibility of lack of integration in the world system and for the possibility of indigenous developments that are autonomous. But it does share with the *dependistas* (including world-system analysts) a concern that is time- and space-bound, that is applied to the entire modern world system and needs to be understood as a component of broader social science theory. The term 'dependency' is therefore used here to indicate an approach that stands mid-way between *dependencia* and 'dependence', that eschews economic determinism but is global, conscious of the past, and part of long-cycle theorising, that is itself located within a wider theory of social systems.

Dependency in the Modern World

It is a premise of this approach that the object of discussion is modern dependency: that is, dependency that is a characteristic property of the modern world and not dependency in general or dependency as a special feature of twentieth-century international relations. More precisely, it may best be viewed as a characteristic of the world system that came into existence at about 1500.

The concern here is solely with the dependency condition that is attributable to the modern world system, viewed as a system of collectivities and organisations prominent in the modern world, such as nations, states, business enterprises, international organisations and the like. The preoccupation, moreover, is primarily with the dependency effects of the long cycle as a macro-political process, and only secondarily with its economic and other effects in as much as global leadership is linked to economic and other processes: hence the need to keep separate the effects of macro-economic processes, of naturally occurring (or simple) dependence that might be attribu-

table to random accident, and to ignore the dependency relations of individuals such as children, the sick, or the aged. All this is in order to isolate, analytically, that type and character of dependency that goes with a modern political structure, for it is only that kind that can be 'blamed' on global politics and may need to be, or can be, considered reversible in the context of the present analysis.

Dependency As Continuously Generated

Dependency is also conceived here specifically as *continuously generated*. In the same way that any society might be thought of as steadily generating new dependency – for example, new generations that need to be nurtured, socialised, and educated – the modern world system can also be thought of as a social system that generates a stream of innovations that disrupt old arrangements and create new ones, that obsolesce some organisations and bring forth others. That is why inherent in the process of innovation may be seen a tendency for fostering dependency. This does not mean that dependency is 'forever' but only that it is an inherent part of a process of social change. But just as, for instance, children proceed into childhood, so dependency may be viewed as a potentially contingent, finite and therefore also reversible process.

THE CAUSES OF DEPENDENCY

The basis proposition therefore is: world system processes generate dependency. As one type of world system process, the long cycle, too, is productive of a great amount of change: the succession of world powers, rising political sophistication and, derivatively, economic and other forms of social development. Some of that change has been positive, cumulative and consolidative; some of it has been negative, unwholesome and unsettling. Dependency is a large-scale consequence of the working of modern politics that is productive of opportunities for positive transformation but also carries a considerable burden of social costs. Its operation cannot be assumed to be Pareto-optimal because it is impossible to demonstrate that the change that has occurred has made no one any worse off, and it is even more difficult to ignore other conditions of Pareto-optimality such as the givenness of the production function, inherently unattainable in a long-range process of continuous innovation. It might be

recalled that Vilfredo Pareto has shown that a situation of maximum efficiency (identical to the economic equilibrium) prevails when it is impossible to increase the welfare of one individual without decreasing that of some other individual.

Why are long cycles associated with dependency? As argued earlier, long cycles have two salient components – recurrent systemic decisions, and innovation – and both carry social costs. Recurrent tests of strength having assumed the form of global wars they have also brought progressively more general hostilities and mounting destruction in their train – as well as pronounced global power concentrations that in turn have greatly raised the saliency of military power in the world picture. Those lacking such power have been placed in a position of political dependency. Innovation linked to long cycles inherently confers the initial advantage on those launching it, and on the world power in particular. Innovation creates concentrations of the 'new' in some parts of the system and necessarily obsolesces the 'old' in other parts. The rise of modern states has obsolesced traditional forms of governance such as empires, or tribal structures, in all parts of the world.

In essence, therefore, long cycles create concentrations of two kinds: those of military power, especially at the global level; and those of innovation, both political innovations and those of the more general kind (such as the discoveries) that are initiated by the world power. But spectacular though they might be, long cycles are not the only long-range process of modern world system. Other recurrent processes may carry additional innovations and are also likely to have dependency effects. The Kondratieff–Schumpeter process of the rise of new industries, for instance, might have significant effects in respect of economic dependency, and long-run processes of social or educational change may also have similar consequences. In short, to get a rounded view of 'dependency generation' in the modern world these other factors need to be considered, too, and all of them might in turn be linked to the long cycle in chains of secondary effects.

For the present, attention must focus on the dependency effects of long cycles alone, and two sets of these will be considered: (i) recurrence effects, chiefly those of military concentration; and (ii) innovation effects, those of disruption and of concentration as shown in the distribution of multinational firms.

Recurrence Effects

The processes of global competition engendered by recurrent tests of strength have been characterised by high costs and waste. The primary instances have been global wars that have marked each long cycle. The benefits of competition (largely among the few) have been limited by competitive waste. The costs included added dependency – especially among the conquered, the victims of war, the defeated and the devastated.

But the important effects of global warfare go beyond its obvious waste and destruction. They create, above all, power concentrations of global proportions and enduring effects. All global wars produced situations where one global power attained oceanic supremacy (cf. Table 2.2). That meant monopoly of sea power lasting for several decades, conditioning global politics, and creating a variety of situations of political dependency, especially among the smaller states and littoral communities of the world ocean. In some world regions, oceanic supremacy in effect conferred regional authority, as in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean or the Caribbean.

Global warfare also has direct consequences for raising the saliency of military power. These great contests have helped to boost the military element in global political arrangements. Military considerations and conditions have assumed a vitally important part in long-cycle processes, to the degree that in the contemporary picture the nuclear problem dominates all else at the global level. This overemphasis on military questions unbalances the global political process and renders large parts of the global polity passive and dependent.

Innovation Effects

The impact of modern innovation at the regional and local levels is, in the first place, a disruption of pre-existing, often imperial, forms of political organisation. The pre-modern regional orders *circa* 1500 contained important elements of dependency of their own devising. China, for instance, employed a long-standing and highly ritualised tributary system to order its relations with the outside world. The dependencies of the Ottoman Empire stretched from Algeria in the West to the Crimea and Arabia in the East. The West European order of feudalism could also be interpreted as a complex and well-formalised system of dependence.

The impact of the modern world system has been to gradually

disrupt this long-standing system of traditional dependence and to substitute for it a global layer of organisation and, in the short-run, patterns of regional governance staffed and managed in an increasingly complex pattern by successive world powers. In the longer run the entire political structure came to be dominated by the nation-state, with only a residual role for regional organisation in the strict sense. In India, for example, the East India Company first worked with the Mughal Emperors, then subverted them. In due course the British abolished the Mughals altogether and substituted themselves for them in the imperial role of regional overlords, only finally to be replaced by nationalist Indian rulers. South Asian regional organisation has been quite slow to emerge. The nation-state became the principal political form of the modern world system, followed by the parallel development of a national economy, a national community and a national language. The global system is yet to reach comparable elaboration.

These processes generated dependency in two ways. (i) The pre-modern forms of dependence tended to be taken over by the world power, becoming in the meantime more streamlined, more global in coverage. (ii) Communities of pre-modern organisation were put in a position of being unequal, less developed, or backward, until they devised their own forms of nation-state. The latter being the model or superior form of political structure, all other forms receded and most often waned in comparison with it. Countries or regions short or devoid of the more complex forms of social organisation, such as the Americas *circa* 1500, or parts of Africa, became particularly vulnerable and unable to afford protection to their inhabitants; areas of long-standing and quite complex forms of organisation such as China, Japan or Persia, fared better but remained under a disadvantage until they adapted to the new conditions. Japan was strikingly successful in that enterprise while other societies have been less so: until they clothed themselves in modern garb, their status remained uncertain. Yet even when the new forms have been introduced, their functioning often remained uncertain and left much to be desired. For even contemporary nation-states often lack the full accoutrements of political independence, relying on nuclear or strategic protection. Nor are the new states of the Third World free from dependence; the political independence many have acquired since 1945 leaves many needs unattended in a rapidly changing world system.

The reverse side of powerful and role-shaping world powers and

nation-states has been a world system that in the twentieth century lacks cultural coherence and is weak on global solidarity, that necessary cement of all social organisation. For some millenia the world has been a loosely tied agglomeration of culture areas of which the chief have been the Chinese, the Hindu, the Moslem, and the European. With the major exception of the Americas, the great culture areas remain in place today much as they were in 1500; the great political and other changes since that time have had little effect upon the cultural map of the old world.

A social system that is weak in elements of common culture will also lack the mechanisms necessary for the correction of its malevolent side-effects, in particular the mechanisms of redistribution and assistance and for taking care of the needy. Such a system will also have difficulty in solving common problems of global scope. It may thus aggravate dependency and make it more persistent.

Global Enterprise

In the modern era, a form of innovation characteristically linked to world powers has been the global enterprise. For some *dependencia* writers (such as Sunkel, 1979) the most important manifestation of dependency in the twentieth century has been the multinational corporation. The global enterprise is, of course, a characteristic outward projection of a lead economy and its activities are mediated, too, by the role played by world powers in setting the rules of the international economic order. Being an innovation it is also unequally distributed.

As shown in Table 8.1, each long cycle has had associated with it characteristic global enterprises, and these typically were related to the world power. This observation holds both in respect of the trade and banking firms of the first three cycles, and in respect of the industrial and financial organisations of the two most recent cycles. On an overall view, the active life of these enterprises does not seem to extend much beyond one long cycle. But in every such cycle the concentration of enterpreneurial innovation is quite marked. Notable, perhaps, in the Britain II cycle is the relative absence of strong global enterprise of an industrial character (despite continuing strength in the commercial sector). This seems attributable to the relatively small scale of industrial firms in the 'founders' era' and also to lags in British corporate organisation. While New York adopted a general law of incorporation in 1811, Britain consolidated its legis-

Table 8.1 Global lead enterprises

World power	*Global lead enterprises*	
	In commerce-industry	*In banking*
Portugal	King of Portugal (Casa da India, Lisbon, f.1501)	House of Fugger (Augsburg, Antwerp, Venice)
Netherlands	United East Indies Co. (VOC), Amsterdam, f.1601	Bank of Amsterdam f.1608
Britain I	Chartered East India Co., London f.1600, reorganised 1680–1708	Bank of England f.1694
Britain II	Thomas Brassey railroad contractor + 1870	John & Francis Baring & Co., London f.1770 Rothschild Bank, London, 1804
United States	Standard Oil f.1865 IBM f.1911	J. P. Morgan & Co., New York, 1895

lation governing limited liability companies only after 1855; it is this that gave American companies an early start in the art of building corporations and helped to launch the era of multinational corporations in the twentieth century.

The world-wide operations of global enterprises have been a highly visible process: evidence of the innovative capacity and the economic vitality of the world powers, and of their political role too. Their impact has been great both in trade and in direct investment in the areas they entered and made dependent. Control over trade gave rise to the classic cases of trade dependency on single export items, as, for example, tea from China or cotton from Egypt, marketed initially and principally in the lead economy. The global enterprises had a large share in this trade but they were also prominent in establishing ownership and control of natural resources in the nineteenth century, and manufacturing capacity in the twentieth, as, for example, in the case of plantations or oil fields, or auto or computer manufacturing more recently. Important sectors of national and local economies world-wide came to be seen to be foreign-owned, hence dominated.

In sum, therefore, modern dependency may be regarded as a form

of assymetry, tension and instability generated by the world system, in part through the long cycle. Much of it is difficult to correct because it is structurally based. But not all of it is.

PROCESSES OF DEPENDENCY REVERSAL

In the literature, the temptation to view dependency as cumulative and, in effect, as irreversible, has on the whole been strong. This is in part a matter of time-horizons, and these in turn are in part a question of power and resources. For if there is a tendency to correct dependency it must surely be a long-run process that is reckoned in decades if not generations. If so, who can be certain of its operation? Those to whom much is given find it easier to contemplate the long-run and the evolutionary trend than those who may live from hand to mouth and to whom today is all that matters. Social scientists advocating a long-range perspective must be able to bear the criticism of those marching to a less distant drummer. Yet even in a short perspective it is hard to argue flatly and without qualification that dependency must always be getting worse just as the poor must always be getting poorer. Only time will tell in the long run, but both social science and social experience suggest that dependency must be capable of at least some degree of correction.

On general grounds alone it would be surprising if a social process that generates disruption and/or systemic destabilisation should not be capable of generating some attempt to contain or reverse such tendencies. More to the point, processes that cause dependency might also be expected to be capable of inducing a set of counter-vailing (or counter-cyclical?) movements conducive to dependency reversal.

The global polity and, more broadly, the modern world system, therefore, might be expected to be capable of at least some degree of self-correction in the direction of non-dependency. Such an argument, in fact, amounts to postulating a 'principle of action and reaction'. Parsons, Bales and Shils (1953, pp. 100–2) have argued that social actions tend to be 'balanced' by 'complementary change' that is 'equal in motivational force and opposite in direction'. Accordingly it is also possible to hold that activities that induce dependency, such as major warfare or clusters of innovations, will in the long run also set in motion strong tendencies running in the opposite direction. This amounts to proposing a mechanism of

dependency reversal that can be set in motion to correct, however slowly, the weaknesses and injustices of the changes wrought *inter alia*, by the long cycle. As a motivational force this mechanism would be perfectly consistent with, for instance, the resistance generated by nationalism. Dependency being continuously created, the drives for reversal would also be expected to be continuous, varied and omnipresent. The causes of dependency that are attributable to long cycles being classifiable in two general categories, the processes of dependency reversal, too, might be expected in the long run to move with equal force along similar but opposite paths: those of power deconcentration, within each long cycle, and those of diffusion of innovation and learning, over a number of cycles. Broadly speaking, therefore, dependency reversal could be seen also as a learning process that is carried by the long cycle and other processes of the modern world system. One must also suppose that dependency reversal might take the negative form of an 'unlearning' process, such as the fundamentalist rejection of innovation and insulation from the world system.

But in addition to being viewed as diffusion, and in particular as innovation-diffusion (Rogers, 1962), hence a form of learning, dependency reversal might also be considered as a form of socialisation, which is also a learning process. If dependency is a formative condition (in some ways akin to childhood), a way of 'bringing up nations', or, conceivably, a form of illness resulting from large-scale social disruptions, then one possible model for dependency reversal might be that of socialisation or therapy (Parsons and Bales, 1955). Both are processes of a special character that occur in stages or phases and whose success is measured not in terms of external achievement but rather in those of harmony and of enhancement of internal stability. To the degree that the long cycle is a learning process it might at the same time set in motion (counter-cyclical) forces conducive to socialisation, and possibly also therapy.

Just as dependency creation might be considered under the two headings of recurrence and innovation, so can dependency reversal. Recurrence means not only the repetitive roar of global war but also the regular appearance, phased into the long cycle, of deconcentration. This deconcentration effect and, linked to it, the succession of world powers in positions of world leadership, are significant elements of dependency reversal that are built into each cycle. Innovation means not only its creation and utilisation by the world power but also its diffusion throughout the system, especially when the time

is ripe for it in the course of the cycle. Diffusion is as much a part of the learning process as is innovation, and the long cycle promotes not only the initial innovation but also its dissemination. Three diffusion effects will be considered here: learning to build and operate nation-states, learning to operate large-scale enterprises, and learning to utilise knowledge.

RECURRENCE

A principal element of the long cycle is the process of deconcentration – that is, the general trend from a state of concentration that is produced by global war, towards conditions of lesser density as the system moves further and further away from that event. As the long cycle proceeds from the climactic phase of global war, to the consolidation of world power, toward delegitimation and deconcentration, the previously high and pronounced density of political and other forms of power based among other things, on a unique organisation of military resources disperses itself; in due course, new such centres gain stature and attention and in that process move toward the reversal of their previous dependency. Gilpin's model of international change (1975, pp. 51–5) is an excellent outline of this process. Thus each long cycle carries an in-built tendency toward periodic reversal.

Two aspects of the process just described may be noted: the cyclical, and the secular. The process of dispersion of political power is not permanent, in as much as, four times in the experience of the modern world, the system reset itself again in a state of high concentration of political power. The cyclical aspect could therefore be regarded, in the long run, as self-cancelling. However, there are grounds for saying that the process is not merely self-cancelling; that, in effect, it resets itself at a higher level, and on each repeat leaves behind a positive residue of self-reliance on which a cumulative and secular dispersal of potential may be based. Viewing the five long cycles *in toto*, there is a gradual broadening of the base of political development world-wide that constitutes a foundation for a cumulatively more powerful process of dependency reversal.

An example of one aspect of the process of deconcentration is the proliferation of nuclear weapons after the Second World War (cf. Ha, 1983). The first nuclear armoury was developed by the United States in the course of that war, and its first and only battlefield use

to date occurred in the closing stages of the hostilities. In 1945 the United States held a monopoly of nuclear bombs; the actual stock of weapons, not very large at that date, grew quite fast in the years that followed. The Soviet Union first tested such a weapon in 1949, a thermonuclear device soon afterward, and by the early 1970s had a stockpile and enough of the systems required to deliver them to constitute a second-strike capability; this established it in the credible status of a superpower. Others claiming the status of nuclear-weapon states by the 1970s were, in the order of their first tests, Britain, France and China. By the 1980s, those capable of entering that category included India, Pakistan, South Africa, Israel and possibly others. The process of diffusion of industrial nuclear technology principally in respect of electric power generation has been even more pervasive and now extends to more than twenty nations.

Among the more dramatic cases of dependency reversal on the modern record have been those of the regular displacement of a retiring world power by a rising nation-state in the succession process of the long cycle. In each such case an existing dependency structure centred on one world power had to be realigned and a new structure was put in place. The result was a spectacular shift in the world's active zone. In addition to Portugal's initial success in overturning Venice's control over the trade with the East (1500–1515) the story of long cycles registers three other cases of such reversal: (i) the Dutch defeat of the Iberian order and reversal of their earlier dependence on Portugal and Spain (*circa* 1580–1609); (ii) England's reversal of dependency on the Dutch (1650–1700); and (iii) the United States' reversal of their previous colonial dependency upon Britain (1750–1850). The outlines of these cases have already been recounted and the general point should by now be obvious, but there might be some value in adding a few details regarding the second case because it, too, might carry suggestions relevant to the contemporary problems of less-developed countries.

England had been close to the Netherlands throughout historical memory. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries England was allied with their rulers, the Dukes of Burgundy, against the Kings of France. England's staple export, wool, found its chief outlet in the Dutch market. By the seventeenth century this took the form of the export – by a monopolistic trading company, the Merchant Adventurers – of semi-finished cloth that was then dyed and finished in Holland. To some English interests this became a matter for dissatisfaction, based upon the belief that England should no longer be a

supplier of raw materials and semi-processed products to the Dutch. Another important quarrel concerned the herring-fishery in the North Sea that in the English view amounted to an unfair exploitation by the Dutch of an English natural resource. Finally, there was also the question of Dutch control of world shipping and of the carrying trade of England, the drain of bullion from England to the Low Countries, and the power of the Dutch East Indies Company and of the Dutch navy. Three classic 'trade wars' (between 1653 and 1674) and, more important, a common alliance against Louis XIV, were needed to remedy these grievances that sound so very modern. The financial power of Amsterdam, its capacity to raise funds and to put together loan packages remained intact until well into the next century, but England's former dependency vanished completely. Soon it was Britain that was the hub of the world's textile industries, the premier shipping nation, the financial centre as well as the greatest sea power. A striking case of dependency reversal in action.

The third, even better-known, case is that of the United States and Britain. From the status of poor English settlements to self-governing British colonies, to independent state, to lead economy and world power, the progression has been rapid by world standards and the reversal complete. Not only did the United States shed their former dependency on the mother country but they also directly supplanted it in the position of leadership. It would be redundant to go into greater detail.

Three additional points might be made about these major examples of dependency reversal. Time-wise they were long-range processes with a period exceeding 100 years. This is not something that promises rapid change nor is the model for a quick amelioration of conditions; but it has nevertheless been of major import. Space-wise, too, a large-scale pattern may be observed. For some four millenia prior to 1500 the Mediterranean had been a principal active zone of the world system. Since then, in a sequence of decisive moves, the world's active zone has shifted to the North Atlantic, in the temperate zone band between 40 and 50 degrees latitude, and is now in North America. Finally, as a political process the reversals were not altogether surprising. They occurred within the confines of the solidarity structure that was put in place in the Dutch cycle, and that has lasted to this day. In that sense they were developmental and incremental rather than sudden or surprising.

Innovation-Diffusion

The nation-state being a relatively recent innovation then the process by which pre-modern communities around the world were socialised into the modern world structure is one of innovation-diffusion; it also amounts to dependency reversal. This view is premised on the proposition that the modern world system generated the nation-states in a process mediated in part by the long cycle (cf. Chapter 6). National organisation being the source of significant advantage, the example spread gradually in a process of diffusion over the entire world, to become a phenomenon universal in aspiration if not yet in achievement. While nation-states remain strikingly unequal, the basic forms are now widely distributed and this diffusion is the substance of 'political development'. If those areas having effective nation-states are defined as the developed part of the world, they have in the past amounted to only a small fraction of the world system; but over time they have been spreading over an increasingly large part of it.

The nation-state constitutes a primary device for the protection of a defined community from harmful global influences and in particular from the damaging effects of political and other developments that are outside national control. National protection takes a variety of forms, depending on the circumstances. In areas lacking states, that were then colonised, the need was for the creation of states as a means of 'growing up' in the modern world. In Asia and northern Africa existing states were rejuvenated, but great imperial states such as the Hapsburg monarchy or the Ottoman Empire fell apart. In the course of its retirement the British Empire spawned dozens of new states. Nation-building was the process of growing out of dependency, not only political, secured through independence, but also economic, cultural and social. The standard measures of dependency reversal such as indigenisation, regulation of foreign investment, economic planning and nationalisation, all depend essentially on the nation-state as the mechanism of control and on a well-functioning economy as a substitute for excessive reliance on foreign trade and investment. These measures work to the extent that national institutions are effectively in place.

Nation-building came in waves related to long cycles. Such prominent wars of national independence as the Dutch or the American were essential parts of their cycles. The liberation of Latin America was the product of the Napoleonic wars. The unification of Germany

and Italy, and the modernisation of Japan, refashioned the world system in the second half of the nineteenth century. The post-1945 wave of decolonisation, virtually ended by 1965, marked the end of Britain's and France's role as global powers.

Global Enterprise-Building

If nation-building is a learning process, so is the creation of large-scale businesses. In a case of 'follow the leaders', there has been, parallelling the succession of world powers, a regular and notable turnover in the significance of global enterprises (as demonstrated in Table 8.1). For example, the British investment that dominated the economy of Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century is now hardly even a memory, perhaps because its fading was a slow and generally painless affair that lasted well into this century. Even the Rothschilds, the financial giants of the second British cycle and the bankers of the coalition that defeated Napoleon, while still prominent, have nothing like their former power. As a rule, the later phases of each (systemic) long cycle have been marked by the rise of competitors. In the closing stages of the Dutch cycle, for instance, the Dutch East Indies Company encountered increased competition from English and Danish traders in the East and a vast array of mercantilist measures devised by Colbert, including France's own East India Company.

Another such process of enterprise-building has been underway in the most recent cycle. Since the end of the Second World War and over the space of just one generation the field of very large companies that were also (most of them) multinational and global had been entered by substantial numbers of new firms, especially so in the case of Western Europe and Japan but also including Latin America. This learning process is also a means of diffusion. For if large-scale industrial and financial units are a necessary feature of the modern world, and the capacity to create and operate them a form of learning, then also the advantage held by large US corporations since the end of the nineteenth century may be seen to have spread to other areas at a measurable rate.

Several of these enterprises were created by means of deliberate measures of dependency reversal. Such were, for instance, the French and Italian oil companies (CFP, Elf-Aquitaine, ENI) originating in deliberate policies of state intervention, or the Mexican and Brazilian oil companies, products of rationalisation and of OPEC-

induced profits. In the 1980s the advantage was still with the American companies in the sense that the volume of their activity, as measured by sales and assets, etc., was higher than might be expected from the US share of industrial production in the world totals; but that advantage had declined noticeably between 1955 and 1982 (Modelski, 1983, p. 64).

Those who speak of the dominant role of multinational corporations in the contemporary world need to remember the other contexts in which dependency might also be at work. The book value of American direct foreign investment in 1981 was close to a quarter-trillion dollars ($226 billion, comprising about 40 per cent of the world total of direct foreign investment). While an impressive figure, it bore comparison with the value of foreign assets, governmental and private, held by just two newly oil-rich nations – Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – in that same year, that were in the same order of magnitude – in fact, somewhat higher ($260 billion), much of it consisting of US government securities (Modelski, 1983, p. 65). Equally significant might be the fact that the indebtedness of less-developed countries to foreign banks in the mid-1980s greatly exceeded that figure. That too was an aspect of diffusion. But the debt problem is a reminder that dependency has many faces.

Knowledge and Dependency Reversal

Three complete cases of dependency reversal at the global level (those of the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States) have already been noted. But do they offer much hope to those who do not or cannot aspire to world power? For on a net view these three cases, arguably, may not have substantially reduced the total of dependency in the system at all. If the United States' former dependency on Britain and its naval power, for instance, has now been replaced by British dependency on US nuclear protection then not much may have changed. Does it not leave the world system unchanged, and with continuing dependency and the tendency for generating more dependency?

That is an incomplete view. It ignores the possibility of learning (of developing and transmitting a fund of experience about handling dependency) as a direct function of the operation of long cycles and other such processes. An interesting aspect of these three cases has been their involvement in the nurturing of the knowledge of the world system and its functioning, and of the possibility of under-

standing that system and conceivably even controlling it. For each of these cases has been linked with significant conceptual and theoretical innovations ('culture-creation') in what would ultimately become the accumulating experience of the social sciences. Here are three examples.

The first concerns Hugo Grotius. This father of International Law was the first to formulate the doctrine of freedom of the seas and freedom of trade as the principled basis of the Dutch case against Portugal's claim to control over all the routes to the East, and over the trade they carried. His *Mare Liberum* (November 1608) was based on a brief submitted by the Dutch East Indies Company in a case involving the capture of a rich Portuguese galleon off Malacca (Scott, ed. 1916); but the principle it proclaimed found a resounding echo world-wide and has been central to these problems ever since (even though Grotius's own position on that principle shifted in the course of his career). After Portugal and Spain no other power was able to assert or legitimately maintain as sweeping a claim to the control over the ocean in peacetime. The process of dependency reversal in this case not only succeeded but also yielded a harvest of professional expertise and normative precedents with the help of which similar cases could be recognised, argued and disposed of in the future.

The second case concerns mercantilism, and the policies of Jean-Baptiste Colbert. The era of Dutch supremacy aroused resentment in England and in France in particular. The Navigation Acts in England, and the measures introduced in France by Colbert, have since been branded as mercantilist and were roundly criticised by Adam Smith one century later. But in their time they arose from the recognition of the fact of dependency upon Dutch maritime and economic power and from sustained reflection about how to deal with it. Concepts of 'balance of trade' or policies of industrial growth or planned development were successfully formulated in response to that dependency. They, too, added to the repertoire of knowledge and continue to be among the stock-in-trade of economic planners.

The third case concerns Thomas Paine and Adam Smith and the process that reversed America's dependency upon Britain. On the American side the most powerful advocacy was Paine's best-selling *Common Sense* (500,000 copies in 1776 alone) whose publication was credited with having helped to crystallise the sentiment in favour of independence. It was an incisive argument for dependency reversal, an inquiry into 'some of the many material injuries which

these colonies sustain . . . by being connected with, and dependant on Great Britain' (Paine, 1976, p. 83), and a sketch of the alternatives open to a free America, including the establishment of a navy. On the British side, the arguments for discarding colonies, and for trade freed from political constraints benefiting entrenched monopolies, were taken up by Adam Smith, especially in chapter 7 of the *Wealth of Nations* published in that same year. In the Smith vision, trade and free access were more important than territorial conquest and dominion. His vision prevailed and remains to this day valid and compelling.

These three cases help to demonstrate how dependency reversal at the systemic level has been linked, and continues to be linked, intimately with the cumulative growth of knowledge in international affairs, politics and economics that erodes the monopoly conditions conducive to dependency. For dependency is in part a function of perception, learning, and awareness of alternatives. In that sense, too, education is also a process of dependency reversal.

A Curve of Learning to be Non-Dependent?

The discussions of nation-states and of party systems have each shown evidence for a long-run evolutionary trend linked to long cycles. Both the rise of world leadership to be an institution of global politics, and the emergence of party systems, have been learning processes of global scope. Is there also evidence for an increased potential for learning to be non-dependent?

An earlier discussion (Orton and Modelski, 1979, p. 391) argued such a tendency in the case of modern Finland and a follow-up study did the same for Mexico (Orton, 1983). Pursuing a similar line of thought, Chase-Dunn (1983) documented a gradual shrinkage of the periphery running in tandem with an expansion of the core and the semi-periphery (in the period 1885–1980) as tending to show evidence for structural mobility in the world system and for the reduction of dependency. If nation-building, economic development and knowledge are the preconditions of dependency control, these have been getting stronger, and a significant new move up the curve of learning to be non-dependent might well lie ahead.

OBSTACLES TO DEPENDENCY REVERSAL

The question might nevertheless be put: If dependency reversal is so much part of the long cycle, why is it that dependency continues to abound in the world system? Why has it not altogether disappeared from the face of the earth? There are a number of reasons for this:

(1) As argued earlier, in the modern world dependency is continuously generated. As long as there is both recurrence and innovation, dependency is likely to remain, changing in complexion and characteristics, but remaining, nevertheless.
(2) Dependency is a function of monopoly. Monopolies offer rich rewards and are slow to dissolve. The tendency to monopolise may never be completely offset by recurrent pressures for deconcentration, and for the diffusion of innovation and knowledge.
(3) Learning is slow, and imperfect. Knowledge diffuses incompletely, especially across community boundaries. Non-inclusive communities create dependencies.
(4) Long cycles are slow, even if moving at deliberate speed. A system as large as the global polity cannot speedily remedy its structural weaknesses. The global-system process is slower still.

The high salience of instrumental considerations, both in the economy and in respect to knowledge, in the last two long cycles, means that the stage might now be set for a new phase of the global system, one in which the overriding functional requirement will be concerned with ends rather than with means and in which those of global community building will receive their due attention. In such a situation the prospects for dealing with dependency appear brighter in the century ahead.

PART III
In Conclusion

The purpose of this book has been twofold: to explain the long cycle as a part of the normal working of global politics, and to suggest several of the ways in which its influences ramify through the world system.

The aim has been to present the process as one whose principal impulse is to animate the global political system along a path that includes both a repetitive beat and an upward thrust. This is not a process that needs to be suppressed or superseded. What it does need is to be understood, worked with and, if need be, modified or channelled. Not that the long cycle works without friction or lacks instances of maladjustment, and its costs at various times have been high. But, in the main, its provenance and its direction have been part and parcel of the regular movement of the world system.

Nothing in the evidence contradicts the expectation that the movement continues on its way. The introduction of nuclear weapons certainly has not abolished it: on the contrary, this is an unsurprising consequence of the last long cycle. The containment and mastery of these weapons is a problem that will have to be solved in the current cycle.

The theory of long cycles offers an explanation of the basic mechanisms involved. The long cycle is the temporal dimension of global polity, whose functional requirements it meets over time by means of its phases. This long (global political) cycle, moreover, does not operate in a vacuum but meshes with other social processes. One of these is a secular movement of the global system paced by successive long cycles. Both are modified Parsonian learning processes that restructure the system as they move it along an irreversible time-path.

But just as the wheels of the long cycle continue to turn, so the study of this process goes on. Even if the basic outlines are in place, the framework is likely to receive additional enrichment, and like the system it attempts to model, it may also experience evolutionary growth. The implications of this analysis for a myriad of problems

and situations remain to be explored. The following are among these implications.

(1) Other things remaining equal, the global political system is working its way toward another global war. Such a war is not imminent but looms ominously and prominently at the end of the next long-cycle phase of deconcentration. Given the likelihood that the next global war will be a nuclear war, the long cycle creates a major problem that awaits a solution within the life-span of the coming generation. The theory of the long cycle delineates the outlines of the crisis; it also might offer clues to its resolution. But this is a major topic that demands separate and sustained attention.

(2) Granted the correctness of this analysis with respect to the learning process, the major functional requirement that needs to be met by the global system in the coming learning cycle is that of integration. The global community needs strengthening and revitalising. This is another major theme which cannot, at this point, be pursued any further but for which the present analysis, once again, offers definitions and leads that need to be pursued in the future.

(3) Last, but not least, is the question of future leadership. If the world needs leadership, as has been argued, then the 'old fashioned' process selection by global war must be replaced by methods more in keeping with recent technological and informational achievements. New methods of selection need to be invented or devised, and a long-cycle approach may be an essential step in such endeavour. But, again, the problem of inventing and engineering alternative procedures for choosing world leadership is one that is too complex to be exhaustively discussed at this stage. For the present, all that will be offered, in lieu of a conclusion, and by way of summary of the arguments of this book, is a more detailed consideration of the conditions for global leadership in the next cycle.

9 Characteristics of World Leadership

The attention given both in the United States and in Japan to Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (1979) is just one indication of a wider anxiety surrounding the problem of world leadership. At issue are not merely questions, say, of relative industrial performance, but fundamental appraisals of the United States' position in the world; a position that is widely perceived to be weaker than it was in 1945.

Because of its importance, the issue also calls for careful analysis and the assembly of all relevant evidence. Moreover, to answer the question 'Who is no. 1?', it is necessary first to clarify the preliminary query, 'What are the conditions required to become no. 1?' Obviously it is not enough for a country to be first, say, in table tennis. Nor, on the other hand, does it suffice for it merely to have the largest store of nuclear missiles. Nor, finally, is the criterion specified by Vogel (1979, p. viii), namely the fact that a country deals 'more successfully with more of the basic problems of post-industrial society than any other country', self-evidently of central importance in this context.

For what is really at stake here is 'world leadership', that is, the capacity to provide, for a substantial period, an ordering principle and a focus for world affairs, in the way that the United States, for instance, did after 1945. In order to reach such a position of leadership a country must meet a set of special conditions called the qualifications, or requirements, for global leadership. What is the best way of determining these conditions of eligibility?

As should by now be obvious, in the experience of the modern world system, four countries, in their time, played such leadership roles: the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal. From the experience of these countries in their heyday, and in their rise to prominence, the ingredients that were essential to that achievement may be extracted by appropriate analysis. The intention is not to uncover the special or accidental factors that individual national histories would bring out, but rather to elicit those conditions common to all these cases that have qualified them as 'leadership

material'; conditions that might also be expected to remain valid for the next case.

THE UTILITY OF LONG CYCLES

The method to be pursued here is, of course, an application of long-cycle theorising. The regularity evidenced both in the rise of new powers and in the recurrence of global wars at intervals of about one century makes it possible to summarise quite succinctly a basic political process; it also makes it possible to venture tentative predictions about the shape of the next cycle. Needless to say, the present theory offers a rather simplified and schematic way of looking at world politics. It refers principally to processes occurring at the global level and only secondarily to regional and national phenomena. But its usefulness in pointing to the essentials in a situation should not be underestimated.

Consider, as an example, the experience of Japan. Japan's entry into the modern world was in fact mediated by the first world power, Portugal, whose naval campaigns in the Indian Ocean and the opening of a regular oceanic route linking Asia with Europe marked the inauguration of the new global system. Beginning with 1542, Portuguese traders and missionaries became the principal links between Japan and the wider world outside. At the height of their activities, under Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and Ieyazu, this process coincided with the political consolidation that (following a century of disorder and civil war) culminated in the Tokugawa Shogunate. As the power of Portugal and Spain waned, the Netherlanders began to arrive in Japan after 1600, and in 1639 the Portuguese were expelled. They were replaced on a narrower basis by the Dutch whose East Indies Company conducted, through Nagasaki, whatever limited trade remained to be transacted for the next two centuries. The restoration of full relations with the outside world occurred at the height of British power and under the pressure of the 'opening of China' after 1841; it is interesting to note, though, that it was mediated by an American mission. This in turn set off the process leading to the Meji Restoration. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) brought Japan into the First World War on the side of Britain and the United States, but the alliance was replaced by a network of arms-control treaties negotiated in Washington in 1922. In the Second World War Japan found itself for the first and only time on

the side of the challengers; but since 1945 the United States, at first through the occupation regime and then through the Security Treaty, has been a primary, though gradually diminishing, influence determining its international position.

Even so cursory a survey of the modern history of Japan suggest the following important generalisations:

(1) Japan's own national institutions have been decisively shaped by global influences, beginning with the Tokunaga Shogunate, through the Meji Restoration, to the post-1945 era.
(2) The chief factors informing Japan's relations with the global system have been the world powers.
(3) Throughout the era, Japan has in effect been a member of the winning oceanic coalition of the global wars, the only significant exception being the 1931–45 period.

In other words, long cycles summarise the entrances and exits of the world powers, and in the process they also dispense a great deal of information about all the other countries. But the succession of world powers, while determined in global wars, is a process whose roots begin to grow much earlier. As already shown, the rise of a world power is observable as early as two generations prior to the onset of the global-war phase of the long cycle. It may therefore also be supposed that similar movements are once again in motion: a new crop of competitors for world leadership is now sprouting, and that is one more reason why the problem merits careful consideration. But the very fact that the question is now being asked does not mean that it is likely to be speedily resolved; on past experience of long cycles, the issue is likely to remain current for quite a while yet.

At the minimal, and the safest, level, therefore, the method for learning about the characteristics of the next world power from the experience of past world powers is inductive and therefore simple and basically straightforward. Its strength lies in its grounding in historical experience and in the practice of international relations. The records of countries such as Britain are open and should be used. The weakness of induction stems from the fact that the past is rarely a complete guide to the future. Specifically, since 1500, world powers have regularly emerged from global wars; yet, for the future, such an eventuality is hard to imagine, and a new method of selecting world leaders needs to be devised. But if the method were changed, then the characteristics required of world leaders might also be subject to some alteration. This point needs to be borne in mind,

together with the consideration that the element of inertia in the world system can be relied upon for making most of the qualifications required for the next world power unlikely to be radically different from those evident in the earlier cases. But the study of long cycles is not only inductive; to the degree that a 'learning' interpretation is valid, deductions may be advanced about the characteristics of the current and coming phases of global politics, and that too is part of this analysis.

FACTORS OF WORLD LEADERSHIP

According to economics textbooks, nearly all economic activity (that is, all production) requires several different 'factors of production' (or factor inputs). The categories usually mentioned are land, labour and capital as well as organisation (management or entrepreneurship). In a similar vein, the political process might be seen to have four types of basic ingredient: location (or geography), population (or society), wealth (or resources), and political organisation. What special features do these assume to create the prerequisites for the successful launching and the sustained operation of world leadership? The following factors will be discussed in turn:

(1) a favourable geography, preferably insular;
(2) a cohesive, open, and coalition-capable society;
(3) a lead economy; and
(4) a politico-strategic organisation of global reach.

Each of the known world powers, the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Portugal, may be shown to have been well endowed with a set of these 'input factors' and these can therefore be regarded as the basic input conditions for world leadership. The precise combination of factors has varied from case to case but the general formula has remained remarkably similar in each one of them. These were the factors most favourable to the successful performance of the role of world leadership, and furthermore they were the ones that made it most likely that the world power would perceive the maintenance of global order as being in its own self-interest.

Insularity

The clearest and most easily observable qualification of world powers has been insularity (or peninsularity), and more specifically, oceanic insularity. The closest to the ideal type in this category (whose most striking proto-type was Venice) has been Great Britain, a kingdom that through its two cycles controlled all of the British Isles, and used that control effectively as the basis of its world policy. The United States may also be regarded as an island, albeit of continental proportions, but it is not as fully self-contained as an island since it shares the North American continent with Canada and Mexico. The United Provinces of the Netherlands were a country of islands and pensinsulas, both protected by dykes whose opening had the effect of converting their towns into islands. Portugal, finally, is located on a major peninsula, the Iberian, and Lisbon, its capital, repeats the pattern on a smaller scale and could be defensible provided its sea-links remained open. All four countries had easy access to the world ocean, especially the North Atlantic.

The significance of insularity is twofold. In the first place, it allows its beneficiaries 'surplus security', that is, higher security than that accruing to a land-locked country in a continental situation and with borders that require protective land measures. It means that an island country is less likely to have suffered armed invasions or occupations, a factor that translates into greater stability and cohesion. It also means ability to spare the resources needed for operations of global reach. In the second place, insularity means easier access to water-borne world communications. A location on a major waterway, be it a river or a river system, such as the Nile or the Yellow River, or on a sea, such as the Mediterranean, has been a crucial factor in the organisation of civilisations in the past. In the modern age, islands in the world ocean have had privileged access to global traffic routes and opportunities to develop trading fleets, fisheries, navies, and explorations. For continental powers these could be seen as luxuries; for insular states they would be necessities and therefore the object of sustained interest and major investment. This advantage continues as long as sea transport remains significant, even in the space age.

All of this, of course, is subject to qualification. Not all islands will be equally advantaged, only those preferentially located with regard to major existing or potential traffic arteries. Islands are preferable to peninsulas because they are more secure, but islands too can be entered by a determined invader, as England was in

1688–9, or else threatened with invasion, as England again was in 1804–5 and 1940. Peninsular states have land frontiers to worry about: Portugal was overrun by Spanish forces in 1580; the Netherlands came close to being conquered in 1672 and were quickly seized by the armies of the French Revolution in 1795.

Stability and Openness

All the world powers have had societies that were, at the relevant time, both stable and open. The favourable geographic location, as already noted, was conducive to that, especially since insularity helps to forge a sense of common identity. The stability prevailed both in the negative meaning of absence of civil strife or internal warfare, and positively, in that it gave rise to national communities that were cohesive, open, and coalition-capable.

Stability and freedom from strife and revolution marked all the world powers during their 'time in office', that is, during 'their' cycle. In those periods, neither Portugal, nor the Netherlands, nor Britain or the United States experienced a social revolution, a military coup, illegal change of government, or foreign intrusion that would disturb the social peace. Social stability and a high degree of solidarity has been the rule, but subject to one condition: in every single case the assumption of world leadership was prepared, usually one or two generations earlier, by a period of political revolution, that is, an institutional clearing of the decks, especially in the political system, rather than a major disruption of society. In Portugal, it was the bourgeois-national revolution of 1383–5, with a follow-up in 1438; in the Netherlands, it was the revolt creating the United Provinces (1565–80); in England, the Puritan Revolution (1641–8) and then the American Revolution (1776) viewed as the disruption of the first British system; and finally, for the United States, the Civil War (1861–6). Thus, stability was significant but not absolute, and had to be prepared for.

Positively, the picture is even stronger. It shows the steady evolution of a society, fortified by common language, consensual as to ultimate goals, and benefiting from an early creation of party systems and the use of methods of representation that served as reliable transmission belts between the national community and its political life. As has been shown, the world powers were the world's earliest nation-states; Portugal began the evolution of institutions for the debate and management of global policies that were right on target;

the Netherlands then proceeded to refine these institutions which were brought to full bloom in the British and American political and party systems.

Thus, sensibly organised national cohesion served as the foundation for global action. For, quite obviously, a society afflicted with internal strife cannot have either the time or the resources to spare to attend seriously to global problems. This has two further consequences. A stable society (and one that is also prosperous) is capable of 'inclusion': that is, it attracts and offers a place to migrants, travellers, fortune seekers, etc. – it becomes a haven. In a world of instability, a stable society also attracts esteem and becomes a lead society, a model of development. In this sense these societies combined inner stability with openness to the outside, an important though difficult combination. In the world at large, this characteristic openness combined with a capacity for forging and maintaining both domestic and international coalitions.

Economic Leadership

Outstanding accomplishments in the economic field have been the hallmark of all world powers. But it is well to specify more precisely the nature of these economic achievements that lend their authors the status of lead economies. It is not the sheer size of the economy, that is, its productive capacity as measured by total GNP, nor is it merely wealth as measured by per capita GNP. Rather, it is a combination of quantity and quality of a special kind manifested early in a country's rise to power that seems to do the trick.

Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain I, were, in their time, key commercial economies; and Britain II and the United States were major industrial economies. Their significance lay not in their absolute size, for in the seventeenth century, for instance, France or the Ottoman Empire (if they might be regarded as national economies) were probably larger than the Netherlands or England. Even as late as 1860, China's GNP might have been more sizable than Britain's, and so was France's. For it is only after 1945, when the United State's GNP approached (for a short time) the level of 50 per cent of the world product (now it is about 25 per cent), and when the GNP became a routinely measured quantity, that the gross size of the domestic output has come to be associated with a global role.

What does distinguish the world powers is not just gross product

(though this is obviously not insignificant) but rather the composition of that product and the proportion of it given to innovative projects. In the commercial phases, it was the size of the effort going into long-distance trade, shipping and especially high-profit items such as precious metals and spices. In the industrial cases, it was the founding of lead industries, such as cotton-spinning and weaving, railroads, aviation, or electronics, combined with emphasis on world trade and multinational investment, that made the difference. Thus it is not just size, nor innovation merely for the sake of innovation, but innovation linked to global reach and world trade: innovation for the adaptive upgrading, in the first place, of the global system (through trade and an expanding division of labour, more rapid and efficient technologies of transport and improved communications) that shaped the role of the lead economies.

These economies should also be referred to as basically capitalist, meaning that their management and investment planning were in the hands of people occupying positions and performing functions significantly (though by no means completely) differentiated and autonomous from those filled by people active in the political sphere. There were some exceptions (the King of Portugal's pepper monopoly), but overall the lead economies derived their strength and their capacity to innovate from this relative freedom of action. In turn, they also helped to shape the world system in that direction, both by supplying role models and by influencing the evolving rules of the international economic order along that path.

Lead economies proved essential to world power because out of the profits of innovation they supplied those surplus resources that paid for enterprises and commitments on the world stage. Conversely, as innovation diminished, the capacity to support such measures also declined.

Politico-Strategic Organisation for Global Reach

Most of all, the world powers have excelled in combining the factors of location, cohesion and productivity into an effective package, an organisation for global political activity. This was never a design for raising the world's largest military forces, but rather a matter of organising a system for keeping order at the global level, in respect of overall security and global economic relations, though not in respect of all the national peculiarities of local administration. In essence, it was a question of directing, through a process of differen-

tiation, a distinct higher-order system for strategic action at the global level that came to be known in past cycles as sea-power, and whose current understanding must also include air- and space-power.

The reader will by now be well aware that each world power had, in its time, effective naval superiority over all comers on the world ocean. That means that for substantial periods its naval resources – that is, its capital ships (including, most recently, nuclear missile submarines) as well as its bases, supply and intelligence systems – were superior to those of all its rivals. As already shown, for close to a century both Portugal and the Netherlands had this maritime capacity. Next the English navy arose to 'rule the waves' from 1692 on, and it held this pre-eminent position until the world wars of the twentieth century. In 1941–2, Japan's initial victories proved insufficient to stop the United States Navy from sweeping the Pacific, beginning with the battle of Midway a few months after Pearl Harbor. Since 1945, the United States armed forces have been deployed world-wide, and among the most spectacular aspects of that deployment have been the enormously powerful nuclear submarine and carrier forces.

The function of the politico-strategic organisation of the world powers has been the ability to maintain the global order of their choice. In practice, this has meant the ability to fight and to win global wars that decided the issue of world leadership. Global wars were the test of ability for *effectively combining* the factors of world leadership. Today, the capacity for fighting a global war is closely linked with thermonuclear weapons, but it is worth recalling that sea- and air-power have not become irrelevant: roughly one-half of the deterrent forces of the major powers (the United States' more so than the Soviet Union's) are sea-based and they are now regarded as the less vulnerable parts of those forces. Moreover, their control depends on warning and reconnaissance, and relay satellites extended and active in space. The logic of the system, therefore, has so far remained unaltered even though the technological conditions have changed a great deal. The forces of global reach still function to preserve the current world order.

What About the Challengers?

Thus, the world powers of the modern age have shared a set of distinctive characteristics (a specific factor endowment). Lest it be thought that this is an arbitrary list, the distinguishing features (in

respect to those same factors) of the major states that did contest the prize of world leadership but lost the global wars that decided the issue, will also be reviewed. These challengers were Spain, making a bid for global leadership after absorbing Portugal, France (twice losing to Britain), and Germany (losing to the United States). For purposes of enhancing the contemporary interest, the Soviet Union will also be considered in this context.

Clearly, none of these countries were islands. Spain, it is true, had the benefits of peninsularity, albeit of continental proportions. Stretching the concept, even France could perhaps be thought of as peninsular, and yet, when compared with England, the disadvantages of its position become quite clear, especially its divided coastline and its open frontier to the East. Germany is the heart of continental Europe, and the Soviet Union the heart of Eurasia. The nemesis of the continental powers has been their inability and unwillingness to detach themselves from territorial and regional conflict, and their consequent difficulty in assuming a 'global' outlook.

Nor is their record of domestic stability impressive. All four show evidence of major internal disruptions. Considering in detail such great disturbances as the Castilian civil wars, the wars of religion in France, the Fronde, the French Revolution, Germany from 1918 to 1945, or the Russian Revolution and its aftermath, three sets of characteristics that distinguish them from the situation of the world powers may be listed: (i) these disturbances had a more pervasive and profound impact, having the character of social rather than merely political revolutions; (ii) they coincided generally with global wars, and this accounts in part for their devastating effect; (iii) they usually led to the suppression of representative institutions and the destruction or elimination of party systems which were then replaced by regimes of absolute or dictatorial rule. Their effect was towards forced cohesion and the creation of closed, rather than open, systems. They prompted emigration (as from France after 1685, or from Germany after 1933) rather than attracting migrants, as did the world powers. It is not that the latter invariably were full-blown havens of liberality but that by contemporary comparison they were broadly more open and more tolerant. This goes, by and large, even for Portugal as compared with its neighbour, even though Spain's expulsion of Jews and Moslems in 1492 was followed by a similar measure four years later in Portugal (Lach, 1965, pp. 94–5).

As for their economies, they were not negligible by any means. Because the countries were large, populous and well-endowed, their

national products were generally quite big. France has always been a rich and productive country, as was Spain (amply reinforced in its time by the legendary treasures from the Americas). In the late nineteenth century, Germany was a model of industrial prowess, and the Soviet Union, too, claimed to offer the world a model of social and economic development based on a continental-size economy. But their actual long-term record of economic management, and growth based on innovation, has been poor, especially as compared with their competitors.

Finally, there is their politico-strategic posture. They all tried their hands at sea power. Spain launched the Great Armada, France built up a splendid fleet under Colbert, Germany tried a naval race with Britain after 1900, and the Soviet Union has since 1945 also embarked on building an all-ocean fleet. The past experience of these efforts has not been positive. Unrelated to long-standing commercial or industrial enterprises, these aspirations appeared idiosyncratic if not capricious. They have been sporadic and lacking in follow-through, as in the case of France whose efforts to secure her eastern frontiers and to influence Germany habitually took precedence over oceanic ambitions; and the case of Germany whose wars on two fronts did not leave enough resources to spare to make a permanent naval impact. These attempts were regularly abandoned when pressures nearer home raised issues of higher priority. At the same time, the knowledge and the conceptual equipment required for operating a global system have been lacking.

Leadership Selection

The analysis, so far, might be summed up as follows. World politics is not a random process of hit or miss, win or lose, depending on the luck of the draw or the brute strength of the contestants. For the past five centuries, the world system has operated in such a way as to select for the role of world leadership a succession of countries with well-defined characteristics, namely, insularity, cohesion, economic leadership, and organisation for global reach. By that same token, these characteristics have become more salient than they were half a millenium ago. Furthermore, the system has also systematically ruled out other competing states that have lacked these qualifications. The principal mechanism of selection has been the long cycle, and the event clinching the selection process, global war.

In this light, 'leadership selection' may be a formative process of

global politics, in the strict sense of the evolutionary theory of natural selection, as formulated at the level of social (rather than biological) systems. It is one of the dynamic forms that evolving systems assume, and it may be described as one of variational evolution in which independent and, in effect, random variations occur in individual countries. The selection of these countries then evolves by a sorting process in which some types are selected out; and the relative frequency of the different variants changes by means of inter-nation competition. In this selection process mediated by global war, the system itself changes in order better to cope with environmental challenges. It chooses those more capable of learning and helps in their survival and reproduction; it slows down the others.

To the degree that a functional theory calls for the specification of a mechanism that satisfies the systemic requirement for leadership, then this leadership selection process via a macro decision does just that. The alternative to this kind of 'natural selection' is rational steering toward a conscious decision. If national systems have been able to devise substitutes for civil war, then the global system, too, must be capable of producing a rational mechanism meeting the requirements for leadership selection by means short of global war. That is the next great problem for global politics.

In some ways, all this is quite reassuring. If a pattern and a process can be perceived as operating in world politics, then its uncertainties and its indeterminacy may be reduced, and the chances of predicting the characteristics of the next occupant of the position of world leadership should also improve.

SYSTEMIC REQUIREMENTS

So much for the basic input factors that seem to be the prerequisites for the 'production' of world leadership. They indicate broadly what is 'leadership material' in the world context, but they need to be qualified by two sets of additional, systemic, considerations that operate in opposite directions. On the one hand, there is a set of systemic *tendencies to repetition*, to building on success, to re-using formulas that have worked in the past. These inertial forces of the world system ensure that new leaders resemble as closely as possible past leaders. On the other hand, there is another set of pressures for *grappling with new problems*. These mean that no matter how successful past solutions may have proved, new global problems call

for new kinds of leaders. Each of these tendencies will set up novel, and possibly conflicting, conditions for world leadership.

Tendencies to Repetition

The advantages of repetition are obvious: simplicity and cost-effectiveness. They are the reasons why all social systems lean toward inertia. In respect of leadership in the world system, this tendency may assume a number of forms: (a) repeat performance; (b) homology; (c) co-leadership; (d) elite cohesion; (e) spatial sequencing.

The most obvious instance of repetition is the *repeat performance*, and the classical and only case known so far is that of Britain's tenure of the role over two cycles. This 'encore', it needs to be remembered, was by no means a foregone conclusion; it had to be earned by leadership in global war, and by a refashioning of the economy and the launching of the Industrial Revolution. But it worked, and the repetition factor may have spared the world some greater traumas. Britain was in a better position to embark on such ambitious projects because of the experience gained in the earlier cycle. The second round is justified substantively because the qualifications originally met in one cycle are unlikely to be so very different in the following one. Although only one case is on record so far, a repeat performance (but one that would have to be 'earned' too) is an entirely plausible scenario for the next cycle.

Homology is defined as a 'similarity attributable to common origin' (as distinct from analogy which refers to 'resemblance between things otherwise unrelated'). In other words, the resemblance so far demonstrated between past world leaders, which distinguishes them from the challengers, is not just a matter of a number of analogous features found in all of them, but is, in part, a matter of homology, that is, of common origin. Quite obviously, one reason why the United States to some extent resembles Britain is that the United States originated in the British colonial system and has retained significant similarities in the political and party systems, in the maritime, economic, and cultural fields. Similar considerations hold for the English–Dutch relationship, as well as the Dutch–Portuguese connection (via Burgundy). The implication of all this is that the next world power will likely have a homologous relation to some or all of the preceding ones.

Next is the phenomenon of *co-leadership*. Three cases are

important in this regard: the Portuguese–Spanish case (the Burgundian connection), the Anglo–Dutch alliance, and the special relationship between Britain and the United States. In each of these cases, and for a certain time, world leadership was in effect shared with another power in a core alliance. That power, in turn, was well positioned to attempt a move to world leadership. For instance, Britain accorded a special status to the United States as early as 1900, a development that led, during the Second World War, among other things, to sharing in the production of the nuclear weapon, and to the Quebec agreement of August 1943 whereby the two powers agreed, among other things, not to 'use it against third parties without each other's consent'. Those entering or enjoying a special relationship with the United States would obviously be more likely – other things being equal – to improve their chances for leadership in a future cycle.

Noteworthy, too, is the fact that matters of *elite cohesion* may have played a significant part in leadership arrangements. Over the period of the last four cycles the prevailing elite complexion of the world powers has been Protestant, more specifically tending toward the Calvinist variant of Protestantism. This has *not* been a question of global ideology, but rather of linkages at the elite level – for instance, helping to mediate and to ease in personal relations: say, the transfer of power between the Netherlands and Britain (William and Mary), or Britain and the United States (Churchill and Roosevelt). One wonders whether this kind of linkage retains its strength, how it might be changing, and what inertial effect it might have in the next cycle.

Lastly, *spatial sequencing* is a concept suggesting that the succession of world leaders over the past millenium traces a fairly regular and progressive path in earth space. Starting in the Northern Mediterranean (Genoa, Venice), it moved first to an Atlantic-oceanic base closest to that sea (Portugal), then, following the Western European coastal route, it went north to the Netherlands from which it was only a short step across the North Sea to London. The Industrial Revolution shifted the centre of gravity to Northern England, to Manchester and Liverpool. Next, the Atlantic ocean was crossed and the North East United States became the centre of affairs. At present, the directional arrow of that movement points south to the Sunbelt and west toward the Pacific Rim. A sudden deviation from this path, an unexpected zig-zag, seems unlikely on past record.

Pressures from New Problems

Social systems not only have the tendency to perpetuate themselves, they also face changes in their environment and they need to change. That goes for the world system too.

A most obvious pressure for change has come from population growth. As already shown, in the late twentieth century the world system is some ten times as populous (close to five billion) as it was in 1500 (425 million). It is also significantly more productive as well as much more interdependent (world trade having expanded by a factor in excess of 100). Its leadership tasks might also be expected to be more onerous in the twenty-first century than they were in the sixteenth.

The progressive institutionalisation of the role of world leadership that took place over the past half-millenium means that each successive world power has been stronger, wealthier, and generally better equipped for global reach than its immediate predecessor. Each successive world power has, in fact, accounted for an increasing share of the world population; whereas in 1500 there were 340 world inhabitants for each Portuguese, in 1950 there were fewer than 20 world inhabitants for each American. In other words, as global problems have increased, so has the capacity of the lead units to deal with them, possibly at a similar or even higher rate. In the future, too, the world powers could be expected to be those most capable of meeting the world's problems.

On these grounds, future world leadership might be anticipated (a) to demonstrate rising capacities for dealing with global problems, (b) to display a capacity to respond specifically to the changing requirements of the age, and possibly (c) to undergo structural change in reacting to such problems.

The *rising resource capacity* of world powers is well documented in the record and shows up clearly in metropolitan populations figures (that might be regarded as the simplest index or proxy of capacity; Table 2.5). The United States fully assumed the role of world power when moving toward a population of 200 million. A similar trend may also be observed in respect of territorial base, from the tiny resources of the early powers to the continent-sized dominions of the United States. Past experience suggests that the next world power will be unlikely to have a population-resource base that is smaller than that of the United States at present.

More crucial, even, because qualitative rather than quantitative,

is the question of *readiness to respond to the problems of the age.* This phrase is used, of course, not in a vague and general sense, but in a specific mode indicated by the analysis in Chapter 5 that viewed the long cycle as a learning process and the global system as moving regularly through a sequence of phases defined by the functional requirements of that system. In each such major period (that is, in phase with the long cycle) a major global problem may be said to define the rules, the players and the stakes of a 'meta-game': past stakes of such games have included 'discovery', 'religion', 'constitutional politics', 'industrial revolution' and, most recently, 'education and science'.

This analysis also suggests that for the coming cycle the dominant problem may be defined as one of 'integration': an effort, possibly indispensable for survival, to strengthen the bonds of solidarity at the global level. A world-wide community of democracies could be one result of such an effort. Closely linked with it and preliminary to it is the necessity to invent a substitute for global war, that is, to transform the global-war phase of the long cycle into a non-lethal political equivalent. This necessity arises because a global thermonuclear war can no longer be considered a rational way of 'working' world politics. This fact being evidently and urgently in the general interest, it can also serve as the basis of new structures of solidarity. Those who will lead in solving these two intertwined problems are likely to be among the world leaders of tomorrow.

The operative assumption, so far, has been that the global system will retain in the next cycle the role of world leadership largely in the form it has had over the past five cycles, and that the only relevant question remains, Who – that is, which country – will be called upon to fill that role? But there is also the possibility that the single-country world leadership role might change. In particular, should a substitute be found for global war as the mechanism of systemic decision for the long cycle, the emphasis on strategic-security issues now dominating world politics would likely be reduced (though hardly eliminated). Characteristics such as insularity, or even economic power, as basis for strategies of global reach might have some of their significance diminished. It is unlikely, however, that the importance of politics, in the pure sense of an enterprise for concerting and co-ordinating social action, will decline.

Along these lines, one conceivable development could be *the differentiation of a so-far-undifferentiated role of world leadership* into several more specialised components, with different countries

devoting themselves to different functional areas, aspects of economic or cultural leadership, and elements of the strategic–political spectrum. Such an arrangement would, however, give rise to new and possibly quite difficult problems of co-ordination.

An alternative, and possibly more interesting, development might take the form of new kinds of *coalition building*. Whereas the experience of world leadership to date refers only to single countries, in the future that role could be explicitly shared by a coalition. States exploring the federal design have been prominent and successful in the record of world powers. The Netherlands were a union of 'states'; Britain was built on a union of England, Wales and Scotland (and an abortive arrangement with Ireland); and the United States is a fully fledged federal polity. The phenomenon of co-leadership has been important, as well as that of core alliances – crucial to global wars, all of which have been coalition wars. A further elaboration of such collaborative principles is not to be excluded from conceptions of the future. Inventing new forms of co-operation has been a hallmark of world leadership, and such novel arrangements are required particularly urgently in respect of nuclear weapons. These might well prove to be the most promising avenues of contemporary political innovation.

The current phase of the political learning cycle is clarification, and the next one is one of coalitioning. Now is the time to clarify the agenda for the next round of macropolitics, an agenda in relation to which contending coalitions might take up their positions in the coming decades.

One important conclusion of this study must be that it takes more than meets the eye to 'run' for world leadership. The conditions that need to be satisfied are as complex as the role is onerous. Many compete for it but only a few, one at a time, have been selected so far. The evidence and the analytical guidelines here brought together are no more than a framework for thinking ahead. But future policies will be more successful, and investments yield better return, if directed to projects that take account of this analysis.

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Index

anacyclosis 58–60
Anglo-American alliance 90–1, 114, 230
Anglo-Dutch alliances 79, 82, 169, 171, 172, 230
Anglo-German alliance 91
Anglo-Japanese alliance 218
Armada 78, 227
Arnold, Matthew 89
Arrow, Kenneth 178–9
Ashby, Ross 32
Austria 11, 52

Bach, Robert L. 194
Bacon, Francis 53
balance of power 32–3, 51–3, 60–1, 68, 82, 84, 87
Bales, Robert F. 99, 104–9, 121, 135, 136, 203, 204
Barbaro, Francesco 51
Beck, P. A. 117
Bibbee, Richard 106, 116–17, 120
Bolingbroke, Viscount 51, 83
Bousquet, Nicole 41
Braudel, Fernand 62, 75, 85, 181
Brazil 11, 69, 78
Brodie, Bernard 53
Burgundy 71, 75, 77, 206, 230
Burke, Edmund 83
Butterfielf, Herbert 52

Calvin, John 185
Calvinist International 184–8
Cambrai, League of (1508) 73
Caporaso, James 195
Cardozo, F. H. 195
Carr, Edward H. 157
Carswell, John 82
challenger 10–11, 12, 18, 39–40, 225–7; and party systems 180–4
Charles VIII, Italian campaign (1494–5) 46, 68–9
Chase-Dunn, Christopher 41, 212
Chatterjee, Partha 52
China 11, 22, 24, 70, 95, 162–3, 200
clarification (phase of) 66–7, 85, 96, 123, 223
coalitioning (phase of) 66–7, 85, 91, 96, 123, 223
Cohen, Stephen B. 109, 136
co-leadership 229–30
Colomb, John 53
Commynes, Philippe de 70
Comte, Auguste 56
Cottle, Thomas J. 109

Davenant, Charles 52
deconcentration (phase of) 31, 40, 66, 118–20, 122, 216
deconcentration (process) 205
Dehio, Ludwig 52, 60, 68, 82
delegitimation (phase of) 31, 40, 66, 88, 118–20, 122
dependency 194ff
dependency reversal 203–13
Deutsch, Karl 32, 104
differentiation: vertical 8, 23–6, 110–11; horizontal 8, 26–8; through time 29–30; of leadership role 232–3
Diffie, B. W. 69, 72, 168
Dujin, J. J. van 61
Durkheim, Emile 56
Dutch-English trade wars 81
Dutch-Spanish wars (1580–1609) 40, 44, 46, 47, 77–8, 96, 102, 169
Dutch war (1672–8) 45, 81, 171

Easton, David 2
Effrat, Andrew 104, 108
Ehrenberg, Victor 17
Elliot, J. H. 181

feedback 29, 32–3; positive (developmental) 34–5; negative (regulatory) 32–3
Ferrari, Giuseppe 63
Fischer, Fritz 184
Fitzgerald, C. P. 162
France 10, 11, 33, 40, 44–6, 52, 71, 76, 82, 85, 88–91, 100, 145–50, 164, 181–8, 226–7
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (1792–1815) 40, 44, 47, 85, 96, 100–2, 174

Galbraith, John K. 151
Galileo, Galilei 2
Gallagher, John 86
Galtung, Johan 195
Gardiner, Patrick 54
Gelderen, J. van 61
generational change 31, 35, 62–3, 115–17
Germany 10, 11, 33, 39, 40–6, 88–90, 123–4, 146–50, 164, 182, 184, 189, 226–7
Geyl, Pieter 171
Gilpin, Robert 41, 58, 205
global community 9, 111
global economy 8, 111
global pattern-maintenance 8, 111
global political system (polity) 3, 7–9, 110–12, 129; components 12; leadership in 12–18; emergence 18–29
global powers 9–12, 43; in global wars 44; as nation-states 147
global problems 111, 131, 222
global system 25–6, 53, 111, 120
global system process 129–135, 232
global war (phase of) 30–1, 36, 40, 66, 77, 82, 91, 100–3, 118–20, 122, 152, 199, 232; as systemic decision 35–7; characteristics 43–6; lethality 46–7
Goldman, Ralph M. 165
Great Britain 10, 11, 15, 35, 39–44, 46, 48–53, 71, 76, 80, 87–91, 95–6, 100, 121, 123, 128, 130–3, 145–50, 165–6, 172–5, 177, 185–9, 201–2, 207, 211–12, 229, 231, 233
Great Powers 12
Grey, Ivan 148
Grotius, Hugo 211

Ha, Young-sun 205
Hare, Paul A. 109
Harlow, Vincent 86
Heeren, Ahl 68
hegemony 17–18, 41
Herodotus 53
Herz, John 157
Hobbes, Thomas 83
homology 180, 229
Huguenots 76, 79, 184–7
Hume, David 83

implementation (phase of) 66–7, 123
India 11, 22, 24, 43, 69, 70
Industrial Revolution 74, 85–6, 130–2, 134, 189
Italian and Indian Ocean wars (1494–1516) 40, 44, 46–7, 73, 102, 152
Italy 33, 68–9, 75, 95, 123, 161

Japan 33, 91, 123, 164, 147, 150, 183–4, 200, 217–19
Jones, Richard 21, 49

Kaplan, Abraham 36
Kaplan, Morton 2, 32
knowledge revolution 92–3, 131–2, 133, 232
Koenigsberger, H. G. 186
Kondratieff, N. 61
Kondratieff wave 61–2, 198
Kutter, Peter 109

Lach, Donald 226
Lane, C. 187
Lasswell, Harold 36
Laszlo, Ervin 12, 28
leadership 12–18; selection 36–7, 227–8
Lean, Tangye E. 174, 192
Levy, Jack 46, 47
LIGA sequence 108, 122–5, 133, in global system 130–2
Linschoten, J., van 77
Lippmann, Walter 120, 157
Locke, John 83
Long cycles 29–36, 93–4, defined 7–8; periodic table 39–40; narrated 69–93; origins 68–9, 94–6; and learning 96–7, 99ff; as Parsonian learning process 118–29

Macauley, Lord 173
McEvedy, Colin 21, 49
Machiavelli, Niccolo 59
McNeill, William 68, 95
macrodecision (phase of) 66–7, 96, 123
Mahan, Alfred 53, 54, 153
Mansfield, Harvey 173
Marques, A. H. de Oliveira 166
Martins, Oliveira 167
Marx, Karl 56, 189
Mattingly, Garret 51
Meinecke, F. 158
Mitchell, William 13, 104
Miyakawa, Hisayuki 163

Modelski, George 10, 24, 25, 41, 42, 81, 103, 150, 155, 191, 210, 212
modern world system 3, 8, 19–20, 21–2
Moll, Kendall 153
Morocco 71, 72, 75
Motley, James 169, 170

Namenwirth, Zvi 106, 116–17, 120
national systems 24–5; and local systems 25
Needham, Joseph 161
Netherlands 10, 11–14, 35, 39–44, 71, 74–80, 89, 95–6, 128, 131, 145–50, 165, 168, 185–8, 202, 206–7, 221–5, 233
nuclear weapons 93, 225, 230, 233

Oppenheimer, Robert J. 93
Orton, Keith 212
Ottoman Empire 11

Paine, Thomas 211–12
Parker, Geoffrey 79, 170, 183, 185, 187
Parsons, Talcott 2, 8, 13, 20, 57, 99, 104–9, 120, 121–2, 123, 131, 132–4, 203, 204
party systems 161ff; in ancient Greece 161; in Renaissance Italy 161–2; China 162–3; Portugal 166–8; Netherlands 168–72; Britain 172–5; United States 175–7; world powers 177–9; challengers 179–84
Pax Britannica 14
Perroux, François 153, 194
phase movement 30, 99–100, Parsonian 104–9; conditions for 110–18; and generations 31, 115–17; directionality 121–5, 128
phases (of the long cycle) 215; ascending/descending 157–9; internal/external 96–7, 117
Plato 59
Plutarch 161
Polybius 1, 53, 59–60
Popper, Karl 54
Portugal 10, 11, 15, 27, 39–49, 69–75, 77, 81, 95–6, 128, 131, 133, 144–50, 165, 166–8, 179, 202, 221–5
Portuguese-Spanish war (1383–1411) 146, 147, 166
Presidential election cycles 29
Prussia 33, 89, 186

Rasler, Karen 101
regional powers 11, 45
regional systems 52–3
repeat performance 229
Rhodes, Cecil 90–1
Robertson, Roland 110
Robinson, Ronald 86
Rogers, Everett M. 204
Rogers, Francis M. 167
Rokkan, Stein 156
Roorda, D. J. 172
Rosecrance, Richard 32
Rostow, W. W. 61
Rowen, Henry H. 81, 171–2
Russett, Bruce 195

Sansom, G. B. 147
Sartori, G. 177, 179, 182
sea power 53–4, 225; distributions 41–2; command of the sea 82, 84, 87, 153
Seven Years' War (1756–63) 45, 46, 84, 96
Shils, Edward 99, 104, 109, 121, 135, 203
Shumpeter, Joseph 61
Smith, Adam 56, 86, 212
Soviet Union/Russia 10, 11, 33, 40, 44, 88–9, 91, 146–50, 164, 182–4, 189, 226–7
Spain 10, 11, 33, 40, 44–5, 75–6, 133, 146–150, 158, 164, 168–9, 181, 183–4, 226–7
spatial sequencing 207, 230
Spencer, Herbert 56
Sundquist, James L. 176
Sunkel, Oswaldo 201
Synod of Dort (1618–19) 79, 170, 172

Thirty Years' War (1618–48) 45, 81
Thompson, William R. 10, 41, 42, 53, 58, 101, 103, 195
Thucydides 1, 53, 59, 161
Tilly, Charles 146
Tordesillas, Treaty of (1494) 25, 69, 74
Toynbee, Arnold 28, 43–44, 55–6, 60–1, 62, 115–16, 117
Trevelyan, G. M. 172, 174
Trompf, G. W. 58, 60
Tuckman, Bruce P. 109

United States of America 8, 10–1, 22, 29, 33, 39, 40, 42, 53, 84, 88–93, 96, 121, 123–4, 128, 131, 136,

145–50, 165, 175–7, 179, 202, 205–6, 212, 217, 221–5, 229, 231–3

Vattel, Emmerich de 51
Venice 49, 51, 56, 70–1, 94–5, 144, 152, 161
Vogel, Ezra 217

Waley, David 161
Wallerstein, Immanuel 17, 41, 57, 68, 195
War of American Independence (1776–1783) 84, 175
War of Austrian Succession (1740–8) 45, 46, 84
Wars of Louis XIX (1688–1713) 40, 44, 47, 82, 102, 173
war-peace cycle 28, 60–1, 115–16
Watt, D. C. 63
Weber, Max 56
Weber, Robert P. 108, 120
Westphalia, Peace of (1648) 79
Wilson, Charles 169, 186
Winius, G. D. 69, 72, 168
world power (phase of) 31, 40, 66, 73, 118–20, 122
world powers 40–2, and nation-states 145–6; and party systems 164–6, 177–180
world system 20–3
World Wars I & II (1914–45) 1, 11, 40, 44, 47, 91, 96, 102, 124, 190
Wolf, J. B. 181
Wright, Quincy 1, 43, 52

Zorzi, Alvise 73